Re: [tor-relays] CVE-2015-7547 Tor network stats

2016-02-23 Thread Louie Cardone-Noott
Based on the exploit, aren't, at most, only the exits vulnerable? I didn't think middles would do any DNS resolving. Those like me running debian and putting off doing a reboot might find needrestart (package of same name) and checkrestart (package debian-goodies) useful. On Tue, 23 Feb 2016, at

Re: [tor-relays] CVE-2015-7547 Tor network stats

2016-02-23 Thread nusenu
> you say that 64% of the guard relays and 51% of the exit relaysare are > unpatched ? These numbers are not based on relaycount but on guard/exit probability (so it takes a relay's contributed bandwidth/consensus weight into account). If you are more interested in relay counts: 3754 out of 7268

Re: [tor-relays] CVE-2015-7547 Tor network stats

2016-02-23 Thread nusenu
Louie Cardone-Noott: > Based on the exploit, aren't, at most, only the exits vulnerable? I > didn't think middles would do any DNS resolving. I didn't mean to imply that tor does the relevant DNS lookup but most servers will do DNS lookups at some point (even if not caused by tor). signature.as

Re: [tor-relays] CVE-2015-7547 Tor network stats

2016-02-23 Thread Toralf Förster
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Louie Cardone-Noott: > Those like me running debian and putting off doing a reboot might find > needrestart (package of same name) and checkrestart (package > debian-goodies) useful. Under Gentoo "lib_users -s" is a useful command IMO to see if a in

Re: [tor-relays] CVE-2015-7547 Tor network stats

2016-02-23 Thread Tom van der Woerdt
Op 23/02/16 om 22:10 schreef Toralf Förster: > Louie Cardone-Noott: >> Those like me running debian and putting off doing a reboot might find >> needrestart (package of same name) and checkrestart (package >> debian-goodies) useful. > > Under Gentoo "lib_users -s" is a useful command IMO to see if

Re: [tor-relays] CVE-2015-7547 Tor network stats

2016-02-23 Thread Random Tor Node Operator
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 23.02.2016 22:12, Tom van der Woerdt wrote: > Op 23/02/16 om 22:10 schreef Toralf Förster: >> Louie Cardone-Noott: >>> Those like me running debian and putting off doing a reboot >>> might find needrestart (package of same name) and checkrestart >>>

Re: [tor-relays] Reminder: exit nodes probably shouldn't be using Google's DNS servers

2016-02-23 Thread nusenu
I guess another reminder doesn't hurt since Google is still the most prevalent DNS server on the tor network, accounting for ~25% of tor exit bw. https://nymity.ch/dns-traffic-correlation/img/top-exit-resolvers.png https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/metrics-team/2016-February/78.html

Re: [tor-relays] Reminder: exit nodes probably shouldn't be using Google's DNS servers

2016-02-23 Thread Tristan
That link almost makes it seem like we shouldn't use any public DNS servers. Can you reliably run an exit server on just a local resolver? I have Unbound, OpenDNS, and Google DNS on my exit relay, and I still get "all nameservers failed." Also, does this apply to Orbot? Because the latest update c

Re: [tor-relays] Reminder: exit nodes probably shouldn't be using Google's DNS servers

2016-02-23 Thread elrippo
Try https://www.opennicproject.org/ On Dienstag, 23. Februar 2016, 19:16:30 Tristan wrote: > That link almost makes it seem like we shouldn't use any public DNS > servers. Can you reliably run an exit server on just a local resolver? I > have Unbound, OpenDNS, and Google DNS on my exit relay, and

Re: [tor-relays] Reminder: exit nodes probably shouldn't be using Google's DNS servers

2016-02-23 Thread Larry Brandt
Same for me Tristan.  It's becoming a problem here.  My last notices.log.gz was over a meg in length.  About 40,000 pages per month on a small exit.  Most entries were dns related. Larry On 2/23/2016 5:16 PM, Tristan wrote: That link almost makes it s