On Sat, Mar 04, 2017 at 11:38:07AM +0100, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) - lists
wrote:
> Imho those should likely be splitted in other two different categories
> of Bad exist nodes:
>
> a-1. passively sniffing
> a-2. actively manipulating client traffic
>
> I feel that we would need to implement a bi
On 3/3/17 7:29 PM, George Kadianakis wrote:
> Hello list,
>
> in this email we will present you the current state of bad relays on the Tor
> network.
>
> It should be no surprise that the Tor network is under constant attack. As
> part
> of critical Internet infrastructure, people have been a
nusenu writes:
> that put users at risk because they potentially see traffic entering
> _and_ leaving the tor network (which breaks the assumption that not
> every relay in a circuit is operated by the same operator).
(strictly speaking, the assumption that no more than one relay in a
circuit is
Thanks for this email.
> Two common Tor network abuses are:
>
> a) Bad exit nodes sniffing and messing around with client traffic.
>
> b) Bad HSDir nodes. The hidden service hash ring is a particularly juicy
>target, since participating relays get to see the addresses of onion
>services
