2012/6/27 Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) :
> Regarding the addressing, why not use directly the .onion address?
The bitcoin p2p protocol is a binary protocol with packets of fixed
size and structure, the packets that broadcast the addresses of other
known nodes to its connected peers can only contain n
2012/6/27 Maxim Kammerer :
> I hope not — there is no reason to replicate the misguided packaging
> design of Tor project's various “bundles” elsewhere.
The reason for such bundles is to be user friendly. To make an
application that will be accepted by ordinary end users it is
absolutely essentia
2012/6/27 Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) :
> Bernd, have you saw the proposed tips on using Tor's GSoc APAF for your
> TorChat buildsystem ? https://github.com/prof7bit/TorChat/issues/16
I have seen it, I need more time to read about it and learn what APAF
actually is and how the final p
2012/6/27 Maxim Kammerer :
> but that requires some
> foresight
It needs help from the Tor devs. For example Is there a fixed ftp or
http address where I can always get the latest stable tor.exe (only
the naked .exe file without installer)?
> and competence.
Please show us the code of *your* co
2012/9/26 :
>>> After implementing the torchat protocol and seeing how bad it
>>> is, but how nice the idea is
What is bad about the torchat protocol? Is it its pragmatism and the
fact that it does not use xml and other bloat?
___
tor-talk mailing list
2012/9/26 meh. :
> It's not pragmatist at all, it wastes time and resources doing
> replaces when it could have just been really binary and prepend the
> length of the packet, which is the sane way to do something like that
> instead of using an end of packet separator.
No, these few string repla
2012/10/20 SiNA Rabbani :
> I am not sure why you would want to do that, but if I understand the
> question... you can add your .onion hostname with your local IP to
> /etc/hosts. That way the .onion would resolve to your local IP.
No. If this worked then there would be a serious flaw in his
confi
2013/1/7 Outlaw :
> Hi! I wonder, is there a way for some malicious node (or someone except
> client and hidden server) to spy upon path part or GET request of .onion
> service? I mean "path/to/somewhere.html" part in
> http://somelonghashstring.onion/path/to/somewhere.html url, not
> physical loca
2013/1/9 Alexandre Guillioud :
> Or malicious code on the last node :)
That would be the server hosting the hidden service. But the server of
some Website you visit and what it does with your requests is beyond
your control anyways (if it not your own server).
just out of curiosity because I am using hidden services
myself (TorChat) and I wonder generally how much usage is made of the
hidden service feature roughly (hundreds, thousands, ten-thousands?).
Bernd
___
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk
n service server then
all the clients will be unable to connect for up to 15 minutes and I
suspect there still exists a bug that makes some clients totally
unable to ever connect the restarted HS again until the client itself
is restarted¹.
Bernd
__
¹) I have observed this strange behavior with TorC
my
> risks, since each reintroduction tells three more organizations the real IP
> of my hidden service, yes ?
No. Nobody knows the IP address of your service because you only
connect via 3 tor hops to the Introducton points (and to the
rendezvouz points),
12 matches
Mail list logo
