On 2016-03-26 01:36, stea...@nym.mixmin.net wrote:
ExitNodes {PL}, {RO}, {LU}, {DK}, {CH}, {NO}, {AN}, {LI}, {IS},
{FI}, {NL}, {HU}, {BG}
ExcludeNodes {US}, {CN}, {FR}, {UK}, {ES}, {IT}, {AU}, {HK}, {RU},
{PT}, {IL}, {IE}, {DE}, {CA}, {BE}, {NZ}, {PR}, {MX}, {KP}, {KR},
{GR}, {DJ}, {JP}
StrictExi
you clarify? I believe that what you actually mean is "Google refuse to
serve certain videos to German IPs", which is not the exit censoring the Tor
user, correct?
--
- cacahuatl
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https://0xcaca0.co.uk/
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De
e of using other services over Tor, YMMV and funneling
arbitrary application traffic through Tor is no guarantee of anonymity
and if it's send over Tor with Tor Browser or a system service is
unlikely to make a meaningful impact.
- - cacahuatl
[1] - https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbro
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I'm not a big fan of adding more complexity to "impove" security.
With fail2ban [1] you run the risk of, for example, someone
bruteforcing your ssh from every exit node they can find, then your
relay blocking those exits meaning there are certain ci
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Markus Hitter:
> Am 24.01.2015 um 17:16 schrieb Matthew Anderson:
>> But I have to ask, why would you want to connect to freenode
>> from an exit relay when you can connect from within?
>
> - It adds unneccessary load to the Tor network.
>
Most o
If you're caching exit traffic and a very naughty person uses your exit,
you've potentially cached "evidence" (to be seized). Also likely has
interesting legal questions, eg. 'if you're actually storing the
content, then do you "possess" it?' ymmv with jurisdiction and ianal.
eric gisse:
> Why? Pe
> tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
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cacahuatl
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