Re: [tor-relays] Is there a reason for all exit nodes being public?

2016-12-07 Thread Peter Ludikovsky
How would that work? First of all, the clients need to know which exit nodes exist, so that they can build circuits. That list, as well as that of the middle nodes, is public, otherwise you'd have to manually request exits by email/web service/… As a result you'd be limited to a few exits, which mi

Re: [tor-relays] Is there a reason for all exit nodes being public?

2016-12-07 Thread Peter Ludikovsky
>> How would that work? First of all, the clients need to know which exit nodes >> exist, so that they can build circuits. That list, as well as that of the >> middle nodes, is public, otherwise you'd >have to manually request exits by >> email/web service/… As a result you'd be limited to a few

Re: [tor-relays] Tor relay from home - end of experiment?

2016-12-14 Thread Peter Ludikovsky
> One of these shiny pretty Netgear R7900? Shiny and dangerous: https://www.wired.com/2016/12/ton-popular-netgear-routers-exposed-no-easy-fix/ Exploiting is as easy as http://www.routerlogin.net/cgi-bin/;echo$IFS'Vulnerable' signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature

Re: [tor-relays] Middle relay still an useful contribution?

2017-01-17 Thread Peter Ludikovsky
On 01/17/2017 03:59 PM, Ortez wrote: > Hello tor relay operators, > I'm thinking about creating another tor middle relay, but i'm not sure > if this is still a good contribution to the tor network. When i'm > looking at some of the relay stats out there, there are so many middle > relays, which get

Re: [tor-relays] Tor version on Debian Wheezy (oldstable)

2017-05-17 Thread Peter Ludikovsky
Nope. Even the official Tor repos still only serve 0.2.9.10. The 0.3.x branch is still only marked as experimental. Regards, /peter On 05/17/2017 05:32 PM, Matt Traudt wrote: > > > On 5/17/17 11:04, Cristian Consonni wrote: >> Hi, >> >> On 16/05/2017 01:52, Roger Dingledine wrote: >>> For those

Re: [tor-relays] Why adding more Nodes won't help?

2018-05-24 Thread Peter Ludikovsky
For that I'd suggest you look into running a separated test network with all nodes having TestingTorNetwork 1 in their torrc. Then you can change the hop number in the source & experiment away, without impacting the real network. Regards, /peter On 2018-05-24 10:30, dave` dave wrote: I don

[tor-relays] Tor Debian repo update

2019-06-19 Thread Peter Ludikovsky
Hello, Does the official Tor Project repo provide upgrades to the new 0.4.0.5 stable for anyone? I can see the new packages in pool/main/t/tor/, but the package index in dists/stretch/main/binary-amd64/Packages still points to 0.3.5.8. Regards, /peter signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital

Re: [tor-relays] Call for setting up new obfs4 bridges

2019-07-12 Thread Peter Ludikovsky
Just how much traffic can one expect when running a bridge? Is it comparable to being an entry/middle node? ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

Re: [tor-relays] Debian is not allowing tor to update despite it being listed as a trusted respritory

2022-05-03 Thread Peter Ludikovsky
Seems like your machine doesn't recognize the certificate for https://deb.torproject.org, which is a separate issue from eg. the GPG key not matching which would make it untrusted. Seems something in the certificate chain from Let's Encrypt has expired, because the cert itself is still valid

Re: [tor-relays] knock knock, police is here

2022-09-13 Thread Peter Ludikovsky
> The thing is you can try to explain that it was not you that was sending the information, but unfortunately it went through your computer which makes you partially responsible. Not in Germany, at least it shouldn't. §§8-10 Telemediengesetz define something called "Providerprivileg" which exo