Hi,
On 04/05/2019 22:08, amytain wrote:
> It was very exciting to get my first relay up today and I'm excited to be
> contributing to the Tor project.
Thanks for running a relay, you might be interested in the tor-relays
list which is where you can get support on any relay/bridge operator
relate
It was very exciting to get my first relay up today and I'm excited to be
contributing to the Tor project.
Sent with [ProtonMail](https://protonmail.com) Secure Email.
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Lucas Teixeira writes:
> Are there references for "real life" usage of traffic confirmation?
I've mentioned the Jeremy Hammond and Eldo Kim cases, which can be seen
as "good enough" coarse-grained correlation. I think there are others
if we look for them.
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Seth Schoen
Senior Staff Technolo
Oskar Wendel writes:
> Seth David Schoen :
>
> > As I said in my previous message, I don't think this is the case because
> > the correlation just requires seeing the two endpoints of the connection,
> > even without knowing the complete path.
>
> Is it possible to be sure that one of these conn
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Oskar Wendel :
> How many relays with guard flag are there? What is the percentage of
> relays with guard flag set in population of all relays?
I'll try to answer this question myself.
$ grep '^m ' /var/lib/tor/cached-microdesc-consensus | wc -l
70
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Seth David Schoen :
> As I said in my previous message, I don't think this is the case because
> the correlation just requires seeing the two endpoints of the connection,
> even without knowing the complete path.
Is it possible to be sure that one of
Alexandre Guillioud writes:
> " That's definitely an improvement, although there's an issue in the long
> run that the crypto in HTTPS is getting better faster than the crypto
> in Tor's hidden services implementation. :-) "
>
> I don't understand why you are saying that this is an 'issue'.
> If
" That's definitely an improvement, although there's an issue in the long
run that the crypto in HTTPS is getting better faster than the crypto
in Tor's hidden services implementation. :-) "
I don't understand why you are saying that this is an 'issue'.
If one of the crypto tech is getting better,
Aeris writes:
> > Does it apply also to traffic going from/to hidden services? How safe are
> > users of hidden services when compared to users that browse clearnet with
> > Tor?
>
> Correlation is possible but very more difficult, because 3 nodes for client
> to
> rendez-vous points, then 3 ot
> Does it apply also to traffic going from/to hidden services? How safe are
> users of hidden services when compared to users that browse clearnet with
> Tor?
Correlation is possible but very more difficult, because 3 nodes for client to
rendez-vous points, then 3 others for rendez-vous to HS.
S
Oskar Wendel writes:
> Does it apply also to traffic going from/to hidden services? How safe are
> users of hidden services when compared to users that browse clearnet with
> Tor?
The hidden service users can be identified as users of the individual
services using the same sybil approach: if a
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Aeris :
> Tor network can be hack (ie. deanonymizing users) with a sybill attack.
> If an attacker control more than 66% of the Tor nodes, he has some
> probabilities to control 2 of the 3 nodes you will use (the most important
> are
> the first an
U gotta know all networks can be hacked , but the reason that tor is great is
cuz its volunteers running tor
Aeris skrev: (29 december 2015 12:06:02 CET)
>Hello and welcome here !
>
>> 1. Tor network is 100% security network? that can not be hacked by
>other
>> cracker?
>
>Tor is not a securit
On 12/29/15, Seth David Schoen wrote:
> ...
> I would suggest looking at Tom Ritter's overview presentation about Tor.
> It is very detailed...
>
> https://ritter.vg/p/tor-v1.6.pdf
Tom also provided a handy redirect to latest,
https://ritter.vg/p/tor-vlatest.pdf
:)
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On Tue, 29 Dec 2015 14:09:05 +0900 (KST)
권현준 wrote:
> 2. If not, How can cracker attack tor network that tor can't prevent?
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/11/tor-director-fbi-paid-carnegie-mellon-1m-to-break-tor-hand-over-ips/
http://www.wired.com/2013/09/freedom-hos
Hi Seth,
On 29-12-2015 11:05, Seth David Schoen wrote:
> If you look at the original Tor design paper, they assume that someone
> who is watching the place where a user enters the network (the first
> node in the chain, today called entry guard) and the place where the
> user's communications exit
권현준 writes:
> I subscribe tor-talk
>
> Hello I'm Korean student studying security
> First of all sorry for my bad english.
> I have a few question about tor network
>
> 1. Tor network is 100% security network? that can not be hacked by other
> cracker?
>
Hello and welcome here !
> 1. Tor network is 100% security network? that can not be hacked by other
> cracker?
Tor is not a security network per se, it provides only anonymity from the
point of view of the servers you use : nobody can say this is you behind this
Tor visitor.
> 2. If not, How
I subscribe tor-talk
Hello I'm Korean student studying security
First of all sorry for my bad english.
I have a few question about tor network
1. Tor network is 100% security network? that can not be hacked by other
cracker?
2. If not, How can cracker attack tor network that tor
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