Re: [tor-relays] Revised Opt-In Trial: Fallback Directory Mirrors

2016-01-11 Thread starlight . 2016q1
Hmm, don't see the script in this Git repository, most recently updated files are from a month ago. At 15:35 1/12/2016 +1100, you wrote: >This list was generated a few minutes ago from >scripts/maint/updateFallbackDirs.py in my branch fallback-17887-17888-18035 on >[2]. (This branch has some bu

Re: [tor-relays] Revised Opt-In Trial: Fallback Directory Mirrors

2016-01-12 Thread starlight . 2016q1
At 16:56 1/12/2016 +0100, you wrote: >Is this list removes already included fallback nodes ? >Previously, my node kitten1 was on the list, but >not on this one. >(I already opt-in for it inclusion on december, >with my others nodes (kitten[1-4])). Reason is listed in the the attachment to the bug-

Re: [tor-relays] Revised Opt-In Trial: Fallback Directory Mirrors

2016-01-12 Thread starlight . 2016q1
Perhaps this is a bug in the consensus system. Pulling the consensus archive and grepping, exactly the one single consensus is showing DirPort as zero: 12-13-09-cons:r kitten1 vG0ZWLi31UXoqz4H2H/hweSvxqo 04:44:19 62.210.124.124 9001 9030 12-13-10-cons:r kitten1 vG0ZWLi31UXoqz4H2H/hweSvxqo 04:4

Re: [tor-relays] Revised Opt-In Trial: Fallback Directory Mirrors

2016-01-12 Thread starlight . 2016q1
I'd guess a bug in the version update script. At 19:20 1/12/2016 +0100, Aeris wrote: >> Are you *absoultely* certain that the config >> was not fiddled with at the time of this event? > >After grepping some logs, seems 13/12 was the day of a Tor >upgrade : > >2015-12-13 10:47:31 upgrade tor:amd6

[tor-relays] probable FallbackDir relay determination bug

2016-01-12 Thread starlight . 2016q1
Dug into the situation Aeris reported where his kitten1 relay was nixed off the fallback directory list due to a single consensus where the dir-port was published as zero. Quickly found three additional very fast very stable relays where the same thing happened: BF0FB582E37F738CD33C3651125F277270

Re: [tor-relays] probable FallbackDir relay determination bug

2016-01-12 Thread starlight . 2016q1
Improved list: BF0FB582E37F738CD33C3651125F2772705BB8E8 12-28:17 quadhead 86E78DD3720C78DA8673182EF96C54B162CD660C 12-13:11 kitten1 6DE61A6F72C1E5418A66BFED80DFB63E4C77668F 12-19:11 eriador 39F096961ED2576975C866D450373A9913AFDC92 12-28:06 metaether 92CFD9565B24646CAC2D172D3DB503D69E777B8A 12-16:1

Re: [tor-relays] Revised Opt-In Trial: Fallback Directory Mirrors

2016-01-12 Thread starlight . 2016q1
Just sent a request to the contact of three affected relays asking they post daemon log entries if they have them. Hopefully someone can retrieve the information and it will shed some light on what's happening. At 10:33 1/13/2016 +1100, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote: >>At 19:20 1/12/2016 +0100,

[tor-relays] avoid exclusion from FallBack Dir list: do not start during minute 49

2016-01-13 Thread starlight . 2016q1
See comment 6 in Bug #18050: Relay submitted a descriptor with 0 DirPort due to a self-test race condition https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/18050 ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/

[tor-relays] what's up(down) with gablemoo?

2016-01-21 Thread starlight . 2016q1
Lately 'gabelmoo' had been bouncing down and up like a ping-pong ball. Because gabelmoo is a BWauth (of which only five exist) as well as a normal authority, the impact is greater than if it did not participate in bandwidth measurement. Disrupts the consensus median. Does anyone know anything

Re: [tor-relays] what's up(down) with gablemoo?

2016-01-21 Thread starlight . 2016q1
At 18:55 1/21/2016 +0100, you wrote: >Gabelmoo is running 0.2.7.6. . . Thank you for replying. I saw earlier that moria1 ran into this and decided to wait on 0.2.7 for my relay, though I suppose the issue is specific to authorities and does not apply to normal relays. ___

[tor-relays] CVE-2015-7547

2016-02-17 Thread starlight . 2016q1
Could someone with a solid understanding of how the Tor daemon interacts with DNS comment on whether and how CVE-2015-7547 (glibc DNS response buffer overflow, remotely exploitable) the bug impacts relay running under Linux? ___ tor-relays mailing list

Re: [tor-relays] Guard Status vs Middle

2016-03-04 Thread starlight . 2016q1
>If your relay has been given guard status does this mean that >one's middle status is put on hold or can a relay be in guard >and middle status at the same time? Guard-flagged relays are both middle and guard nodes. Take a look at the relay in https://atlas.torproject.org/ and https://globe

Re: [tor-relays] Relays with broken DirPorts

2016-04-01 Thread starlight . 2016q1
These relays all appear at least somewhat overrated by BWauths and are not rate-limiting with BandwidthRate. DirPort performance is bad due to a saturated physical link or 'tc' bandwidth limit, so TCP congestion back-off kicks in. If BandwidthRate were the limiting factor DirPort would return a

Re: [tor-relays] Using your own Relay as Entry Node

2016-04-14 Thread starlight . 2016q1
You may find the information in this ticket of interest, particularly the cited comment: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16824#comment:23 ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/ma