[tor-relays] Self hosting bridge at home - de-anonymization risk?

2025-04-05 Thread bjewrn2a--- via tor-relays
> All Tor relays -- even non-exit relays -- are in a public list. Many > sites and services block access to all traffic coming from a Tor relay > IP address. Either they don't understand how Tor works or (more likely, > in my experience) they're just hostile to Tor. > > If you host a relay on your

[tor-relays] Self hosting bridge at home - de-anonymization risk?

2025-04-05 Thread bjewrn2a--- via tor-relays
> I would worry about my IP address at home ending up on a blacklist, even > with a bridge. Google and Microsoft have hidden blacklists with secret > criteria to be listed there, and to get off them once listed is a > long-winded pain. You only know there is an issue when emails won't > arrive

[tor-relays] Self hosting bridge at home - de-anonymization risk?

2025-04-05 Thread bjewrn2a--- via tor-relays
> >> The more Tor traffic goes through the machine that identifies you,  > >> the more confused an adversary is. It also makes > >> naïve correlation attacks impossible,⁽¹⁾ and increases cost of more > >> advanced ones. > >To know why Tor Project itself doesn’t speak on this matter, you’d > ne

[tor-relays] Self hosting bridge at home - de-anonymization risk?

2025-03-28 Thread bjewrn2a--- via tor-relays
>My personal opinion is that hosting a bridge or middle at your home doesn't >risk de-anonymizing Thank you, I am counting on that too. However, I haven't seen it recommended anywhere else before. Are you aware of any articles or studies backing this up? If that's a preferred setup I would have

[tor-relays] Self hosting bridge at home - de-anonymization risk?

2025-03-27 Thread bjewrn2a--- via tor-relays
> > but what if you used tor normally, not through your own bridge, but through > > "regular" randomly chosen 3-hop circuits and at the same time run a tor > > relay > > (entry/middle)  > This wouldn't require weakening the tor circuit model > anymore. Yes, this is correct. The more Tor traffic g

[tor-relays] Self hosting bridge at home - de-anonymization risk?

2025-03-27 Thread bjewrn2a--- via tor-relays
> I have a non-exit node at home, and (...) I use Torbrowser that connects with > the usual 3 hops. Thanks Marco, yes, that's what I'm hoping to setup now, as well, however I haven't seen this setup recommended on the official torproject websites. If you are aware of any published studies or anyt

[tor-relays] Self hosting bridge at home - de-anonymization risk?

2025-03-26 Thread bjewrn2a--- via tor-relays
s7r > Why do you think this is a good setup, what do you think it provides in > addition to the default usage? I thought this will let you blend in your traffic and hide it from your ISP, however as you mentioned later this may be not worth the risk (if it's of any benefit, at all). Also a vangua

[tor-relays] Re: Self hosting bridge at home - de-anonymization risk?

2025-03-26 Thread bjewrn2a--- via tor-relays
Thank you mpan, I agree, is the problem that I am using: 1. the same entry node for every circuit? 2. entry node can be traced to me directly, because it's hosted in my geographic location (at home)? I agree that blending your traffic with other users is security by obscurity and it's not worth th

[tor-relays] Self hosting bridge at home - de-anonymization risk?

2025-03-25 Thread bjewrn2a--- via tor-relays
is there any documentation on self-hosting a bridge at home and using it for your own connections? I am trying to understand why this isn't a recommended setup, would it lead to de-anonymization? Why/how much? your traffic blends with other users directly via the same connection other users use y