Thus spake Seth David Schoen (sch...@eff.org):
> Alex M (Coyo) writes:
>
> > It concerns me that you [Mike Perry] refer to "we" as though you
> > contribute anything to the tor project.
>
> https://gitweb.torproject.org/
> https://www.torproject.org/torbutton/en/design/index.html.en
> https://ww
On 04/13/2013 01:29 AM, Mike Perry wrote:
Thus spake Alex M (Coyo) (c...@darkdna.net):
On 04/13/2013 12:13 AM, Mike Perry wrote:
If you have a specific list of design flaws that aren't couched in
long rants, we can perhaps help instruct you on how you might
solve them in your redesign with Mr
On 04/13/2013 01:45 AM, Seth David Schoen wrote:
Alex M (Coyo) writes:
It concerns me that you [Mike Perry] refer to "we" as though you
contribute anything to the tor project.
https://gitweb.torproject.org/
https://www.torproject.org/torbutton/en/design/index.html.en
https://www.torproject.org
On 04/13/2013 01:54 AM, Griffin Boyce wrote:
Alex M (Coyo) wrote:
>I must have somehow missed it.
>
>I would really appreciate a link. I cannot seem to find it on my own.
>
>Thank you in advance.
Here are the common ways: roll a bunch of bridges using Amazon's cloud
[1], have friends/allies
OnionCat? Anything more extreme than that is going to have be built from
the ground up.
On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 5:20 AM, Alex M (Coyo) wrote:
> On 04/13/2013 01:54 AM, Griffin Boyce wrote:
>
>> Alex M (Coyo) wrote:
>>
>> >I must have somehow missed it.
>>> >
>>> >I would really appreciate a l
On 13.04.2013 04:30, Alex M (Coyo) wrote:
> Is Tor ever going to include support for isolated, independent bridge
> relay communities that can host their own bridge directory authorities
I'm working on setting up (yet) another non-profit organization with
limited liability in Germany (gGmbH). Over
Alex M (Coyo):
> I have still not gotten a straight answer about whether or not the
> bridge community featureset has been released in the stable tor client.
It's all in there.
https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en
AlternateBridgeAuthority [nickname] [flags] address:port fingerprint
Alex M (Coyo):
> On 04/13/2013 12:13 AM, Mike Perry wrote:
>> Otherwise, thanks for your concern/veiled threats/trolling.
>
> Because obviously criticism and actual concern for the well-being of a
> foss project is always trolling and threats.
>
> I hope you aren't a contributor.
See https://www
Alex M (Coyo) wrote:
> On 04/13/2013 01:54 AM, Griffin Boyce wrote:
>>
>> Here are the common ways: roll a bunch of bridges using Amazon's cloud
>> [1], have friends/allies/interesting frenemies run bridges using Vidalia
>> [2], or just use a garden-variety VPN/proxy before entering the Tor
>>
Alex M (Coyo):
> On 04/12/2013 10:37 PM, adrelanos wrote:
>> Hi Alex,
>>
>> these are interesting thoughts. I wrote something related a while ago.
>>
>> Tor: lobbies vs lobbies - Who will prevail?:
>> https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-August/025109.html
>>
>> Alex M (Coyo):
>>> I
I think you're right.
On 04/13/2013 04:32 AM, Gregory Disney wrote:
OnionCat? Anything more extreme than that is going to have be built from
the ground up.
On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 5:20 AM, Alex M (Coyo) wrote:
On 04/13/2013 01:54 AM, Griffin Boyce wrote:
Alex M (Coyo) wrote:
>I must
On 04/13/2013 05:02 AM, Moritz Bartl wrote:
On 13.04.2013 04:30, Alex M (Coyo) wrote:
Is Tor ever going to include support for isolated, independent bridge
relay communities that can host their own bridge directory authorities
I'm working on setting up (yet) another non-profit organization with
On 04/13/2013 10:27 AM, adrelanos wrote:
Alex M (Coyo):
I have still not gotten a straight answer about whether or not the
bridge community featureset has been released in the stable tor client.
It's all in there.
https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en
AlternateBridgeAuthority [ni
On 04/13/2013 10:29 AM, adrelanos wrote:
Alex M (Coyo):
On 04/13/2013 12:13 AM, Mike Perry wrote:
Otherwise, thanks for your concern/veiled threats/trolling.
Because obviously criticism and actual concern for the well-being of a
foss project is always trolling and threats.
I hope you aren't a
On 04/13/2013 10:35 AM, Griffin Boyce wrote:
Alex M (Coyo) wrote:
On 04/13/2013 01:54 AM, Griffin Boyce wrote:
Here are the common ways: roll a bunch of bridges using Amazon's cloud
[1], have friends/allies/interesting frenemies run bridges using Vidalia
[2], or just use a garden-variety V
> I mean, most overlays out there are NOT for anonymity
Not for strong anonymity at least. Many are closes source windows blobs
and generally weighted towards filesharing and vague vpn privacy claims.
Those are definitely the ones to avoid. If you can't see and change the code
it's not worth one b
adrelanos wrote:
> Alex M (Coyo):
> > I have still not gotten a straight answer about whether or not the
> > bridge community featureset has been released in the stable tor client.
>
> It's all in there.
>
> https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en
>
> AlternateBridgeAuthority [nickname
>>> It concerns me that you [Mike Perry] refer to "we" as though you
>>> contribute anything to the tor project.
Mike does a good deal of fine work for the Tor project.
And I'm happy to see the torbrowser project come in place
with as part goal of working with Mozilla to finally upstream
fix FF fo
Alex M (Coyo):
> On 04/13/2013 10:29 AM, adrelanos wrote:
>> Alex M (Coyo):
>>> On 04/13/2013 12:13 AM, Mike Perry wrote:
Otherwise, thanks for your concern/veiled threats/trolling.
>>> Because obviously criticism and actual concern for the well-being of a
>>> foss project is always trolling a
On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 01:14:16PM -0400, grarpamp wrote:
> > Sure, i2P exists, but who wants to spin up a huge honking java virtual
> > machine just to participate in that relay pool?
>
> It's actually pretty easy and can run on modest hardware as a node.
I disagree about modest hardware. Anyth
Hi,
Quote from the path-specification (2.2)
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/path-spec.txt
"We do not choose any router in the same family as another in the same
path."
Made me think that if one declares family for the entire network except
his/her own nodes he would se
In a recent crypto.is post, Tom Ritter provides a clear explanation of
the traffic correlation attack that can be performed if the adversary
can see the first and last connections. (I know this is Tor 101, but he
has nice diagrams).
If I live in freedom-loving State (B) and want to view informatio
I'm killing this thread. It's long ago moved beyond any point of
usefulness for the tor-talk community.
Thanks for the understanding.
--
Andrew
http://tpo.is/contact
pgp 0x6B4D6475
___
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.t
On 13.04.2013 20:10, Sebastian G. wrote:
> Seems to explain it better; like I would expect it to work. Only if two
> relays declare family with each other they will be excluded from being
> in the same path.
Yes.
> I mean I assumed it would work in the way that "A" AND "B" declare
> family with
13.04.2013 06:39, Alex M (Coyo):
> On 04/12/2013 11:01 PM, adrelanos wrote:
>> Griffin Boyce:
>>> There's really nothing keeping you from making a private bridge network.
>>> The documentation's all there.
>> Indeed. One can even make its own (private) Tor network. It will require
>> a considerab
On Apr 13, 2013 2:19 PM, "hamahangi" wrote:
[...]
> So why is there no ExcludeEntryNodes option? It seems to have been
> present at some point as there's reference to it in old mirrors of the
> documentation and on the blog[0], and the helpdesk advised me that it
> was still there, but I've tried
#5903 and #6523. There seems to have been some fiddling with both but no
comments to speak of. Thanks for clearing up the reasoning behind your
decision.
Also a web search for "ExcludeEntryNodes" brought up a preparatory
commit you seem to have made earlier this year
[https://lists.torproject.org/
On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 6:01 PM, hamahangi wrote:
> #5903 and #6523. There seems to have been some fiddling with both but no
> comments to speak of. Thanks for clearing up the reasoning behind your
> decision.
Thanks; I've marked #5903 for 0.2.5 and closed #6523 as a duplicate.
That's not a commi
Nick Mathewson:
>
> I think that's actually a false dichotomy, and an interesting one. In
> order to help users get security, an option needs to work in a way
> that they they expect. Otherwise, when they try to avoid using nodes
> in one way, and they wind up telling Tor to do something else
> e
Thus spake grarpamp (grarp...@gmail.com):
> >>> It concerns me that you [Mike Perry] refer to "we" as though you
> >>> contribute anything to the tor project.
>
> Mike does a good deal of fine work for the Tor project.
> And I'm happy to see the torbrowser project come in place
> with as part goa
Sebastian G. :
> (Fun part?)
Not a fun part for me. It's sad that these concern have been raised by
a troll (or someone who doesn't know how to behave). However, these
concerns are valid, and from my perspective, I can't understand why
they are easily dismissed.
> About assassinating (double ass)
Let's not dread on things out of our control; IMO we should use these
concerns to develop solutions then turn them into soultions that we can
implement. Obviously we can't develop around assassinations nor state
funded terrorism, but we can develop a solution for backdoors
and information leaks.
Hi Gregory!
Gregory Disney:
> Let's not dread on things out of our control; IMO we should use these
> concerns to develop solutions then turn them into soultions that we can
> implement. Obviously we can't develop around assassinations nor state
> funded terrorism, but we can develop a solution fo
On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 8:44 PM, adrelanos wrote:
> I assume you're the Gregory Disney who is also one builder of those
> Bitcoin deterministic builds? Since you're involved in Tor as well, I
> seems to me you could be a great help by providing some information
> about the Bitcoin build process.
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