Am 21.06.2018 21:48 schrieb Keifer Bly:
Hi,
So I had a thought. It seems like a lot of the relays run off of
various port numbers (of course). However if all of the relays and
bridges are running off of various port numbers (ie 9001, 1,
etc.), couldn’t this stop censored users (who’s isp or
On 2018-05-08 16:59, Jonathan Marquardt wrote:
On Tue, May 08, 2018 at 04:45:58PM +0200, Martin Kepplinger wrote:
How does a usable ipset (hash:ip,port) look like, so that it is a whitelist
for
in/out tcp connections? *Everything* else from/to the outside world is
assumed
to be dropped. (DNS
Hi,
How does a usable ipset (hash:ip,port) look like, so that it is a
whitelist for
in/out tcp connections? *Everything* else from/to the outside world is
assumed
to be dropped. (DNS too).
* dir auths from src/or/auth_dirs.inc
* fallback dirs from scripts/maint/fallback.whitelist
* current gu
Am 05.10.2017 19:08 schrieb AMuse:
Hi all! I'm getting a number of ISP Abuse complaints around outbound
ssh brute-forcing from our exit relay.
I'm personally of the opinion that people should run fail2ban (or
equiv) and get on with life and I generally ignore the complaints -
but wondered, what
Am 22.09.2017 16:07 schrieb nusenu:
Martin Kepplinger:
That's a contradiction and it might end up in *not* selecting relays,
whos operators care a lot about security.
If you care a lot about security you can use OfflineMasterKeys and keep
your identity for a very long time and have no u
hi,
Fallback directory mirrors [1] seem to be selected (if the need should
arise, according
to release planning and whatnot) with criteria "uptime", among others.
And it's only
this criteria I'm thinking about here:
Now, in the wiki we have advice on how to improve relay security, and
among
Am 17.09.2017 01:56 schrieb Roger Dingledine:
On Sat, Sep 16, 2017 at 11:44:41PM +, dawuud wrote:
> Your only option would be to ask your ISP to uncensor the internet,
> unfortunately. Tor requires that all relays are able to contact all
> other relays, and those which cannot participate in
Hi
So I think 2 days ago I updated tor on my debian stable machine and
since then it's seen as not running anymore. It should be a relay.
And locally it doesn't listen on port 9050, so it's not even a client
now. My torrc hasn't changed.
What's going on? Any config changes I missed?
thanks
Am 2016-05-18 um 22:13 schrieb pa011:
> I am running some pretty good developing relays which I would like to
> change into exit-nodes over time. As I have no experience how to handle
> possible abuses I would need some help please?
>
> Is there anybody out there who can give me some advice, or ev
Hi
Imagine a router that want to only whitelist the IP addresses that
Torbrowser needs to work. What IPs would it need (for start up and
browsing) ?
* Guards
* Authorities
* HSDir flagged relays (?)
and would such a whitelisting of IPs even work? At least I think DNS can
be ignored as it is r
Am 2015-12-15 um 18:23 schrieb Hans Wurscht:
> Hi
>
> I would like to operate an IPv6 only exit node. I.e. it's fine if tor
> relays through IPv4, but I want exiting traffic only through IPv6
> (because I don't want my (only) IPv4 to be blocked, abused and such).
>
> The way I thought this would
Those Mails just keep coming. I replied to hundreds of them and never
heard back. They're a normal part of maintaining my exit relay :)
martin
Am 2015-11-21 um 04:34 schrieb Riccardo Mori:
> Hi everyone,
> It's almost a week that I am receiving dozens of "Notices of Claimed
Am 2014-07-02 21:06, schrieb Elrippo:
> Same from here. If I would have known earlier, I would have booked me a
> Ticket!
>
> But I got the fqdn!
> Is there a funding also to participate?
>
If there'll be "too" many people, it'll mainly be get-to-know people.
It'll most likely be "off"-topic di
Am 16.04.2014 06:42 schrieb Roger Dingledine:
Hi folks,
I'm attaching the list of relay identity fingerprints that I'm
rejecting on moria1 as of yesterday.
I got the list from Sina's scanner:
https://encrypted.redteam.net/bleeding_edges/
I thought for a while about taking away their Valid flag
Am 2014-03-22 23:33, schrieb Gordon Morehouse:
> Hello all,
>
> I've finally released[1] signed binary .debs for Tor 0.2.4.21 for
> Raspberry Pi. All the usual "random dude's binaries" apply, but at
> least these are signed with my PGP key and distributed with hashes.
> They're really for tempora
Am 2013-11-22 18:45, schrieb Gordon Morehouse:
> I've built Tor 0.2.4.18-rc for the Raspberry Pi and released
> unofficial packages[1]. They are signed with my GPG key, but as
> always, if you don't trust binary packages from some dude on the
> internet, please see the instructions to compile them
Am 26.02.2014 06:09 schrieb Andreas Krey:
On Tue, 25 Feb 2014 19:43:02 +, Steve Rich wrote:
Hey,
I am running the following relay, and never see traffic going more
than 250k. Is Comcast throttling non-exit tor proxies?
Do you have 4Mbit/s uplink? That would be
the 250k which is kBytes/s,
julien.robi...@free.fr:
> Hello krishna,
>
> I agree with you as I also think that the approach you describes (your ISP
> transmit to you, almost "don't care" and just want you to do the job and copy
> to them) is so much better :) and I really think my ISP is trying to work
> like that.
>
> T
Hi,
Sorry for being lazy, I'm not sure if I can figure it enirely out
myself: Is there _any_ implication on the status of a bridge in the Tor
network when I run random web services like an open website, xmpp
server, whatever, on the same device/IP? It'll somehow be more exposed
that way but I'd be
Anonymous:
> 11.11.2013 20:55, Anonymous kirjoitti:
>> 11.11.2013 20:08, krishna e bera kirjoitti:
>>> On 13-11-11 12:56 PM, Anonymous wrote:
How may I create an Tor exit node with some ports and sites
blacklisted?
>
>>> See the Reduced Exit Policy page referred to at
>>> https://blog.
Lunar:
> Martin Kepplinger:
>> I will not send my fingerprint to globe over http. I want to keep it
>> secret so I can't check my bridge. I hope it works. obfs-ports are
>> forwarded and everything else are standard torrc-settings.
>>
>> But please make globe
keep it
secret so I can't check my bridge. I hope it works. obfs-ports are
forwarded and everything else are standard torrc-settings.
But please make globe accessible over https.
thanks
>
>
> Lunar :
>> Martin Kepplinger:
>>> When my bridge uses only the same f
When my bridge uses only the same few MBs each day, i guess it isn't
used at all right?
Is there a simple way to ensure it is in bridgeDB and functioning as it
should?
thanks,
martin
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The Maker:
> I want to run a relay that starts every time I login to my machine. I
> went to the page that discusses how to add the correct PPA to Ubuntu but
> it stops at 11.10. Is this also the PPA I should use for 12.04 or is
> there another one?
>
> Many Thanks,
> The Maker
>
> __
Lunar:
> Martin Kepplinger:
>> Really quick not too important question. When switching a relay to
>> become an exit node or the other way round, does it make sense to delete
>> /var/lib/tor/keys/* beforehand and start it over this way?
>
> Why would you want to do that
Really quick not too important question. When switching a relay to
become an exit node or the other way round, does it make sense to delete
/var/lib/tor/keys/* beforehand and start it over this way?
I was thinking, if the relay has the guard flag, it would make sense,
but maybe even if it doesn't.
In order to run an obfsproxy bridge on my Pi, I need tor from git or
tor's experimental repos; raspbian's packages are too old right?
I got confused with recent discussions on raspberry pi here. What's the
simples way to run a obfsproxy bridge on my Pi and keep it up to date as
well!
thanks!
Cook:
> On 26.9.2013 23:25, Roger Dingledine wrote:
>> EFF recommends against it in their Legal FAQ:
>> "Should I run an exit relay from my home?"
>> https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq
>>
>> Their recommendation comes from dealing with one too many distraught
>> relay operators who had co
David Carlson:
> On 9/25/2013 11:10 AM, Joe wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> I'm planning to run a Tor relay on a spare computer at home. Security
>> is a concern, and not only regarding the machine running the relay but
>> also my other computers. Are there any (theoretical or otherwise)
>> known attacks a per
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