try lo link opera with tor.
> Date: Wed, 23 Feb 2011 23:45:36 +0100
> From: tag...@gmail.com
> To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
> Subject: Re: [tor-talk] I wish to see one video on you tube
>
> On 02/12/2011 03:32 PM, Karsten N. wrote:
> >> how to run the second point(you select an exit fro
> Of course, until you factor in the information we received later which
> is that a researcher has apparently been using a technique to discover
> "passively" eavesdropping nodes, and the node in question here came
> up. Sort of mooting the whole discussion until the research is
> published.
The
These lgggtt blurbs
are showing up in the gecos field of the 'Reply-To: ' address
being sent from the list engine. To which people are replying
causing uglification of other people's mailboxes. I presume it
is an oversight. Try defining this instead:
'Reply-To: "tor
On Thu, Feb 24, 2011 at 12:11:57AM -0500, a...@mit.edu wrote 1.2K bytes in 27
lines about:
: Seems like Weather should alert the user if their version is not in the
: recommended versions list. It shouldn't alert the user if there exists
: a version newer than their current one, yet both are in th
On Thu, Feb 24, 2011 at 02:51:33AM -0500, grarp...@gmail.com wrote 0.9K bytes
in 19 lines about:
: 'Reply-To: "tor-talk" '
: Also, I believe that blurb belongs to tor-dev, not tor-talk,
: for which another header or two per list would need fixed.
I fixed it two days ago after getting annoyed at
Am 24.02.2011 08:45, schrieb grarpamp:
> There is NO way to detect passive monitoring unless you have access
> to the monitor.
for each exit node I can set up a unique decoy email account one a
machine controlled my myself, access it over unencrypted pop or imap
sessions thru Tor and wait for a s
On Thu, 24 Feb 2011, Olaf Selke wrote:
Am 24.02.2011 08:45, schrieb grarpamp:
There is NO way to detect passive monitoring unless you have access
to the monitor.
for each exit node I can set up a unique decoy email account one a
machine controlled my myself, access it over unencrypted pop o
Thus spake Olaf Selke (olaf.se...@blutmagie.de):
> Am 24.02.2011 08:45, schrieb grarpamp:
>
> > There is NO way to detect passive monitoring unless you have access
> > to the monitor.
>
> for each exit node I can set up a unique decoy email account one a
> machine controlled my myself, access it
On Thu, 24 Feb 2011 02:45:34 -0500
grarpamp wrote:
> > Of course, until you factor in the information we received later which
> > is that a researcher has apparently been using a technique to discover
> > "passively" eavesdropping nodes, and the node in question here came
> > up. Sort of mooting
On 02/24/2011 07:27 AM, Olaf Selke wrote:
> Am 24.02.2011 08:45, schrieb grarpamp:
>
>> There is NO way to detect passive monitoring unless you have access
>> to the monitor.
> for each exit node I can set up a unique decoy email account one a
> machine controlled my myself, access it over unencryp
Hey all,
Security researcher here (as I assume are many of you).
Papers and a book linked to from sig.
Anyway, if I want to come up to speed on the security properties
of tor, to the point of understanding how they're enforced and what
isn't an enforced security property, what's the suggested rea
As a Russian lawyer I am intresting in such Internet-resources as
"kad.arbitr.ru".
I use a browser "Iceweales 3.0.6" with TB 1.2.5 on Debian Lenny.
It is very pitty but that resource need to enable JS for working with it.
But when I try to indicate a name of my clients into appropriate forms
of tha
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