Hi
First of all, I'm writing this for Linux as I don't know IIS and I've
never used apache on Windows. Use any Linux distro that you want listed
below. I do not recommend Tails as it is not meant for web servers.
OK, so there are two parts. 1. Set up tor. 2. set up your web server.
Part 1: Inst
On 09/26/2017 10:21 AM, Muppet96 wrote:
> Hi,
>
> today my colleague told me that he would like to start to write some kind of
> blog and publish it in the tor network. Because I`m not use to say people
> that I`m using TOR Network, I answered that I simply do not know how its
> working and who
Hello Tor community,
The OONI team is super excited to announce OONI Run!
OONI Run is a new OONI Probe mobile app feature linked to this site:
https://run.ooni.io/
Through this site, you can:
* Engage your friends (and the world) with censorship measurement tests!
* Monitor the blocking of
Hi Maria,
I also posted this question as a comment on the blog post, but I was
wondering if OONI encounters adversarial activity from censors who
try to either locate and shut down OONI nodes, or return different
information to OONI nodes than to other Internet users. If so, the
OONI Run feature
Hi Seth,
When you click on a link with OONI Run the user is presented with a page that
shows them the list of URLs (if the test is web_connectivity) that they are
about to test.
If a malicious URL is included in such list, the user will be able to avoid
running it by simply clicking the X butto
Arturo Filastò writes:
> That said, something to keep in mind, is that OONI Probe is not a privacy
> tool, but rather a tool for investigations and as such poses some risks (as
> we explain inside of our informed consent procedure).
>
> We are not aware of any OONI Probe users having gotten int
Hello.
How can I sure a Tor node that I connected to it is secure and is not a NSA or
CIA node?
Thank you.
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Jason Long:
> Hello.
> How can I sure a Tor node that I connected to it is secure and is not a NSA
> or CIA node?
You can't ensure that none of the Tor nodes in a particular three-node
circuit aren't run by some three-letter government agency.
There are regular checks about expired versions of
If you're able and willing to drive Ubuntu, I've tried to document a
reasonable means to set up an Onion-only server here:
https://github.com/alecmuffett/the-onion-diaries/blob/master/basic-production-onion-server.md
- which sets you up with up-to 4x onion addresses, and with them you get 4x
dist
On Wed, Sep 27, 2017 at 3:04 PM, Jason Long wrote:
> How can I sure a Tor node that I connected to it is secure and is not a NSA
> or CIA node?
Go meet the operator and conduct an anal probe on them
far more intensive and long running than an SF-86 SSBI.
Parallel to that, go image the node, try
grarpamp :
> On Wed, Sep 27, 2017 at 3:04 PM, Jason Long wrote:
>> How can I sure a Tor node that I connected to it is secure and is not a NSA
>> or CIA node?
> Go meet the operator and conduct an anal probe on them
Ouch ! Please NO !
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George:
> There are regular checks about expired versions of Tor
Can you elaborate on that?
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nusenu:
>
>
> George:
>> There are regular checks about expired versions of Tor
>
> Can you elaborate on that?
As per this thread about Atlas reporting:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2017-August/012715.html
Although I'm not aware of any active notifications about versions.
George:
> nusenu:
>>
>>
>> George:
>>> There are regular checks about expired versions of Tor
>>
>> Can you elaborate on that?
>
> As per this thread about Atlas reporting:
>
> https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2017-August/012715.html
>
> Although I'm not aware of any active no
George writes:
> But ultimately, Tor's topography mitigates against one of the three
> nodes in your circuit being compromised. If the first hop is
> compromised, then they only know who you are, but not where your
> destination is. If the last hop is compromised, they only know where
> you're goi
On Wed, Sep 27, 2017 at 5:03 PM, Petrusko wrote:
> Ouch ! Please NO !
Well it is perhaps possible to avoid that to you, by this user
completely sequestering the node from you operator access,
other than to allow you operator payment to hosting account.
User must still then investigate the HW
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