Re: [tor-relays] clarification on what Utah State University exit relays store ("360 gigs of log files")

2015-08-23 Thread Richard Johnson
On 2015-08-13 01:40, Mike Perry wrote: As such, I still look forward to hearing from someone who has worked at an ISP/University/etc where this is actually practiced. What is in *those* logs? I deal with two flow recording practices and resulting records retention at work. The first is at the

Re: [tor-relays] Subpoena received

2015-04-22 Thread Richard Johnson
On 2015-04-20 08:32, Tyler Durden wrote: Hi I just wanted to let you know that Washington sent us a subpoena regarding one of our exit nodes in Romania. They want to know the real IP behind the Tor Network. I mailed them what Tor is and why I can't help them in identifying this person. Neverthele

Re: [tor-relays] relayor: automation for relay operators (ansible)

2015-03-01 Thread Richard Johnson
On 2015-02-27 14:53, Nusenu wrote: Supported platforms: ... - OpenBSD Everything is still fresh, so I would NOT recommend to use this on production relays. Testing and review is appreciated. There is still a crucial piece missing (init scripts), but I hope tor packagers are willing to

Re: [tor-relays] 7 relays gone because of spammers

2015-02-25 Thread Richard Johnson
On 2015-02-25 11:35, Speak Freely wrote: The Abuse department's rationale is as follows: "Your account was suspended because 100% of your IPs are blacklisted on multiples lists for Spam and other malicious activities. This case is closed and this decision is final." Speaking as an abuse desk l

Re: [tor-relays] Reminder: exit nodes probably shouldn't be using Google's DNS servers

2015-01-10 Thread Richard Johnson
On 2015-01-08 08:04, Nick Mathewson wrote: It's probably a better idea to have your own local cacheing DNS server. It is especially a good idea to have your own local DNS resolver if you run Tor exits at an institution that's required to otherwise log DNS queries. Tor needs a separate (and n

Re: [tor-relays] Jump in brute force complaints

2015-01-04 Thread Richard Johnson
On 2015-01-04 03:31, usprey wrote: and the sysads don't even bother to do a reverse lookup before sending abuse complaints I will not bother wasting my time on answering them. It is no secret how to properly secure internet connected systems, and in all cases their firewalls etc. obviously works,

Re: [tor-relays] Jump in brute force complaints

2015-01-04 Thread Richard Johnson
On 2015-01-04 09:07, Daniel Case wrote: On 4 January 2015 at 11:00, wrote: I should have specified that I was talking about brute force attempts against http servers, not SSH servers. I don't get any complaints about SSH brute force attempts. I have also had a spike these last few days, ma

Re: [tor-relays] ntp needs attention

2014-12-22 Thread Richard Johnson
On 2014-12-22 01:42, Felix wrote: Hi See: https bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=773576 There's as of yet no update from Apple applicable to those relays running on Mac OS X. In the interim, I've reconfigured ntpd on the Macs to deny queries (steps below). This may prevent their

Re: [tor-relays] Platform diversity in Tor network [was: OpenBSD doc/TUNING]

2014-12-16 Thread Richard Johnson
On 2014-12-16 12:05, teor wrote: From: Richard Johnson Modify /etc/tor/torrc2, /etc/tor/torrc3, ... so they refer to their appropriate private DataDirectory and PidFile, listen on the appropriate ports and IP addresses, and have the appropriate exit policies. (Remember that the public Tor

Re: [tor-relays] Platform diversity in Tor network [was: OpenBSD doc/TUNING]

2014-12-15 Thread Richard Johnson
On 2014-11-05 10:47, Libertas wrote: I appreciate your interest! Also, I hope I'm not speaking with too much authority. If anyone here has more OpenBSD experience than me, please send addendums or corrections. Maybe call this an addendum? Some version of the following work in progress is going