Flokinet or Trabia have been perfect for running relaxed Exit nodes for me.
Sent from ProtonMail Mobile
On Fri, Feb 24, 2017 at 12:52 pm, Michael Armbruster <'t...@armbrust.me'> wrote:
On 2017-02-24 at 13:50, mick wrote:
> On Fri, 24 Feb 2017 12:43:20 +0100
> Michael Armbruster allegedly wrote:
nly if
all HTTP(S) was blocked (as the IWF blacklist is secret there's
presumably no way to tell the tor network what is inaccessible from
this node).
Thanks in advance,
Nick
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ld
I decide what an appropriate value should be? Twice the maximum
upload limit I can devote to it? Or if I left the value unset would
tor likely do a good enough job of deciding on an appropriate
bandwidth value?
Nick
Quoth Thomas Hand:
> Hi Nick,
> I was in a similar boat to you for a whi
idea. I don't know
of any good and vaguely affordable ISP in the UK anymore, though,
now that Be have gone away.
Nick
Quoth Richard Edmondson:
> Hi Nick,
>
> I'm not sure whether the stories are true or not but I have heard of
> people having their computer kit confisc
t something that would be
likely to help things if I can get it working?
Thanks folks,
Nick
P.S. Are there any known cases of law enforcement seizing equipment
or otherwise terrorising people for running home exit nodes? I would
like to imagine that Tor is well known enough in such circles
Hi BluStar88,
Quoth BlueStar88:
> Got this error on precise:
>
> ...
>
> :
> Failing due to -Werror.
It may not help, but you could try deleting the two instances of
-Werror in the tordnsel.cabal.
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Quoth Bryan Carey:
> Is there any kind of compiled list of IPs that relay operators can refer to
> that are known bad IPs (sources of brute force SSH attempts, etc.)? Is
> there a reason to NOT block (drop) traffic from these IPs?
Quite possibly I'm being stupid, but wouldn't these IPs just be
ot
Quoth Bryan Carey:
> Thanks everyone for your input! I already had root access disabled via sshd
> config. I will look into fail2ban as it sounds like it remedies the problem
> I'm having.
Changing the port sshd runs on has a suprisingly large impact on
reducing the number of these attacks, too.
On Mon, Sep 02, 2013 at 08:33:48AM -0400, That Guy wrote:
> a suggestion: maybe a new tor-node-moralfag-mailinglist should be set-up
> as to remove this soap opera from a technical mailing list.
Eugh, please don't use homophobic language like fag.
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to
will get much
faster; I'm aware the relay is of questionable value at present
bandwidth levels, but they should increase in not too long.
Thanks,
Nick
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Many thanks for the useful reply krishna!
I'll read up the links you suggested and think more about whether I
can make this relay useful, or whether I should just wait until the
aDSL speed improves.
Thanks again,
Nick
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same server?
The tor relay isn't anonymous - its IP address will be widely
shared. It's used to keep tor users anonymous. Unless you're
referring to hidden services, in which case the answer is 'yes', I
think, as long as you're careful not to leak anythi
Quoth Raistlin Majere:
> Let me try another way of asking that first question .. how much
> bandwidth is required for the relay to be useful?
Search the mailing list archives for guidance on that. IIRC
something like 50KiB/s is a useful minimum, but I may be
misremembering.
_
ing whether the fact that my IP is already known
as a relay means that it wouldn't be useful? That is, if the people
bridges try to foil are likely to just blacklist any relays they see
by default (it wasn't an exit or guard).
Thanks for any advice,
Nick
__
Quoth Roger Dingledine:
> On Sun, Dec 08, 2013 at 04:00:06PM +0000, Nick Sheppard wrote:
> > At the end of the month I got a bill for 120 dollars. And Amazon
> > were quite right - they were charging me for the 1024 GB of storage
> > I had accidentally asked for by not changi
l.org/news/secadv/20160926.txt
best wishes,
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.3.0.1-alpha, you should upgrade to 0.3.0.2-alpha
or later, but there are only around 53 relays still on that version,
so I'm freaking out less about that.
best wishes and many thanks,
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/CoreTorReleases
.
I'll send out another message like this in early July.
peace,
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it will use either one
when appropriate.
Of course, we can only use these compression formats when both sides
support them.
best,
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HACKING/HelpfulTools.md, that would rock.
(warning; instructions might need work too.)
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On Mon, Jun 5, 2017 at 9:01 AM, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> Hi!
>
> This is a reminder that we will not be making new releases for the
> 0.2.4, 0.2.6, or 0.2.7 release series after 1 August 2017. If you are
> running one of those series, please make a plan to upgrade some tim
rs and the version of the openssl library
-- as if Tor detected one version of openssl with the library search
during configure, but we're compiling against the headers from another
version of openssl.
--with-openssl-dir might be able to clear this up, as might
[TROVE-2017-008. CVE-2017-0380. Severity: medium]
Hello!
We have found a possible problem with the code that reports an error
during the construction of an introduction point circuit. Because
of this bug, it is possible that some hidden services will sometimes
write sensitive informatio
On Mon, Sep 18, 2017 at 1:19 PM, Toralf Förster wrote:
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA256
>
> On 09/18/2017 03:41 PM, Nick Mathewson wrote:
>> This bug can only happen when the SafeLogging option is disabled,
>> and SafeLogging is enabled by default.
escalating
them for traffic-analysis purposes.
Note that only the following series are supported, and only they will
receive updates: 0.2.5, 0.2.8, 0.2.9, 0.3.0, 0.3.1, and 0.3.2. 0.2.8
and 0.3.0 will become unsupported in January; 0.2.5 will become
unsupported in May.
best wishe
for information about how we rank security issues.)
These releases will also backport the anti-DoS features from Tor 0.3.3.
Relays and authorities should be sure to upgrade once packages are
available; these issues are not high-priority for clients.
best w
announcement, including changelogs, see
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-announce/2018-March/000152.html
best wishes,
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proxy managed
then on tor start I get:
[warn] Strange ServerTransportPlugin type 'obfs3'
[warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Invalid server transport line.
I thought my versions would be recent enough to handle obfs3? Is this a
bug, or am I missing something obvious?
On 20/09/14 15:00, Lunar wrote:
Nick Sheppard:
I'm running tor 0.2.5.7-rc and obfsproxy 0.2.6, and everything seems to work
perfectly with these PT lines in torrc:
ServerTransportPlugin obfs2 exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy managed
ExtORPort auto
However, if I try to use obfs3 as
On 20/09/14 15:00, Lunar wrote:
Nick Sheppard:
I'm running tor 0.2.5.7-rc and obfsproxy 0.2.6, and everything seems to work
perfectly with these PT lines in torrc:
ServerTransportPlugin obfs2 exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy managed
ExtORPort auto
However, if I try to use obfs3 as
On 24/09/14 19:30, grarpamp wrote:
finding the best country and provider.
Tired of people asking here what's the most best/friendly provider.
Do people think saturating popular names like Amazon AWS, OVH, Dreamhost,
Rackspace, Lowendbox, Hurricane, Digitalocean, etc with nodes is
helping Tor's
eaks or remote code execution.
Still, the ability to selectively disable relays might enable a
sophisticated attacker to do some kinds of traffic analysis more
efficiently. So, fix your relay if it's affected.
Q: Should we run in circles and freak out?
A: Not this time. We should just make sur
On Mon, Oct 20, 2014 at 10:43 PM, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> Hello, relay operators!
[...]
> best wishes,
Oh, darn it. I knew I'd forget something if I hit send then.
Thanks to everybody who helped find, diagnose, fix, and test fixes for
this bug, including Yawning, asn, weasel,
ecessary.
Eventually I'll have to reinstall everything from scratch,
straightforward enough, but what can I do to make sure it doesn't happen
again? Would hardening my iptables work? Has anyone else seen this?
Nick Sheppard
___
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re up-to-date,
more packages should be up-to-date over the next week. Usually I
don't announce a stable till there are packages, but people have been
asking me about this one, and I'd rather have an official release
announcement than a series of weird rumors.
at prevents you from
running a more recent version of Tor, please let us know soon so that
we can try to address it before 0.2.3 becomes totally obsolete and
gets rejected from the network.
best wishes, and thanks for running relays!
--
Nick
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access - I ssh in by requesting
a temporary (time-limited) console from Solus, and it gives me a
one-time strong password to use for that). Is this plausible? perhaps
the next step is to send all this to Edis support and see if they
noticed anything unusual around 17:19 last Friday?
Thanks a
On 26/10/14 19:46, Geoff Down wrote:
Hello Nick,
I hop you don't mind a few pointers on this based on my experience of
hacked sites:
When listing directories, use 'ls -alct' to show hidden files as well,
and the ctime rather than the mtime - mtime is trivial to falsify.
ng
list, so that other folks can add improvements for it. (Though I hope
that expert packages in some form will return soon.)
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trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11476 has more
background here. I don't think it's the likeliest explanation, but
it's worth examining.
Are the people experiencing this issue using similar allocators?
--
Nick
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this fixed in
0.2.6.1-alpha with this commit:
d1fa0163e571913b8e4972c5c8a2d46798f46156
And this ticket:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13325
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On Tue, Dec 23, 2014 at 12:00 PM, Seth wrote:
> On Tue, 23 Dec 2014 06:33:44 -0800, Nick Mathewson
> wrote:
>>
>> What version of Tor are you using here? I think we have this fixed in
>> 0.2.6.1-alpha with this commit:
>>d1fa0163e571913b8e4972c5c8a2d
On Wed, Dec 24, 2014 at 5:15 PM, Seth wrote:
> On Tue, 23 Dec 2014 09:16:56 -0800, Nick Mathewson
> wrote:
>>
>> Strange! There is code in git master that is supposed to prevent
>> this.
>
>
> Yes, I thought it had been fixed by your commit from this tic
e
greatest idea for users' privacy, having one DNS provider that gets to
see so many requests. It's probably a better idea to have your own
local cacheing DNS server.
Would anybody like to share a guide about how to set one of those up
safely and migrate correctly?
t; has uploaded a new draft. Do we think this is better
than nothing and worth shipping with Tor, or does it need big changes?
If possible, please write comments on the trac ticket above: it will help
keep all the discussion in one place.
best wishes,
--
Nick
ix on 0.0.8pre1.
If that's so, the likeliest explanation is that Globe is not
displaying the bandwidths correctly with the new intervals. Trying to
get it investigated...
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https:/
On Wed, Mar 4, 2015 at 5:26 AM, wrote:
> Cipher-downgrade CVE-2015-0204 fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.1k.
>
> usual sensational write-up courtesy of El-Reg
>
> http://theregister.co.uk/security
I believe this doesn't affect Tor relays or clients, because we have
never supported export ciphers or generate
ately afterwards, the process killed itself for no reason.
What version of Tor did these relays run? Is it possible that one of
the crash bugs fixed in 0.2.5.11 is to blame?
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Also, if you can possibly avoid it, it would be a good idea to stop
using the OpenSSL 0.9.8 series entirely. It's old and crufty and is
missing many security improvements in later versions. OpenSSL 0.9.8
will not be supported in Tor 0.2.7.2-alpha or later.
best wishes, and many thanks!
--
TL;DR: Stable non-exit relays can help tor clients use the Tor
network. Please opt-in!
We want to run a trial of fallback directory mirrors (fallbacks) in
Tor. Tor clients contact fallbacks to download the consensus during
initial bootstrap, before they contact the directory authorities.
Fallback
gt;
> Tor 0.2.3.7-alpha (git-a1a44384422174d9) on Linux x86_64
>
> Any developper wants logging?
If it crashes or asserts, stack traces would be ideal.
(Best place to report bugs is trac.torproject.org, if it's not too
much trouble. That way we can't lose track
1 (https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4371 ).
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I'm showing that tor is currently using 12 - 14 Mbps on my relay, however,
the status page for my relay (
http://torstatus.blutmagie.de/router_detail.php?FP=192bdf2831c1b007a08dc3c1d7e36be16b5cf1c6
)
does not reflect this speed. Is there a reason for this?
On Mon, Jan 23, 2012 at 2:27 PM, Geoff Down wrote:
> Can anyone help with this please?
>
> % sudo ./configure --with-libevent-dir=/opt/local/lib/ && make && make
> install
> -> checking for libevent directory... configure: WARNING: We found the
> libraries for libevent, but we could not find the C
we
haven't already. If somebody looking at the code would correct me,
I'd appreciate that.)
Also, there are a few relatively uncommon name lookup types that can
use the platform resolver rather than Tor's code. For example,
hostnames specified in the torrc file are pretty much
otely. To avoid that, I'd recommend
that all Tor nodes running any version of OpenSSL 1.0.1 should upgrade
to 1.0.1c.
Non-1.0.1 version of OpenSSL have this bug in their DTLS
implementations, but Tor doesn't use DTLS.
We'll try to get new packages out
ation you listed there, and it seemed to
work out okay for me. It might be easier to diagnose if you could
upload your entire torrc, and the entire output of starting Tor up to
the point where it says "failed to parse/validate config:"
hth,
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and IPv6 hacks will probably happen in 0.2.4.x, time and development
energy permitting
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r
path as "tor", or something like that?
yrs,
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On Tue, Jul 17, 2012 at 12:07 AM, Scott Bennett wrote:
> Hi Nick,
> On Wed, 11 Jul 2012 11:33:52 -0400 Nick Mathewson
> wrote:
>>On Sun, Jul 8, 2012 at 4:19 AM, Scott Bennett wrote:
>>> While testing my torrc with 0.2.3.18-rc, I tried adding the
>>
5A65D9C242359983718A19650A25F7.
This looks like bug #6475. Those warnings should be suppressed in
0.2.3.31-rc and fixed for real in 0.2.4.x.
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relay?
Any other configuration info would be helpful here too.
(To answer your question: looking through the changelogs, and the
commit logs for src/or/circuitbuild.c and src/or/routerlist.c, I can't
find anything that stands out to me as something that might cause an
ExcludeNodes regression. So more investigation will be needed!)
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On Tue, Sep 11, 2012 at 4:48 PM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
> Nick Mathewson:
>> On Tue, Sep 11, 2012 at 1:12 PM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
>>> Hi Scott,
>>>
>>> It is nice to see you posting again, I had wondered where you had gone.
>>>
>>> Scot
for 0.2.4 too, so
we'll have to see whether it gets done in time. (The feature I want MOST
for 0.2.4 is "comes out on schedule.")
yrs,
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looks like it was previously noted
> under 4171, with the cause being 4641. Both now fixed.
>
> Should I be concerned over this?
Probably not. The likeliest explanation (from what I can tell) is
somebody else running an old buggy version
ut the details, have a look at section 6.2 of
dir-spec.txt (which should probably be better written; I found it
pretty confusing when I looked just now), and at
node_get_by_nickname() in src/or/nodelist.c in the Tor source.
best wishes,
--
Nick
_
limits the size of
the queue based on the expected time to clear it.
(Another thing to look at would be the output of ./src/test/bench in
the 0.2.4.x package.)
yrs,
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d nowadays?
It's still correct.
> Would this be useful to set on machines with limited memory
> resources, e.g. the Raspberry Pi?
Probably not -- it has no effect except on Windows.
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way of "Don't look too closely, and hope for the best at the end of the
month" was *not* a good idea.
Nick Sheppard
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On 08/12/13 18:54, Runa A. Sandvik wrote:
On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 at 4:00 PM, Nick Sheppard wrote:
Hi all,
Hi Nick,
At the end of the month I got a bill for 120 dollars. And Amazon were quite
right - they were charging me for the 1024 GB of storage I had accidentally
asked for by not changing
Hi Roger,
Thanks for responding so quickly!
On 08/12/13 18:29, Roger Dingledine wrote:
On Sun, Dec 08, 2013 at 04:00:06PM +, Nick Sheppard wrote:
At the end of the month I got a bill for 120 dollars. And Amazon
were quite right - they were charging me for the 1024 GB of storage
I had
On 08/12/13 19:02, Nick wrote:
Quoth Roger Dingledine:
On Sun, Dec 08, 2013 at 04:00:06PM +, Nick Sheppard wrote:
At the end of the month I got a bill for 120 dollars. And Amazon
were quite right - they were charging me for the 1024 GB of storage
I had accidentally asked for by not
On 08/12/13 23:22, Runa A. Sandvik wrote:
On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 at 10:26 PM, Nick Sheppard wrote:
On 08/12/13 19:02, Nick wrote:
Quoth Roger Dingledine:
On Sun, Dec 08, 2013 at 04:00:06PM +, Nick Sheppard wrote:
At the end of the month I got a bill for 120 dollars. And Amazon
were
goes into charging e.g. $1.
Robert
... and that is what I should have done. And will do next time.
Nick Sheppard
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ign there is still sound, but it needs some C hackers with
spare time.
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.2.5.x, the ntor handshake is on by default no matter what the
consensus says.)
yrs,
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trying an attack.
(If somebody _were_ trying an attack, this would be a stupid one,
since it wouldn't work against any Tor software I'm aware of.)
peace,
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On 09/12/13 02:28, Runa A. Sandvik wrote:
On Mon, Dec 9, 2013 at 1:49 AM, Nick Sheppard wrote:
On 08/12/13 23:22, Runa A. Sandvik wrote:
On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 at 10:26 PM, Nick Sheppard
wrote:
On 08/12/13 19:02, Nick wrote:
Quoth Roger Dingledine:
On Sun, Dec 08, 2013 at 04:00:06PM
On 30/03/14 17:02, Runa A. Sandvik wrote:
On Sun, Mar 30, 2014 at 3:29 PM, Nick Sheppard wrote:
Hi Runa (and AWS users),
Hi Nick,
Did we ever get to the bottom of the default storage/AMI copying issue? I'd
like to have another go at setting up a Tor relay on AWS eu-west-1.
I haven&
sandbox code, once Tor 0.2.5.4-alpha is out. It's present in
Tor 0.2.5.3-alpha, but it's kind of buggy.)
Also, see bug #11232
(https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11232) for the stuff
I found running under AddressSanitizer and ubsan already.
best wishes,
--
Nick
__
down "bugs" which are actually "user errors"),
>> but I don't have the knowledge to say whether this is a bug or not...
>>
>> Any thoughts?
>>
I think this is a symptom of bug #10801 and isn't your fault at all.
It can happen when you run the unit test
use a cryptographic identifier instead of a unique ID or a list:
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/torspec/-/blob/main/proposals/321-happy-families.md
I'd be curious to know whether relay operators think this proposal
would be usable for them; wh
handshake was some facets of the v2 onion
service protocol, and that's now been fully deprecated. So I wouldn't
personally worry about TAP too much.
hoping this helps and I haven't screwed up my analysis,
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connections with one another.
This is caused by a regression in OpenSSL 1.1.1a's implementation of
tls13_hkdf_expand() function. For more information, see
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/28616
We're looking into possible mitigations.
best wishes
On Sat, Dec 1, 2018 at 8:40 PM Paul wrote:
>
> I have run into this issue just now and iam curious if i can "just"
> downgrade back or if there is any other way to workaround?
>
I think that it's okay to downgrade to 1.1.1 for Tor's purposes: the
two security vulnerabilities fixed in 1.1.1a are ab
On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 9:52 PM Alexander Nasonov wrote:
>
> I recently tried updating one of my relays to Tor 0.4.0.1 compiled
> with NSS (and without OpenSSL) but it failed to start, see the logs
> below. I wonder if this configuration is supported at all and
> whether I should try running a bra
I finally figured this one out, though it took a lot
longer than I had expected. There's a patch linked from ticket 29241
(https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/29241) that works for
me.
If all goes well, this fix should go into the next
On Thu, Nov 21, 2019 at 5:03 AM Logforme wrote:
[...]
>
> Should I open a ticket?
Very interesting! Yes, a ticket would be welcome. Actually, this
_might_ be the same as #16423 , which stalled a while ago due to
difficulty reproducing. But I'm not quite sure: that ticket is very
old, and the
-- Forwarded message -
From: Nick Mathewson
Date: Mon, Mar 16, 2020 at 1:25 PM
Subject: Upcoming Tor security releases to fix a denial-of-service issue
To:
Hello!
Some time this week, we currently plan to put out a set of security
updates for all supported versions of Tor
is a super-important change that needs to
happen to the list before it goes in any alphas. Otherwise, please
don't worry if you don't get a reply until David is back.
best wishes to all,
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we should allow UTF-8 for values, at least. It looks
like we're standardizing on UTF-8 as our character encoding for
directory documents in Proposal 285.
cheers,
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a ticket to label them right at
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/torspec/-/issues/1
> Is prop-285 already implemented in tor?
Partially. Directory authorities reject anything that isn't UTF-8, in
dirserv_add_multiple_descriptors().
> In that case I'm happy to add UTF-8 as recomm
ject.org/rs.html#details/92E807AC5E23CCD9FE623EA4DC020B1627A0D09B
>
> https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/AC5CECEF6AF649F2A7F047D102FE9B461DA9234E
>
> They havnt exit-flag. Why it happen?
Onion services don't need to use exit nodes, since their traffic
doesn&#
s might all change in the future: generally, it's a lot safer to
take a formerly non-working configuration and make it permitted than
it is to take a working configuration and disallow it.
cheers,
--
Nick
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fix.
I haven't tested this bug, but I believe that it would allow an
adversary to remotely crash Tor relays and authorities. It won't have
any effect on Tor clients.
I suggest that everybody should upgrade to the latest OpenSSL when it
becomes available on their platform.
best wishes
se?
If I'm left to my own devices, I will probably just implement option
2 for now, but leave the door open for option 3 in the future.
best wishes,
--
Nick
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On Sat, Nov 6, 2021 at 10:36 AM Nick Mathewson wrote:
> Hello, relay operators!
>
> I'm hoping to get some feedback from relay operators, particularly
> those who use the MyFamily option, about the best way to deploy
> proposal 321. You can read the prop
chosen as the exit.)
Now I realize that this attack is somewhat self-limiting, since it is less
helpful the larger the attacker becomes. Still, because of this attack
(and in case there are even better ones) it seems best to authenticate
family membership.
cheers,
--
Nick
On Sat, Nov 6, 2021 at 10:36 AM Nick Mathewson wrote:
> Hello, relay operators!
>
> I'm hoping to get some feedback from relay operators, particularly
> those who use the MyFamily option, about the best way to deploy
> proposal 321. You can read the prop
On Tue, Dec 14, 2021 at 1:07 PM nusenu wrote:
> Nick Mathewson:
> > 1) The proposal currently limits each relay to no more than 3 families.
> > Is that a reasonable upper bound?
>
> Yes, 3 is a reasonable limit.
>
> > 2) We hadn't been planning to implemen
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