Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

2018-02-12 Thread Karsten Loesing
On 2018-02-08 19:48, to...@protonmail.com wrote: > Whatever you decide, I think you should have this mentioned in the setup docs > for bridges. We have the following explanation in the manual: "Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line can be used to contact you if y

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

2018-02-12 Thread Karsten Loesing
On 2018-02-11 00:43, nusenu wrote: >> Possible advantages are: >> - Relay Search would support searching for bridges by contact information. >> - People who keep a watching eye on the Tor network could reach out to >> bridge operators to inform them that they're running an outdated tor/PT >> vers

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

2018-02-12 Thread Alexander Dietrich
On 2018-02-11 00:43, nusenu wrote: - we could tell operators that running obfs3 and obfs4 is a bad idea Are you saying obfs3 and obfs4 shouldn't run simultaneously on the same bridge? That would be good to know indeed. - we could tell operator that exposing their vanilla ORPort is a bad id

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

2018-02-12 Thread nusenu
Once the decision has been made to publish contactInfo, people with access to the current contactInfo (bridgeDB, isis?) should sent current bridge operators a pre-notice about the upcoming change so they have a chance to react to it. I assume you will not implement this change retroactively (only

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

2018-02-12 Thread Karsten Loesing
On 2018-02-12 11:39, nusenu wrote: > Once the decision has been made to publish contactInfo, people with > access to the current contactInfo (bridgeDB, isis?) should sent current > bridge operators > a pre-notice about the upcoming change so they have a chance to react to it. > > I assume you wil

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

2018-02-12 Thread Karsten Loesing
On 2018-02-12 11:19, Alexander Dietrich wrote: > On 2018-02-11 00:43, nusenu wrote: > >> - we could tell operators that running obfs3 and obfs4 is a bad idea > > Are you saying obfs3 and obfs4 shouldn't run simultaneously on the same > bridge? That would be good to know indeed. Citing from the I

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

2018-02-12 Thread nusenu
>> If you block the ORPort, won't the reachability check fail? > > Fine question. At least this has been the case in the past, though I > know there was discussion and maybe development to overcome this > weakness. But even if it's not possible yet, having bridge contact > information would allow

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

2018-02-12 Thread entensaison
  Am Montag, 12. Februar 2018 um 12:33 schrieb nusenu :   If you block the ORPort, won't the reachability check fail? Fine question. At least this has been the case in the past, though I know there was discussion and maybe development to overcome this weakness. But even if it's not possible ye

[tor-relays] 1 circuit using 1.5Gig or ram? [0.3.3.2-alpha]

2018-02-12 Thread Stijn Jonker
Hi all, So in general 0.3.3.1-alpha-dev and 0.3.3.2-alpha running on two nodes without any connection limits on the iptables firewall seems to be a lot more robust against the recent increase in clients (or possible [D]DoS). But tonight for a short period of time one of the relays was running

Re: [tor-relays] 1 circuit using 1.5Gig or ram? [0.3.3.2-alpha]

2018-02-12 Thread tor
I see this occasionally. It's not specific to 0.3.3.x. I reported it back in October 2017: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2017-October/013328.html Roger replied here: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2017-October/013334.html MaxMemInQueues is set to 1.5 GB b

Re: [tor-relays] 1 circuit using 1.5Gig or ram? [0.3.3.2-alpha]

2018-02-12 Thread David Goulet
On 12 Feb (20:09:35), Stijn Jonker wrote: > Hi all, > > So in general 0.3.3.1-alpha-dev and 0.3.3.2-alpha running on two nodes > without any connection limits on the iptables firewall seems to be a lot > more robust against the recent increase in clients (or possible [D]DoS). But > tonight for a s

Re: [tor-relays] 1 circuit using 1.5Gig or ram? [0.3.3.2-alpha]

2018-02-12 Thread Stijn Jonker
Hi Tor & Others, On 12 Feb 2018, at 20:29, tor wrote: I see this occasionally. It's not specific to 0.3.3.x. I reported it back in October 2017: Thx, I more or less added the version in the subject to clearly indicate it was on an alpha release https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-r

Re: [tor-relays] 1 circuit using 1.5Gig or ram? [0.3.3.2-alpha]

2018-02-12 Thread Stijn Jonker
Hi David, On 12 Feb 2018, at 20:44, David Goulet wrote: > On 12 Feb (20:09:35), Stijn Jonker wrote: >> Hi all, >> >> So in general 0.3.3.1-alpha-dev and 0.3.3.2-alpha running on two nodes >> without any connection limits on the iptables firewall seems to be a lot >> more robust against the recent

Re: [tor-relays] 1 circuit using 1.5Gig or ram? [0.3.3.2-alpha]

2018-02-12 Thread David Goulet
On 12 Feb (21:14:14), Stijn Jonker wrote: > Hi David, > > On 12 Feb 2018, at 20:44, David Goulet wrote: > > > On 12 Feb (20:09:35), Stijn Jonker wrote: > >> Hi all, > >> > >> So in general 0.3.3.1-alpha-dev and 0.3.3.2-alpha running on two nodes > >> without any connection limits on the iptables

[tor-relays] 1 circuit using 1.5Gig or ram? [0.3.3.2-alpha]

2018-02-12 Thread starlight . 2017q4
On 12 Feb (19:44:02 UTC), David Goulet wrote: >Wow... 1599323088 bytes is insane. This should _not_ happen for only 1 >circuit. We actually have checks in place to avoid this but it seems they >either totally failed or we have a edge case. > >Can you tell me what scheduler were you using (look for