Sorry, slight correction, instead of NIC / network card, I meant the internet
connection established by the modem itself.
Same for cable and fiber, but those usually have higher download speed, and
that's what it comes down to when facing DoS attacks, how many megabytes an
attacker needs to put
If there is DoS on bridges on domestic connections, or connections with very
low throughput, then handling (D)DoS at an application layer becomes futile -
it will simply overload the NIC.
But for bridges on at least 100MbE ports, this would be a nice addition.
On Sunday, August 11th, 2024 at 9:
Since it is still all fresh in our heads, I wanted to pitch an idea real fast.
No idea if it was covered at a tor meeting at some point.
For bridge relay operators, such as those with very low bandwidth, it may be
worth it to keep lower-than-consensus-restrictions using the DOS flags here
https
