I want to setup a Tor relay, but know nothing. Got a minute to read a page of
questions?
On Thursday, April 17, 2014 10:27:31 PM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
On Fri, Apr 18, 2014 at 01:40:17AM +0200, Tobias Markus wrote:
>> Tor circuits (a "way" through the Tor network) and thus nodes are
>> ent
On Thu, Apr 17, 2014 at 12:17:02AM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> Thanks Andrea. 374 of the 380 lines from Sina's file overlap with yours.
>
> I've moved moria1 to reject the union of the two lists.
Four other directory authority operators have also blacklisted these keys,
and they've now been
On Fri, Apr 18, 2014 at 01:40:17AM +0200, Tobias Markus wrote:
> Tor circuits (a "way" through the Tor network) and thus nodes are
> entirely chosen by clients based on the consensus given by dirauths
> (see my earlier post). The ExcludeNodes statement you use basically
> instructs the Tor *client*
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Hi,
(again a Disclaimer: I am not a Tor dev/guru and might be talking
bullsh*t.)
Tor circuits (a "way" through the Tor network) and thus nodes are
entirely chosen by clients based on the consensus given by dirauths
(see my earlier post). The ExcludeN
Perl script attached which I made to take this !reject formatted list
of bleeding tor nodes and reformat it into a mega-long ExcludeNodes
line and put it at the end of my exit node's torrc. My tor daemon did
not bomb or complain upon seeing the line.
Hopefully that is the right way to use that
Thanks Andrea, Thanks Scott,
Keys have been replaced and I tested the relay with the script on
github as well. I guess it was something stupid like forgetting to
restart.
For the rest: test your server via the script on
https://github.com/wwwiretap/bleeding
Andrea Shepard wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 17, 2014 at 08:58:46PM +0200, Lars Kumbier wrote:
> > I'm supposedly running one of the still affected tor-relays and since my
> > relay is also a guard, I'm in the latest blocklist[1] (pre-upgrade
> > fingerprint). I did upgrade the system on April 9th to open
On Thu, Apr 17, 2014 at 09:20:10PM +0200, Yoriz wrote:
> Dear Andrea,
>
> Could you please elaborate if/how we can use your file on a Tor node? Should
> we use these as 'ExcludeNodes' rules in the `torrc` configuration files of
> our Tor nodes? Or is the file merely intended for Tor clients?
It
Dear Andrea,
Could you please elaborate if/how we can use your file on a Tor node? Should we
use these as 'ExcludeNodes' rules in the `torrc` configuration files of our Tor
nodes? Or is the file merely intended for Tor clients?
Best regards,
Yoriz -- Operator of the privshield.com Tor exit node
I'm supposedly running one of the still affected tor-relays and since my
relay is also a guard, I'm in the latest blocklist[1] (pre-upgrade
fingerprint). I did upgrade the system on April 9th to openssl
1.0.1-4ubuntu5.12 - base system is an ubuntu 12.04.
According to the changelog[2], this should
On Thu, Apr 17, 2014 at 08:58:46PM +0200, Lars Kumbier wrote:
> I'm supposedly running one of the still affected tor-relays and since my
> relay is also a guard, I'm in the latest blocklist[1] (pre-upgrade
> fingerprint). I did upgrade the system on April 9th to openssl
> 1.0.1-4ubuntu5.12 - base s
A lot of relay operators were contacted within 12 hours of the
heartbleed bug being published. Of course, not everyone lists their mail
address in the directory, so those didn't get contacted.
Tom
AJ B schreef op 17/04/14 20:04:
Can we do anything to attempt to contact those relay operators
Can we do anything to attempt to contact those relay operators that
are still affected by Heartbleed?
I might be a little late to the discussion and this has already taken
place, just wanted to check.
On Thu, Apr 17, 2014 at 9:47 AM, Saint Aardvark the Carpeted
wrote:
> Tobias, thanks so much fo
Tobias, thanks so much for the explanation!
--
Saint Aardvark the Carpeted
http://saintaardvarkthecarpeted.com
Because the plural of Anecdote is Myth.
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I was going to ask something similar, and this sounds like the best kind of
answer - 'you don't need to do anything' :D
On 17 April 2014 17:05, Tobias Markus wrote:
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA1
>
> Hi,
>
> (Disclaimer: I am just a "regular" supporter and have no great
> in-
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
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Hi,
(Disclaimer: I am just a "regular" supporter and have no great
in-depth knowledge about Tor internals.)
there is a difference between a directory *authority* and a directory
*mirror*. There are only 8 or so directory authorities in the Tor
networ
Roger Dingledine disturbed my sleep to write:
> On Wed, Apr 16, 2014 at 08:03:51PM -0700, Andrea Shepard wrote:
> > > http://charon.persephoneslair.org/~andrea/private/hb-fingerprints-20140417002500.txt
> >
> > The SHA-256 hash of that file, for the sake of stating it under a PGP
> > signature, is:
On 04/17/2014 12:17 AM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
On Wed, Apr 16, 2014 at 08:03:51PM -0700, Andrea Shepard wrote:
http://charon.persephoneslair.org/~andrea/private/hb-fingerprints-20140417002500.txt
The SHA-256 hash of that file, for the sake of stating it under a PGP
signature, is:
dadd2beca51
FYI guys - The Guardian just published an article about the effect of
Heartbleed on the network:
Tor may be forced to cut back capacity after Heartbleed bug
http://gu.com/p/3zfqj
On 17 Apr 2014 12:51, "Steve Snyder" wrote:
> On 04/17/2014 12:17 AM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Apr 16, 2
On Wed, Apr 16, 2014 at 08:03:51PM -0700, Andrea Shepard wrote:
> > http://charon.persephoneslair.org/~andrea/private/hb-fingerprints-20140417002500.txt
>
> The SHA-256 hash of that file, for the sake of stating it under a PGP
> signature, is:
>
> dadd2beca51d1d5cd7ffe7d3fe3a57200c7de7e136cad23b0
On Wed, Apr 16, 2014 at 06:24:40PM -0700, Andrea Shepard wrote:
> A list of 1777 proposed reject lines of fingerprints which have
> ever turned up as potentially exposed by Heartbleed in my scans
> is available at the URL below. This was generated with the following
> query:
>
> (select distinct
A list of 1777 proposed reject lines of fingerprints which have
ever turned up as potentially exposed by Heartbleed in my scans
is available at the URL below. This was generated with the following
query:
(select distinct
hb.probe_identity_digest as identity_digest
from
heartbleed_probe_result
22 matches
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