Re: [tor-relays] Terraform to deploy Tor Relays

2022-01-16 Thread abuse department
> > The focus is on running on cloud hosting providers, currently supported cloud > services are digitalocean, vultr and heztner. You did check the price lists? signature.asc Description: Message signed with OpenPGP ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-

Re: [tor-relays] General overload -> DNS timeouts

2021-12-16 Thread abuse department
+1 > On 16. Dec 2021, at 14:47, John Csuti via tor-relays > wrote: > > Signed PGP part > I agree its kinda pointless if you know the issue already... > > Thanks, > John C. > > > > On 2021-12-16 08:41 AM, nusenu wrote: > >> >> To stop confusing operators it would make sense to remove the >

Re: [tor-relays] Responding to Tor censorship in Russia

2021-12-11 Thread abuse department
Correct! Bridges weren't involved in the last attack thats why bridges will never be involved in a future attack in a highly dynamic environment. You cant make this shit up. > > AFAIK, bridges weren't involved in the last attack. But, maybe others > folks here could have different evidences an

Re: [tor-relays] Responding to Tor censorship in Russia

2021-12-11 Thread abuse department
Sorry for this post but it pisses me off so much. We now have terms and conditions how well known Tor relay operators are allowed to donate their own money in form of IPs, BW and CPU cycles without getting anything back? > > If censorship in Russia scale to a country-wide Tor block, then you

Re: [tor-relays] Responding to Tor censorship in Russia

2021-12-09 Thread abuse department
So we want bridges without contact info and from unknown persons / state agencies? I am sure there is nothing with this excellent plan that could possible go wrong. > > A bridge has no `family´. An entity running bridge and exit generates an > end-to-end situation and might not be what we wa

Re: [tor-relays] Recent rejection of relays

2021-12-01 Thread abuse department
Could you please list me the massiv malicious actor networks that the Tor Project found out by itself in the last years? > On 1. Dec 2021, at 14:32, Georg Koppen wrote: > > We have not finished our analysis for the relay group nusenu is talking about > in the blog post, so not sure yet about t

Re: [tor-relays] Exit

2021-06-11 Thread abuse department
There is always a small chance that things go horrible wrong. Got some requests for user information from Poland and no problems at all. One request was in polish and I requested a translation of it and rerequest via MLAT. Never heard of them again … > On 11. Jun 2021, at 10:31, Walenty Czerwi

Re: [tor-relays] current HSDir flag requirements

2021-05-25 Thread abuse department
Problem is that Tor is mostly used for web browsing and the amount of graphics and videos is increasing. You do not want to surf with >1 mbit at all and maybe there are two users on this relay so we have >0.5 mbit …. If a first time user is surfing over Tor with 1 mbit he will uninstall it ...

Re: [tor-relays] current HSDir flag requirements

2021-05-25 Thread abuse department
What year is it? > On 24. May 2021, at 13:53, Logforme wrote: > > "Fast" -- A router is 'Fast' if it is active, and its bandwidth is either in > the top 7/8ths for known active routers or at least 100KB/s. signature.asc Description: Message signed with OpenPGP __

Re: [tor-relays] A report on running a bridge on google cloud

2021-05-03 Thread abuse department
roject.org/rs.html#search/as:AS197019 > > On Mittwoch, 28. April 2021 12:41:31 CEST abuse department wrote: >> if you want to run a bridge, Ionos is your new best friend, shitty VPS für 1 >> Euro a month. It is shit but runs a bridge perfectly. > > -- > ╰_╯ Ciao Marco

Re: [tor-relays] A report on running a bridge on google cloud

2021-04-28 Thread abuse department
if you want to run a bridge, Ionos is your new best friend, shitty VPS für 1 Euro a month. It is shit but runs a bridge perfectly. > On 26. Apr 2021, at 19:40, Keifer Bly wrote: > > Hi List, > > So for a little bit over a week now, I have been running a bridge on Google > Cloud and it has cha