In principle this is (as they write) very similar to earlier papers. The
major catch to their plan may be that if a hidden service already has
chosen its entry guards, and the "modified Tor nodes" are put out there
later - they ("malicious nodes") will therefore not be a part of the
path. But if t
intrigeri:
> Hi,
>
> adrelanos wrote (16 Oct 2012 18:28:19 GMT) :
>> Abel Luck:
>
>>> I need to do more research into what it would take to protect the
>>> localtime. For example, what are the consequences (technically and
>>> UX-wise) of changing the local timezone to, presumably, UTC?
>
>> UTC
On 19/10/2012 04:12, Lee Whitney wrote:
I was reading a paper on discovering hidden service locations, and couldn't
find any reason it shouldn't work in principle.
However being that I'm a Tor novice, I wanted ask here.
In a nutshell they propose throwing some modified Tor nodes out there that
adrelanos:
> Abel Luck:
>> adrelanos:
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> Is it Amnesic or can it be made Amnesic?
>>>
>>> Or in other words Can you be sure, that after deleting (or wiping)
>>> the torified AppVM no activity can not be reconstructed with local disk
>>> forensics? Could the torified AppVM be secure
Abel Luck:
> adrelanos:
>> Hi,
>>
>> Is it Amnesic or can it be made Amnesic?
>>
>> Or in other words Can you be sure, that after deleting (or wiping)
>> the torified AppVM no activity can not be reconstructed with local disk
>> forensics? Could the torified AppVM be securely wiped without any
adrelanos:
>> Future Work Integrate Vidalia
>
> About Vidalia again... I was quickly reading my dev ticket again (
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorBOX/Dev#SHELLSCRIPTSVidaliabydefaultGraphicalGatewayWAITINGFORVIDALIA0.3.x
> ), why it's not yet integrated into Whonix.
>
> S
Abel Luck:
> Abel Luck:
>> adrelanos:
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> Is it Amnesic or can it be made Amnesic?
>>>
>>> Or in other words Can you be sure, that after deleting (or wiping)
>>> the torified AppVM no activity can not be reconstructed with local disk
>>> forensics? Could the torified AppVM be secure
Abel Luck:
> adrelanos:
>>> Future Work Integrate Vidalia
>>
>> About Vidalia again... I was quickly reading my dev ticket again (
>> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorBOX/Dev#SHELLSCRIPTSVidaliabydefaultGraphicalGatewayWAITINGFORVIDALIA0.3.x
>> ), why it's not yet integrated in
Abel Luck:
> adrelanos:
>> Abel Luck:
>>> adrelanos:
Hi,
Is it Amnesic or can it be made Amnesic?
Or in other words Can you be sure, that after deleting (or wiping)
the torified AppVM no activity can not be reconstructed with local disk
forensics? Could the to
Abel Luck:
>>> Future Work Use local DNS cache to speedup queries (pdnsd)
>>
>> That could make users more fingerprintable.
>>
>>> Future Work Support arbitrary DNS queries
>>
>> That could make users more fingerprintable.
>>
>
> Yup, I'm aware. Really I've no plans to move forward here unti
On Fri, 19 Oct 2012 11:25:34 +, Anon Mus wrote:
...
> Within 24hrs of making that Tor hidden service live I could see, in my
> firewall logs, hundreds of repeated attempts trying to hack my server,
> directly from the internet, not via my hidden Tot service.
Welcome to the internet. Have an
Abel Luck:
> Moreover, wrt the New Identity button. With several client VMs, multiple
> apps using different SOCKSPorts, the behavior of New Identity is confusing.
> Does pushing it tear down and construct new circuits for
> everything? Only the TransPort? Only X?
Maybe the Tor develop
There are actually two possible explanations for what you saw:
1) Tor was compromised
2) Your IP was discovered
Maybe the test request you made logged your IP and then it could be
anywhere. Also as you know people are constantly scanning subnets for
servers.
I don't discount go
Thanks for your comment Lasse, that makes sense.
On 10/19/12 3:23 AM, "Lasse Øverlier" wrote:
>
>In principle this is (as they write) very similar to earlier papers. The
>major catch to their plan may be that if a hidden service already has
>chosen its entry guards, and the "modified Tor nodes"
My question is, if you NEVER requested the 1 web page in the first
place, would you have experienced the same attack? I mean if I were
looking for new live Tor services I would probably periodically just
roll through unknown IPs and check for a live node (or something) as one
layer of attack.
On Fri, Oct 19, 2012 at 11:25:34AM +0100, Anon Mus wrote:
> e.g. lets say a node is in a server in an IBM/US telecoms company based
> in France, then that server will almost certainly be routing ALL its
> traffic through the USA and back to itself (or another node in the same
> company) befo
After trying to think of privacy flaws in hidden service (which i still
don't like) I began to wonder
What happens if you have MULTIPLE servers with the same hidden service?
As in you have a small VPS which is getting busy and you'd like to share
the load with another VPS. Assuming they know about
adrelanos:
Future Work Optionally route TorVM traffic through Tor
>>>
>>> What is the motivation behind it?
>> There is no good reason I can think of yet, I'm just concerened a
>> user misunderstanding what a TorVM does (provides torified
>> networking to other AppVms), and opening firefox on
When trying to run Tor on Bluestacks (Android App Player for PC), I get "unable
to start Tor"... any idea??
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Can't you just use a load balancing proxy instead?
On Oct 19, 2012 2:55 PM, "Daniel Dennis"
wrote:
> After trying to think of privacy flaws in hidden service (which i still
> don't like) I began to wonder
>
> What happens if you have MULTIPLE servers with the same hidden service?
> As in you have
sy00963-...@yahoo.fr:
> When trying to run Tor on Bluestacks (Android App Player for PC), I get
> "unable to start Tor"... any idea??
This is a very esoteric problem. Bluestacks is Windows/Mac closed source
software and I don't see how privacy is one of their goals.
Even if you could get it to w
Daniel Dennis:
> After trying to think of privacy flaws in hidden service (which i still
> don't like) I began to wonder
>
> What happens if you have MULTIPLE servers with the same hidden service?
> As in you have a small VPS which is getting busy and you'd like to share
> the load with another VP
"sy00963-...@yahoo.fr" wrote:
>When trying to run Tor on Bluestacks (Android App Player for PC), I get
>"unable to start Tor"... any idea??
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>tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
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Due to many sexual illegal behavior, Korean government started to block sexual
video about under-18-old people(=underage video)
>
Nowadays, in south korea, they started to arrest people who download underage
video due to child-teen law(in Korean, 아청법) However, there is big problem. If
the title
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