Hello all,
I've been experimenting with protocols for solving the following
problem:
A small (N = 10 to 100), fixed group of participants would each like to
publish
a random, fixed length string to the other participants, without revealing
who the string came from (except that it cam
The system you describe is approximately a one-hop mix, with Tor layered in
front of the mix to prevent the mix (the leader in your design) from
learning who submitted which message. So the security against learning
group membership will reduce to the security of Tor; the security against
the lead
On 8/5/2012 4:56 PM, Joe Btfsplk wrote:
1st, this isn't a "GMX" thing, although their (canned, I believe)
replies to support questions, got me to wondering in a much broader
way - what are overall effects of any exit node IP address being on
even 3 or 4 blacklists out of ~ 75 blacklist sites?
On 8/5/12, Tomás Touceda wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On 8/4/12 4:54 PM, m...@tormail.org wrote:
>> Since the last version and continuing with the current version of Linux
>> TBB 32bit, there is an
>> extra line added to torrc on TBB reload, by Vidalia, with steps to
>> reproduce:
>>
>> * Directory:
>> ~/tor-
Hi, where can I download latest .apk for android platform? The ones
at links below don`t match those ones in google play, not even close :-\
https://www.torproject.org/docs/android.html.en
https://guardianproject.info/apps/orweb/
https://guardianproject.info/apps/orbot/
https://github.com/guardian
Please send me a simple example in Ruby.
How I can read from onion adress.
connect to ypr7i2smxhcjalla.onion
socker.write("string")
and get ansver.
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Hello Nick,
Thanks for the reply.
> The system you describe is approximately a one-hop mix, with Tor layered in
> front of the mix to prevent the mix (the leader in your design) from
> learning who submitted which message. So the security against learning
> group membership will reduce to the se
