On 9/6/13, Carsten N. wrote:
> An analysis of Truecrypt was done by the Privacy-CD team:
>
> en: https://www.privacy-cd.org/downloads/truecrypt_7.0a-analysis-en.pdf
> de: https://www.privacy-cd.org/downloads/truecrypt_7.0a-analysis-de.pdf
Just taking a moment to thank anyone reviewing the code
of
Hi,
Tor switches over to ECC what's a reasonable step.
I'm unable to find the blog post (or maybe it was an official comment on
the blog) [With DDG and StartPage] where someone said that if the NIST
(I guess) is not lying ECC is safe.
Is the ECC used by Tor in some way certified by NIST?
Are ot
On 13-09-06 10:26 PM, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> Over the 0.2.5 series, I want to move even more things (including
> hidden services) to curve25519 and its allies for public key crypto.
> I also want to add more hard-to-implement-wrong protocols to our mix:
> Salsa20 is looking like a much better choi
You can check the source code. No back doors. Plus people at the FBI have
used it for anonymity...
Sent from my Android so do not expect a fast, long, or perfect response...
On Sep 6, 2013 8:14 PM,
wrote:
>
> http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/06/the-feds-pays-for-60-perce
On Friday, September 06, 2013 10:28:22 PM Nick Mathewson wrote:
>
> Yup. Please upgrade, people. 0.2.4 is looking pretty good right now,
> and I'd recommend it strongly over 0.2.3 or a variety of reasons, not
> limited to this.
Would love to but yum only finds 0.2.3 as far as I understand =(
On Sat, Sep 7, 2013 at 5:25 AM, Sebastian G.
wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Tor switches over to ECC what's a reasonable step.
>
> I'm unable to find the blog post (or maybe it was an official comment on
> the blog) [With DDG and StartPage] where someone said that if the NIST
> (I guess) is not lying ECC is sa
On Sat, Sep 7, 2013 at 12:44 PM, Martin Skjöldebrand
wrote:
> On Friday, September 06, 2013 10:28:22 PM Nick Mathewson wrote:
>
>>
>> Yup. Please upgrade, people. 0.2.4 is looking pretty good right now,
>> and I'd recommend it strongly over 0.2.3 or a variety of reasons, not
>> limited to this.
>From Nathan Suchy, September 07, 2013 4:20 PM UTC:
> You can check the source code. No back doors. Plus people at the FBI have
> used it for anonymity...
A back door is not always easy to spot. Especially for people who are not
experts in all the technologies involved. And Tor, and the tech
On 2013-09-07 19:03, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> On Sat, Sep 7, 2013 at 12:44 PM, Martin Skjöldebrand
> wrote:
>> On Friday, September 06, 2013 10:28:22 PM Nick Mathewson wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Yup. Please upgrade, people. 0.2.4 is looking pretty good right now,
>>> and I'd recommend it strongly over 0.2
On Sat, Sep 7, 2013 at 12:02 PM, krishna e bera wrote:
One note about that Schneier essay. On his website[1], he says:
"EDITED TO ADD: That was written before I could talk about this.[2]"
[1] https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/the_nsas_crypto_1.html
[2] https://www.schneier.com/blo
On 13-09-07 01:20 PM, Asa Rossoff wrote:
> Trust is involved. Speaking of which, do we have bios of all Tor
> contributors, esp. those that authorize code changes and those that compile
> code? Do we have public ongoing accounting of who gets paid how much and
> for what?
Why would we need perso
I presume they mean the OpenPGP standard tools, and its not
surprising. Many of the people who posed a threat to the British and
US states have said they used it, from the IRA to the 6/7 bombers (in
London), so its only to be assumed that the top cryptographic
departments of the military would fin
On 2013-09-07 10:02, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> The elephant in the room here is TLS itself. Frankly, I'm starting to
> think we should cut the Gordian Knot here and start a little
> independent protocol group of our own if the TLS working group can't
> get its act together and have one really good c
07.09.2013 19:02, Nick Mathewson:
Do not dare to reply again before your weekend is over. Probably don't
even read it.
> On Sat, Sep 7, 2013 at 5:25 AM, Sebastian G.
> wrote:
>>
>> Tor switches over to ECC what's a reasonable step.
>>
>> I'm unable to find the blog post (or maybe it was an offi
07.09.2013 19:41, Nick Mathewson:
No need to worry, no lengthy content, just adding links.
> On Sat, Sep 7, 2013 at 12:02 PM, krishna e bera wrote:
> I want to fix all that in 0.2.5 -- see proposal 220 [3], and George
> Kadianakis's draft hidden service improvements, and so forth. I'd
> like to
"inserted secret "back doors" into software with the help of technology
companies" AS LONG THERE'S A BACKDOOR INSTALLED IN THE PROGRAM. Without the
backdoor, NSA can't do shit.
On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 9:56 PM, wrote:
> It's not like I blew off my chair in surprise:
>
> "U.S. and British intellig
Bruce Schneier recommends *not* to use ECC. It is safe to assume he
knows what he says.
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At 11:08 PM 9/7/2013 +, you wrote:
>Bruce Schneier recommends *not* to use ECC. It is safe to assume he
>knows what he says.
But, but, isn't Schneier a crazy conspiracy theorist?
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-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
hello is this normal i upgraded my to the latest release client that i
could find in the directory after reading your your form post please
look at the guard notice it looks odd suspecting a virus i lounged my
forensics tools and did a scan including
It appears that estimated Tor users using the new approach (beta) is
plateauing at about 5.3 million. But the estimate using the standard
approach is still spiking, albeit perhaps more gradually.
What might that mean?
Also, I don't see any increase in relay count. Given the circumstances,
that's
On Sat, Sep 7, 2013 at 4:08 PM, anonymous coward
wrote:
> Bruce Schneier recommends *not* to use ECC. It is safe to assume he
> knows what he says.
I believe Schneier was being careless there. The ECC parameter sets
commonly used on the internet (the NIST P-xxxr ones) were chosen using
a publish
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