Re: [tor-relays] Reapply exit policy on reload

2024-08-10 Thread trinity pointard
The DoSCircuitCreation/DoSConnection configs are unrelated to what ReevaluateExitPolicy allows. DoSCircuitCreation/DoSConnection are enacted by guards, to protect themselves, and to some extent the rest of the network, from "noisy IPs" trying to connect to Tor. ReevaluateExitPolicy is not a DoS opt

Re: [tor-relays] Reapply exit policy on reload

2024-08-10 Thread George Hartley via tor-relays
P.S: If this is a client to guard detection only, then why does my exit node also block a significant amount of DoS (I had around the same statistics when my guard probability fraction was still zero, so clearly something is working): > Aug 09 21:08:36 matrix tor[XXX]: Aug 09 21:08:36.000 [noti

Re: [tor-relays] Reapply exit policy on reload

2024-08-10 Thread George Hartley via tor-relays
I am very well aware of that and how it works, I have seen your commit that got merged, and am a C/C++ programmer as well. Nevertheless, this is a feature I wanted anyway, so I could just reload the config and block IP's or even ranges if SSH range / portscans are done using my exit. Right now

Re: [tor-relays] Recent Tor versions not reloading config on / ignoring HUP kill signal.

2024-08-10 Thread George Hartley via tor-relays
Can this get some attention please? A temporary fix seems to be to either patch the two magic constants of MIN/MAX_THREADS mentioned in the bugtracker, or to not use the seccomp syscall sandbox. Both not obviously not the best options. Regards, George On Saturday, January 13th, 2024 at 6:29 PM

Re: [tor-relays] Reapply exit policy on reload

2024-08-10 Thread lists
On Samstag, 10. August 2024 00:58:29 CEST George Hartley via tor-relays wrote: > Then these must be targeted attacks, as I have never encountered something > like this during 10 years of relay operation under different providers and > aliases. Of course, these are targeted attacks and have been ex

Re: [tor-relays] Reapply exit policy on reload

2024-08-10 Thread lists
On Samstag, 10. August 2024 05:25:51 CEST George Hartley via tor-relays wrote: > If this is a client to guard detection only, then why does my exit node also block a significant amount of DoS (I had around the same statistics when my guard probability fraction was still zero, so clearly somethin

Re: [tor-relays] Reapply exit policy on reload

2024-08-10 Thread lists
On Samstag, 10. August 2024 14:38:27 CEST George Hartley via tor-relays wrote: > I am very well aware of that and how it works, I have seen your commit that > got merged, and am a C/C++ programmer as well. > > Nevertheless, this is a feature I wanted anyway, so I could just reload the > config and