There's an upcoming bar camp in Brussels (2012-09-14 - 2012-09-17) that
is relevant to our interests, but doesn't seem to be on the calendar yet:
http://www.freedomnotfear.org/
https://wiki.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/Freedom_Not_Fear_2012
It's likely to be attended by a fair number of non-technica
Here's my key transition message:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
I, anonym , have replaced my OpenPGP key:
Old key:
pub 1024D/D0E64958 2007-06-25
uid anonym
Fingerprint: A43A 06A5 C52F 59C2 7ABB B56F A7C1 2CC1 D0E6 4958
New key:
pub 4096R/10CC5BC7 2012-08-2
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Hash: SHA1
On 08/20/2012 08:49 AM, fakef...@tormail.org wrote:
> Good pointing at this. Gets much too less attention. You need much
> less wiretapping orders. Just one. Wiretap the internet exchange
> point and get any Tor user.
Those are all excellent points.
- Forwarded message from Bryce Lynch -
From: Bryce Lynch
Date: Tue, 21 Aug 2012 12:49:02 -0400
To: zs-...@googlegroups.com
Cc: doctrinez...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] End-to-end correlation for fun and profit
Reply-To: zs-...@googlegroups.com
On Mon, Aug 20, 2012 at 3:43 P
- Forwarded message from Bryce Lynch -
From: Bryce Lynch
Date: Tue, 21 Aug 2012 13:08:52 -0400
To: zs-...@googlegroups.com
Cc: doctrinez...@googlegroups.com
Subject: [ZS] Re: [tor-talk] End-to-end correlation for fun and profit
Reply-To: doctrinez...@googlegroups.com
On Tue, Aug 21, 201
On Tue, Aug 21, 2012 at 6:21 PM, The Doctor wrote:
> As I understand it, Tor nodes know IP addresses one up and one down in
> a circuit. I haven't read through the Tor codebase in a while (two or
> three years), so my question is this: Does Tor apply the same family
> avoidance check when picking
> Or they could get a blanket wiretapping order and catch them all at
> once. I've often wondered if it's worth running Tor routers on the
> EC2 for this reason.
Bridges make sense if EC2 has enough IP addresses and the censurer doesn't
ban the whole range.
Too many relays give too much power to
> - Forwarded message from Bryce Lynch -
>
> From: Bryce Lynch
> Date: Tue, 21 Aug 2012 13:08:52 -0400
> To: zs-...@googlegroups.com
> Cc: doctrinez...@googlegroups.com
> Subject: [ZS] Re: [tor-talk] End-to-end correlation for fun and profit
> Reply-To: doctrinez...@googlegroups.com
>
> O
Hey guys,
I succeeded to build a private tor network including some hidden services in it and every
tor-machine (ubuntu) is behind a different router (multiple networks) I have tried to
build my tor network as real as possible in our lab environment. Now I am monitoring the
network traffic bet
What is the plan if exit harassment is one day so strong that there are no
more exit server? Is that a realistic scenario?
As backup plan I suggest to keep the network and to concentrate on .onion.
Server with .onion obviously accept Tor traffic and don't harass Tor
servers.
Am I mistaken or isn'
Hi,
Once there are no exit servers any more (for which there is absolutely
no indication), the network of relays will still exist and Hidden
Services will still work. So your "backup plan" is already in position.
On 21.08.2012 20:16, fakef...@tormail.org wrote:
> What is the plan if exit harassme
On Tue, Aug 21, 2012 at 8:27 PM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
>> 10 11.50%
>
> So, in other words, you'd hav to have 10 Tor routers on the same
> network. That's like me having 10 Tor nodes on my home network and
> not setting the NodeFamily directive in torrc. Somebody playing games
> aside, I can see th
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On 08/21/2012 01:30 PM, Runa A. Sandvik wrote:
> From
> https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/path-spec.txt:
>
>
"We do not choose more than one router in a given /16 subnet (unless
> EnforceDistinctSubnets is 0)."
So, seeing as
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On 08/21/2012 02:57 PM, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
> No, it means that if you intercept traffic from 10 top-bandwidth
> Tor routers with some characteristics (Guard + Exit, basically) at
> what's probably the nearest hardware switch (seems true for the
> n
Original Message
> From: Bryce Lynch
>
> This claim sounds a little fishy to me, in this light.
I'm not surprised. Last week, the same guy kept asserting that Tor was mainly
used for nefarious purposes like buying drugs or illegal pornography, in
addition to claiming such wou
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I think karsten's graphs from #6443 fit also well to this thread:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6443
You might also be interested in this thread on tor-relays:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2012-July/001433.htm
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On 08/21/2012 04:13 PM, With Weather Eye Open wrote:
> I'm not surprised. Last week, the same guy kept asserting that Tor
> was mainly used for nefarious purposes like buying drugs or
> illegal pornography, in addition to claiming such would be "not
On Tue, Aug 21, 2012 at 09:09:32PM +0300, juha...@wippies.fi wrote:
> I succeeded to build a private tor network including some hidden
>services in it and every tor-machine (ubuntu) is behind a different
>router (multiple networks) I have tried to build my tor network as real
>as possible in our la
On Tue, Aug 21, 2012 at 10:33 PM, The Doctor wrote:
> That suggests that an attacker won't get nearly as much information with this
> attack as it seems.
No, you didn't understand the point of the attack.
> A valid point, I will concede.
Nothing written about /16 and /24 networks in this threa
On Tue, Aug 21, 2012 at 11:13 PM, With Weather Eye Open
wrote:
> I'm not surprised. Last week, the same guy kept asserting that Tor was mainly
> used for nefarious purposes like buying drugs or illegal pornography, in
> addition to claiming such would be "not difficult to prove." LOL!
1. Stop s
On Tue, Aug 21, 2012 at 11:25 PM, tagnaq wrote:
> I think karsten's graphs from #6443 fit also well to this thread:
Bingo — in the first graph in the ticket [1] you see that the
probability gets to ~80% when the number of nodes gets to 40. What
this graph doesn't show, however, is that many of th
On Mon, Aug 20, 2012 at 10:33:29AM +0300, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
> As you can see, sniffing just 25 Class-C networks (or 42 individual
> nodes) lets an adversary correlate ~25% of (non-.onion) circuits.
I think your numbers may not be right (there are a lot of other subtleties
to the calculation),
With Weather Eye Open:
> Original Message
>
>> From: Bryce Lynch
>>
>> This claim sounds a little fishy to me, in this light.
>
> I'm not surprised. Last week, the same guy kept asserting that Tor was mainly
> used for nefarious purposes like buying drugs or illegal pornograph
On Mon, 2012-08-20 at 10:33 +0300, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
> Hello gentlemen,
> [1] http://pastebin.com/hgtXMSyx
I ran this script on the current consensus. The full results (the
nodes-sniff-summary file) are below my signature. How did you compile
the country-codes to IPs list? That wasn't produce
On Wed, Aug 22, 2012 at 3:29 AM, Ted Smith wrote:
> I ran this script on the current consensus. The full results (the
> nodes-sniff-summary file) are below my signature. How did you compile
> the country-codes to IPs list? That wasn't produced by the script.
Manually, using WHOIS and traceroute.
Maxim Kammerer:
>> It's comforting that this approach yields quickly diminishing returns.
>> Going from 25 to 60 networks only gets you a 10% increase in networks
>> surveillance (if I'm reading the output correctly), and returns plateau
>> entirely at that point (I'm considering about two percent
Hello,
The stable version of Tor is currently 0.2.2.38-1 according to the website.
Does someone cares about the deb- and rpm repositories or are they deprecated?
The latest version in the repositories is mainly 0.2.2.35.
Or is there another reason (except the lack of time) why 0.2.2.35 is the
On Wed, 2012-08-22 at 04:42 +0300, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
> > Also, it's not immediately clear whether eavesdropping those
> networks
> > would actually get you strong enough correlation to accurately
> > de-anonymize users[1]. If our rodent(?) friend(s?) could comment on
> > this, I'd appreciate th
On Wed, Aug 22, 2012 at 2:11 AM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> I think your numbers may not be right (there are a lot of other subtleties
> to the calculation), but your point is still generally correct.
There are some subtleties, mainly the restriction on distinct families
in a circuit — you can acc
On Wed, 22 Aug 2012 04:42:35 +, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
...
> technologies (like Tor). So maybe you need them to be ?sophisticated?,
> after all, but my point was that you don't need something exceptional
> like involving state security agencies ? i.e., FBI + UK Police + DE
> Police + a couple of
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