Le 27/02/2016 13:18, Guido Witmond a écrit :
> A hash table does a lookup from HASH(data) -> data.
No, a DHT stores some data about something referenced by something
looking like a hash
>
> When I retrieve the data, I can calculate the hash and determine if I
> got the correct data.
When you
Hi Zenaan,
Thank you for all these questions, I'll answer them to the best of my
ability.
But first, please accept the premise that I don't want to cast Keybase
in a bad light. On the contrary, they are trying to solve the most
difficult problem on the internet:
*How to find the correct public
100% OK with Zenaan
Maybe slow too but this model would need another validation step (like
sites' CA verification via an external system, blockchain for example)
Which seems useless, the concept of CA is obsolete, in addition the
future for ID management can't be centralized.
I have evoked the p
On 2/26/16, Guido Witmond wrote:
> On 02/25/16 01:58, Paul Syverson wrote:
>> On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 12:26:02AM +0100, Guido Witmond wrote:
>>> I don't want *people* to exchange keys. I envision people to exchange
>>> names and let computers do the key lookup.
That's fine but should be achievabl
On 02/25/16 01:58, Paul Syverson wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 12:26:02AM +0100, Guido Witmond wrote:
>>
>> I don't want *people* to exchange keys. I envision people to exchange
>> names and let computers do the key lookup.
>>
>
> The description below sounds a fair amount like Keybase (https:/
On 02/25/16 11:57, m...@beroal.in.ua wrote:
> A magic wand is a solution. :-)
Luckily, any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from
magic, so to my audience - the normal user - it looks like that :-)
> Though I don't understand your protocol, I don't like id@site names.
> That s
On 02/23/16 20:28, krishna e bera wrote:
> On 02/22/2016 04:03 PM, Guido Witmond wrote:
>
>> If either the blogger or responder wishes to send a private message,
>> they can use the others' persons public key after validating there is no
>> MitM. Message transport goes through the site. After a fe
On 25.02.16 01:26, Guido Witmond wrote:
On 02/24/16 23:26, juan wrote:
On Wed, 24 Feb 2016 23:04:39 +0100
Guido Witmond wrote:
My drive is to make key exchange happen as a natural part of normal
interactions between people.
So teach people how to exchange keys.
Teaching is not a sol
On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 12:26:02AM +0100, Guido Witmond wrote:
>
> I don't want *people* to exchange keys. I envision people to exchange
> names and let computers do the key lookup.
>
The description below sounds a fair amount like Keybase (https://keybase.io)
Perhaps it would be helpful to cont
On Thu, 25 Feb 2016 00:26:02 +0100
Guido Witmond wrote:
> So, to answer your question: people communicate id@site names, the
> computer verifies the uniqness properties to determine the
> corresponding public keys. The requirement to make the relation
> between names and public keys is key. Pun
On 02/24/16 23:26, juan wrote:
> On Wed, 24 Feb 2016 23:04:39 +0100
> Guido Witmond wrote:
>
>> My drive is to make key exchange happen as a natural part of normal
>> interactions between people.
>
> So teach people how to exchange keys.
Teaching is not a solution. See Peter Gutmann's bo
On Wed, 24 Feb 2016 23:04:39 +0100
Guido Witmond wrote:
> My drive is to make key exchange happen as a natural part of normal
> interactions between people.
So teach people how to exchange keys.
> Not as a separate step that could be
> neglected, forgotten or done wrong.
Ah yo
On 02/24/16 00:22, Allen wrote:
>>
>> Secondly, with the requirement that nickn...@sitename.tld to be unique,
>> I could write that nickname on a business card and hand it out. People
>> could verify at a verification service that there is only one
>> certificate (and public key) for that name and
I am not sure neither to understand the interest of the system.
Why should it be better than systems such as Namecoin?
Why this (umpteenth) concept of discussing using hidden services
(unlikely to be usable by normal people) on a small network like Tor?
How do you prevent name squatting/spoofing
>
> Secondly, with the requirement that nickn...@sitename.tld to be unique,
> I could write that nickname on a business card and hand it out. People
> could verify at a verification service that there is only one
> certificate (and public key) for that name and be sure to have gotten
> *my* public
Hi Allen,
Good questions.
On 02/23/16 22:26, Allen wrote:
> I don't understand. If a message is associated with an identity, then it
> is not anonymous, it is at best pseudo-anonymous. Which are you proposing,
> truly anonymous messages that have no identity associated with them, or
> pseudo-a
I don't understand. If a message is associated with an identity, then it
is not anonymous, it is at best pseudo-anonymous. Which are you proposing,
truly anonymous messages that have no identity associated with them, or
pseudo-anonymous messages that have a pseudo-anonymous identity associated
wi
On 02/23/16 19:51, m...@beroal.in.ua wrote:
> On 23.02.16 20:31, Guido Witmond wrote:
>> The answer is to let strangers - who never met before - exchange
>> public keys in a verifiable way.
> This very statement makes no sense to me. Verifying strangers?
Indeed, verifying strangers doesn't make se
On 02/22/2016 04:03 PM, Guido Witmond wrote:
> If either the blogger or responder wishes to send a private message,
> they can use the others' persons public key after validating there is no
> MitM. Message transport goes through the site. After a few round trips
> of messages, there is certainty
On 23.02.16 20:31, Guido Witmond wrote:
The answer is to let strangers - who never met before - exchange
public keys in a verifiable way.
This very statement makes no sense to me. Verifying strangers?
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On 02/23/16 11:16, m...@beroal.in.ua wrote:
> Hi. I still don't understand what is the use of this contrived scheme.
Hi,
The answer is to let strangers - who never met before - exchange public
keys in a verifiable way.
After the exchange is verified to be free of MitM's, they can
communicate in
Hi. I still don't understand what is the use of this contrived scheme.
On 22.02.16 23:03, Guido Witmond wrote:
Dear Tor community,
I came across this message[1] about Shari Steele wanting to bring Tor to
the mainstream. I humbly believe I have something that might assist her
in this quest. I ca
Dear Tor community,
I came across this message[1] about Shari Steele wanting to bring Tor to
the mainstream. I humbly believe I have something that might assist her
in this quest. I call it Eccentric Authentication.
Philosophical:
The Eccentric Authentication protocol is designed for situations
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