eady for inclusion in Tor itself in terms of being
well-understood, but even this piece by itself is a large engineering
effort that currently has no funding to complete.
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es are always better. I've been thinking about making that
policy into a torrc option, so it would be useful to know if the
situation has changed.
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Oskar Wendel:
> Mike Perry :
>
> > I'm still with Roger on being careful about assuming its an attack (and
> > not a bug, or other emergent behavior) before conducting more tests. At
> > least, that is what proper engineering and science demands before we can
>
acy on
the web, since web sessions contain plenty of identifying information
when they resume, regardless of what circuit they use. In my
not-so-humble opinion here, the Tor network usage should match Tor
Browser's identifier protections exactly. Any mismatch is just bad
usability
ate
node, or hidden service is taking large amounts of CPU time, this will
prevent traffic from flowing while that operation is happening. See:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16585 (though that
ticket could use some help with clarity).
That single-threaded issue may be exploited by an attack, or it could
just be happening naturally. Again, more analysis needed :/.
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nodes, since almost no one is able to successfully configure and use
bridges these days (unfortunately, censorship circumvention maintenance
and usability is not a priority for our current sponsors, but this does
have some benefits for those precious few who can figure it out).
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ght. I am not optimistic that
Twitter will be any different.
Welcome to the Nymwars 2.0!
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Артур Истомин:
> On Fri, Aug 28, 2015 at 08:05:17PM -0700, Mike Perry wrote:
> > Garrett Robinson:
> > > On 8/28/15 7:01 PM, Mike Perry wrote:
> > > > sg.i...@email-postfach.info:
> > > >> Hi guys and girls, are there security issues using the priv
Garrett Robinson:
> On 8/28/15 7:01 PM, Mike Perry wrote:
> > sg.i...@email-postfach.info:
> >> Hi guys and girls,
> >> are there security issues using the privacy badger from eff.org with the
> >> tor browser ?
> >> Or: Is there are a
ferences. Others may end up
disabling filters (or subsets of them) because they break random stuff
(if they could even figure that out).
The only way to win the blacklist game is not to play it, I'm afraid.
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nately, Mozilla has not yet updated the nsIProtocolProxyService
documentation (at
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Tech/XPCOM/Reference/Interface/nsIProtocolProxyService)
to describe the new channel-based filter.
Here's where we landed the patch for the new API, though:
https:/
se also let me know if this ends up being due to either some
feature we've patched/disabled in Tor Browser, or due to a recent
regression in Tor Browser 5.
Thanks!
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e upgraded to 5.5a1
(also based on Firefox 38-esr, but with the fix included).
1. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1179262#c33 is the
statement from Mozilla for FF31 not being vulnerable. They have made a
similar statement on the ESR mailinglist (but that does not have open
archive
seen the design doc, it explains what we did and why:
https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/
I am currently in the process of updating that for 4.5-stable this week.
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ting a much more comprehensive blog post; it
> >will be filled with gory technical details AND it will include
> >information on how to use HoneyBadger. HoneyBadger has optional (off
> >by default) full-take logging which could enable you to capture a
> >zero-day payload from
Mike Perry:
> Seth David Schoen:
> > Luis writes:
> >
> > > What are the reasons that makes building a Tor Browser using Chromium
> > > not such a good idea? I recall reading somewhere that while making a Tor
> > > Browser with a Chromium base
e updates.)
>
> Andreas
>
> --
> "Totally trivial. Famous last words."
> From: Linus Torvalds
> Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2010 07:29:21 -0800
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> ht
basic security patches is a non-starter for
any project involving Chrome.
P.S. How I miss the days when the outlandish doomsday scenarios that I
imagined were still merely hypothetical. It seems every week a new
nightmare comes true. (Man, I sure hope I'm wrong about the likelihood
of wid
set to false. Again, the
existing PoC fails in this case for me, but we need more in-depth tests.
For more info, see:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/14836 and
https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser-spec.git/tree/audits/FF31_NETWORK_AUDIT
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Mike Perry:
> Cyrus Katrak:
> > https://github.com/kr36/seaturtle
> >
> > At a high level:
> > - Process per tab security model, with each tab owning it's own in-memory
> > state (cache, cookies, local storage, hsts db etc...).
>
> We've been goi
n OpenWRT configuration I can give you to monitor for proxy
leaks on an upstream router, but you need to be able to configure Tor
Bridges to make use of it.
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Mike Perry:
> Thomas White:
> > I didn't realise my nodes didn't allow the bitcoin port. I'll get
> > right on it.
>
> You may be interested in:
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ReducedExitPolicy
>
> It lists not only the offic
intro for anyone looking to write their first Tor patch.
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of sacrifice/scarcity could benefit not only Tor users,
but also the rest of the Internet as well. It is also interesting
because right now, the naive proposal people often make for such systems
is "dude, just use Bitcoin, man!", but clearly we now have a catch-22
here (i
Mike Perry:
> CJ:
> > Hello!
> >
> > just a small update regarding orWall: it's released 1.0.0!
> > There's still *one* annoying issue regarding the tethering, but it
> > should be OK next week. Just have to take some time in order to debug
> > th
CJ:
> On 04/10/14 00:27, Mike Perry wrote:
> > Also looking forward to the "Logs" window doing something :)
>
> Same for me. This part will be complicated due to different kernel
> capabilities:
> some supports LOG target, other NFLOG, and the latter doesn't p
we haven't thought of, or find some way to write a shim on the DNS
resolution filesystem socket to enforce what we want.
You could list this on a known issues or FAQ page, or in your bugtracker
I guess. Making root/UID 0 handle DNS is also a security risk, and I'm
very surprised the Androi
grarpamp:
> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 5:16 PM, Mike Perry wrote:
> > I think pushback
> > from actual CloudFlare customers will carry far more weight
>
> Via Tor, I tried to buy some stuff (Stuff) through a shop (Newegg)
> that clears its transactions (Bitcoin) through a p
iced that nearly all of the Bitcoin web
infrastructure is hosted on Cloudflare. Surely some of those people
might be willing to speak up for us.
Has anyone else noticed Cloudflare captchas on sites that they would
otherwise expect to be run by Tor-friendly entities?
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you'd like to avoid this possibility, probably the
safest thing to do is simply report on the Tor Browser release the week
after.
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Tails has officially
supported UEFI and Mac hardware since Tails v1.1. These ancient Mac
users would be much better off in Tails, too.
Are there any 10.6 32bit Mac users on this list? Is Tails a workable
option for you?
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iew
them very closely, and they usually end up going through a few revisions
before we merge them. We obviously subject all contributed patches to
careful review like this, regardless of if they are named, pseudonymous,
anonymous, or "bobnomnymous".
1. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-28886465
2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linus%27s_Law
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n I
created this userinit hack:
https://people.torproject.org/~mikeperry/android-hardening/android-firewall/userinit.sh
> the app I've done lists the installed application requesting network
> access, you just have to check those you're wanting to allow network
> access and
. Or
worse, they simply do not care.
That is indeed deeply troubling.
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it sucks. In fact
dangerously so - to the point where I am not optimistic about our
ability to have functional computing devices at all in about 5-10 years
time unless drastic changes are made:
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/deterministic-builds-part-one-cyberwar-and-global-compromise
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nb.linux:
> Mike Perry:
> > anonymous coward:
> >> My special concern is about the baseband CPU. The baseband potentially
> >> allows full access to the whole system. And the baseband is closed source.
> >>
> >> Thus, the baseband is the perfect troja
redmine.replicant.us/projects/replicant/wiki/SamsungGalaxyBackdoor
> >
> > So free software matters, e.g. by not implementing risky features.
> > But it is not a guarantee and may only work sometimes, as it depends on
> > the architecture of the phone.
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> on your device and you can do *nothing* about it.
Not nothing. You either need a device without a baseband, or with a
hardware isolated baseband. See that blog post.
> What do you say? The battle seems lost, just as the whole war seems lost?
Nah. It's just going to be kinda trick
text for historical record.
Mike Perry:
> Hello all,
>
> I've discovered that the Linux kernel appears to have a leak in how it
> applies transproxy rules to the TCP CLOSE_WAIT shutdown condition under
> certain circumstances. This applies to both the kernels in use by comm
oup might have different sets of commentary, and both groups
should be aware of this issue. Don't be a jerk like me, please. Use your
best judgment to Cc one list or the other.
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#!/bin/bash
IPTABLES=/sbin/iptables
TOR_UID=`id -u debian-tor`
NETWORK_USER_ID=1000
# Clear existi
ain" button).
>
> Regards,
> David
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to false, but there may be other prefs involved too.
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olence that
apparently did happen on Silk Road can almost certainly be attributed to
the social effects of prohibition and related pressures. :/
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doubt many clients are going to be willing to
> make that tradeoff.
It depends on the mirroring mechanisms available, actually. If the log
is widely mirrored, the user needs only to find a way to reach an active
mirror.
> > ** The Web of Trust is technically capable of multipath authentication
> > by itself, but only if you are aware of all of the multiple paths that
> > *should* exist. Unfortunately, nothing authenticates the whole Web of
> > Trust in its entirety, so it is impossible to use it to reliably verify
> > that multiple paths to a key do actually exist and are valid.
>
> i don't understand this footnote; I’ve never seen anyone claim that "the
> web of trust in its entirety" should be authenticated -- i don't even
> know what that means. can you clarify?
Basically, for the current signature-based authentication mechanism to
work, the user needs to be sure that when they download a key and a set
of signature paths, they are seeing all of the available paths, rather
than a subset chosen/created by the adversary.
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authentication
by itself, but only if you are aware of all of the multiple paths that
*should* exist. Unfortunately, nothing authenticates the whole Web of
Trust in its entirety, so it is impossible to use it to reliably verify
that multiple paths to a key do actually exist and are valid.
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y old key) at:
http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x29846B3C683686CC
Here's the fingerprint and current subkey information for reference:
pub 8192R/29846B3C683686CC 2013-09-11
Key fingerprint = C963 C21D 6356 4E2B 10BB 335B 2984 6B3C 6836 86CC
uid
harmony:
> Mike Perry:
> >
> > So this means that if you resize your browser, you also get a
> > totally different display fingerprint. However, if you resize it to
> > something weird, and continue to use that weird size for a while,
> > all of that activity
uide/CSS/Media_queries
To learn about more fingerprinting issues in TBB that could use some
help:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?keywords=~tbb-fingerprinting&status=!closed
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x27;re doing our best with what we have
2. Provide citations to support your conspiracy theories of Tor's subversion
3. Find better meds
4. Go fuck off
Pick one. Or more. Whatever.
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Georg Koppen:
> On 30.08.2013 09:14, Mike Perry wrote:
> > 2. If this was Pirate Browser:
>
> They are using FoxyProxy, right? Let's assume the PirateBrowser folks
> did not deactivate update checks. Then, there should be a similar spike
> visible on AMO where FoxyPro
e start of the month and the end. It seems that it
> > was the confluence of many states increasing their censorship of the
> > Internet, especially instances like Vietnam and Facebook. Here is the raw
> > data:
> >
> >
> > https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0A
wledge.
I was able to remove my account from the project, and thankfully I have
not been re-added, but sf.net did not react to my abuse/trademark
violation complaint in any way.
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Roger Dingledine:
> On Sun, Jul 14, 2013 at 11:28:25AM -0700, Mike Perry wrote:
> > > Supposing it is applied does it help to prevent website fingerprinting
> > > to a high extend? (high extend = being costly to circumvent by
> > > adversaries)
> >
>
tly have not implemented a way to check if a potential bridge
relay is fast enough for the "Fast" relay cutoff, for example, let alone
making sure users are allocated to them in proportion to bandwidth
(which is a much harder problem).
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think protocol-level active attacks
(such as RPW's hidden service Guard discovery attack, and the Raccoon's
bitstomping/tagging attack) are far more likely to be how intelligence
agencies and others will attack Tor:
http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a080.pdf
https://lists.torproj
Andreas Krey:
> On Tue, 02 Jul 2013 12:33:10 +0000, Mike Perry wrote:
> ...
> > But I got distracted by more pressing issues before I could finish the
> > scripts.. Also, many of those encrypted+authenticated Tor container
> > things probably don't make much
city.
> Would it be able to keep the nickname or would it have to change also?
> Would this have effect on the onion address if I had a hidden server?
No and no, but your hidden server might have brief downtimes/descriptor
publish times that correlate with your key rotation. Not
Nick Mathewson:
> On Sat, Jun 29, 2013 at 10:32 PM, Mike Perry wrote:
> > David Balažic:
> >> Hi!
> >>
> >> You don't realize how big the TBB is until you're forced to use a slow
> >> connection.
> >>
> >> In that light, are
wnloading a new one to replace it, though..
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Andreas Krey:
> On Fri, 14 Jun 2013 19:39:31 +0000, Mike Perry wrote:
> ...
> > Please try these out, test them, and give us feedback! The plan is to
> > post them on the blog by Monday, unless something goes horribly wrong.
> >
> > https://people.torproject.org/~
:Andreas Krey
>
> Sent: Saturday, June 15, 2013 12:15 AM
> Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Tor Browser Bundle 3.0alpha1 test builds
>
>
> On Fri, 14 Jun 2013 19:39:31 +, Mike Perry wrote:
> ...
> > Please try these out, test them, and give us feedback! The plan is to
> >
ve the
infrastructure to set up and seed magnet links atm.
Should I just serve them out of people, and should Tor Browser Launcher
use my people homedir instead of www?
In the meantime, I've synced the mirrors to create this url, which
should be up shortly:
https://www.torproject.org/dist/to
rspec.git. Fixes bug 8965.
>
> o Code simplification and refactoring:
> - Avoid using character buffers when constructing most directory
> objects: this approach was unwieldy and error-prone. Instead,
> build smartlists of strings, and concatenate the
Matt Pagan:
> On 6/16/13, Andreas Krey wrote:
> > On Sat, 15 Jun 2013 19:09:28 +0000, Mike Perry wrote:
> > ...
> >> For everyone who is experiencing these crashes: Do you have a system tor
> >> installed? If so, if you uninstall it and reboot, does TBB still cra
Andreas Krey:
> On Sat, 15 Jun 2013 19:09:28 +0000, Mike Perry wrote:
> ...
> > For everyone who is experiencing these crashes: Do you have a system tor
> > installed? If so, if you uninstall it and reboot, does TBB still crash?
>
> Not sure what 'system tor' i
le place so that we don't get into a
> situation where there's an updated version but TBL can't find it?
There will always be a chicken/egg problem here. We need to update the
recommended versions file before the bundles get uploaded so that the
first people who download them don&
Matt Pagan:
> On 6/15/13, Georg Koppen wrote:
> > On 15.06.2013 09:15, Andreas Krey wrote:
> >> On Fri, 14 Jun 2013 19:39:31 +, Mike Perry wrote:
> >> ...
> >>> Please try these out, test them, and give us feedback! The plan is to
> >>> pos
quot;2.3.25-9-Linux",
> "2.4.12-alpha-2-MacOS",
> "2.4.12-alpha-2-Windows",
> "2.4.12-alpha-2-Linux"
> "3.0-alpha-1-Linux"
> "3.0-alpha-1-MacOS"
> "3.0-alpha-1-Windows"
> ]
>
> There missing commas at the end of
and sign that tag?
> l11n:
> At least the German translation should see some improvements before you
> do a final release. I'll look into Transifex within the next days. The
> blog post announcing the alpha should call for help in that regard.
>
> Some dial
or-browser-bundle.git/blob/HEAD:/gitian/README.build
Please try these out, test them, and give us feedback! The plan is to
post them on the blog by Monday, unless something goes horribly wrong.
https://people.torproject.org/~mikeperry/tbb-3.0alpha1-builds/official/
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sig
ypothesis is right I ask owners of Exit-nodes, if it
> possible, to let that port in their ExitPolicies.
Not sure if that's actually the problem, but if the only way you can
get to Skype is to use a Bittorrent-supporting exit, it certainly seems
like a possibility.
Th
edia.org/wiki/Feature_selection
Ad-hoc techniques as simple as making a conscious effort to "sound" like
someone else have also been shown to be effective without requiring much
practice, but it can also be difficult to break certain key stylistic
habits.
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gt; >
> > ___
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> > tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
> > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
> >
> ___
> tor-talk mailing list
y
serve to allow us to more effectively rate limit abuse.
1. https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Persona
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t..
I believe we even have an upstream deliverable for a flash sandbox.. Not
my area of personal expertise or interest, though. I'm with Steve Jobs
on this one: kill that fucker until it is dead.
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Thus spake grarpamp (grarp...@gmail.com):
> >>> It concerns me that you [Mike Perry] refer to "we" as though you
> >>> contribute anything to the tor project.
>
> Mike does a good deal of fine work for the Tor project.
> And I'm happy to see the
Thus spake Seth David Schoen (sch...@eff.org):
> Alex M (Coyo) writes:
>
> > It concerns me that you [Mike Perry] refer to "we" as though you
> > contribute anything to the tor project.
>
> https://gitweb.torproject.org/
> https://www.torproject.org/torb
Thus spake Alex M (Coyo) (c...@darkdna.net):
> On 04/13/2013 12:13 AM, Mike Perry wrote:
> >If you have a specific list of design flaws that aren't couched in
> >long rants, we can perhaps help instruct you on how you might
> >solve them in your redesign with Mr Dis
rocess.
Otherwise, thanks for your concern/veiled threats/trolling.
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etection
> and interception, but goes further than that, and makes traffic
> itself plausibly deniable, not just the content of or parties to a
> particular instance of communication.
>
> Tor needs to evolve very rapidly and become impossible to detect,
s shouldn't be too
hard to hack up with a well-documented controller library such as Stem:
https://stem.torproject.org/
I would be happy to help mentor someone to do this for GSoC, etc.
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e long-lived by default.
As far as I can tell, also having the onion key doesn't get you much
beyond what the identity key enables, especially if you're an "external"
adversary (such as we would presume the NSA and other intelligence
agencies to be).
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like we can certainly hammer it in there if we have to ;).
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of their users is visiting, especially
over a number of days of repeated activity, and especially for smaller
identity providers (or malicious providers that set very low cert
expiration times for both user certs and their own IdP certs).
I guess I probably should bring these issues up
sn't strike me as the
right move.
We do have quite a bit more work to do before this stuff is actually
usable by most of the population, and I think that is what a 3.x version
number represents to most people (or at least it used to).
After all, we are attempting to do what is more or l
ning the Entry Node or it is being hosted on Google, the
> Google would still be able to correlate the Size and Time?
>
> ___ tor-talk mailing list
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ase let me know.
>
> I am trying to get some patches merged into the Linux TBB bundle start
> up script "start-tor-browser". I started with a trivial one:
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7266
>
> Already mailed Mike Perry, but no response.
If you have
t.org/blog/new-firefox-17-and-tor-alpha-bundles
Be aware that it is an alpha, and more auditing work needs to be done
on Firefox 17 in general, though.
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the state
file got truncated?
If you can reproduce the issue reliably, can you perhaps send us the
results of something like 'grep "Build" /var/lib/tor/state'? Private
email is fine.
Don't ever publish the entire state file though: it is dangerous to your
hidden service
; care if those I know also left Tor, but if you guys do not take this
> matter seriously, Tor will become irrelevant.
Signed consensus documents that everyone can globally verify are the
best way we know of to "take this matter seriously".
--
Mike Perry
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Thus spake unknown (unkn...@pgpru.com):
> On Wed, 30 Jan 2013 15:49:54 -0400
> Mike Perry wrote:
>
> > Longer term, I'm interested in having some form (or better: many forms)
> > of multipath consensus validation:
>
> May be that algo is relevant to inde
ol that automatically stores consensus history for later
out-of-band comparison against the public git repo, or even for live
multipath validation.
Might be a fun intro project for someone interested in getting involved
in Tor, actually, and it would potentially be a helpful validation tool
for
actually have these things see real use.
[1]. http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/papers/pets08metrics.pdf, section 6.
[2]. https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1854
--
Mike Perry
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their assumption holds equally well for these
CPUs, I would also guess that the interrupts even from passively
scanning WiFi should provide enough entropy even without driver support,
though. From the table in that that url, it looks like the least amo
Oct 2012
> From: Mike Hearn
> Subject: Re: [tor-talk] registration for youtube, gmail over Tor -
> fake voicemail / sms anyone?
Thanks for clarifying this for me. Sorry for the misunderstanding.
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Mike Perry
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nto an
"Identity provider" for the Internet. Good luck with that, guys... I
for one love a good lolocaust ;).
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Mike Perry
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who framed our
> exit relay funding debate as an "if you" vs "now that" game. When you
> incentivize people with "if you X, I'll Y", they behave differently than
> when it's "now that you've X, I'll Y".
Does this theory hav
phisticated operations.
This would also be consistent with it just being a one-man operation run
by the IAmA poster on reddit.
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44. I find this
annoying because I actually like having local TBB browsing history.
On the plus side, any custom Firefox extensions you have in your TBB do
stay active after updating this way (though the usual caveat about
choosing your extensions carefully to avoid leaks and
EDGE?
If it is significantly slower than your wifi (especially in terms of
ping times/latency), this could be bug #3443:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3443
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Mike Perry
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