Note that Dissent-related work is ongoing. For a recent addition
see "Scalable Anonymous Group Communication in the Anytrust Model"
It's not on anonbib, but you can get it at http://www.ohmygodel.com/
See also http://dedis.cs.yale.edu/2010/anon/
-Paul
On Tue, Aug 07, 2012 at 05:01:34AM -0400, Ed
Great, that looks like it solves exactly the right problem!
Thanks,
Edward
Excerpts from Roger Dingledine's message of Tue Aug 07 04:29:57 -0400 2012:
> On Mon, Aug 06, 2012 at 09:54:51PM -0400, Edward Z. Yang wrote:
> > > http://freehaven.net/anonbib if you haven't already.
> >
> > That is a ve
On Mon, Aug 06, 2012 at 09:54:51PM -0400, Edward Z. Yang wrote:
> > http://freehaven.net/anonbib if you haven't already.
>
> That is a very nice list of papers. I will do some reading into DC-nets;
> what is your favorite paper describing their implementation?
Take a look at http://freehaven.net
Hello Nick,
Thanks for the reply.
> The system you describe is approximately a one-hop mix, with Tor layered in
> front of the mix to prevent the mix (the leader in your design) from
> learning who submitted which message. So the security against learning
> group membership will reduce to the se
The system you describe is approximately a one-hop mix, with Tor layered in
front of the mix to prevent the mix (the leader in your design) from
learning who submitted which message. So the security against learning
group membership will reduce to the security of Tor; the security against
the lead
Hello all,
I've been experimenting with protocols for solving the following
problem:
A small (N = 10 to 100), fixed group of participants would each like to
publish
a random, fixed length string to the other participants, without revealing
who the string came from (except that it cam
