Hello!
petition_tricky750--- via tor-relays:
Hello,
What are some of the most common reasons for relays and exits to be banned from
Tor?
Had it happen to all of my 5 nodes and I'm currently awaiting response from
bad-relays list.
I don't see an email from you there yet. You might want to re
usetor.wtf via tor-relays:
Adding another me too.
2 of 5 different ISPs for middle and entry nodes shared same abuse complaints
other received.
First time in 10 years to receive abuse complaints from middle/entry nodes.
Not fun.
It'd be great for Tor to publish a blog on what is happening / w
Josh Lawson via tor-relays:
Does Tor Weather work with bridges? I have 2 bridges that have been operating
for years and it says the fingerprints do not match any relays.
I have been using Uptime Robot, but it would be cool to use Tor Weather.
Right now, Tor Weather does not work for bridges.
Zachary via tor-relays:
The "first seen" date on my relay
A00E3AAF5A24DC69740FA7A3A1C4A0ECB7972722
Got reset today while I was at work. It's not a problem and I don't
particularly care, but is there anything that would cause this? IP hasn't
changed, Tor version hasn't changed, etc.
That's
Hello!
In case it affects you as you are still running your relay or bridge on
Tor 0.4.7.x: the 0.4.7 series is going EOL on *2024-01-31* (roughly in 2
weeks from now).
That's currently still 1346 relays, which means roughly 15% of the
advertised bandwidth of the network (and 964 bridges, wh
Keifer Bly:
Hi,
So my relay at
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/79E3B585803DE805CCBC00C1EF36B1E74372861D
is suddenly saying it's a new relay. Don't know why this would happen as
it's been running for a few years, but suddenly saying it's new?
Should be fine again right now, no? W
Jan:
Dear Tor Metrics Support Team,
I hope this message finds you well.
I am writing to report an issue regarding the status of my relay on Tor
Metrics. According to Nyx, my relay appears to be running without any
problems. However, Tor Metrics indicates that it is offline.
Relay Details:
Nam
Hello exit node operators!
Today (2023-12-08) the Network Team has released a new Tor version,
0.4.8.10[1]. This update contains a fix to a remotely triggerable crash
bug (TROVE-2023-007) affecting exit relays on the 0.4.8.x series. Please
upgrade as soon as possible to maintain network stabil
rusive than what you have in mind. But I am fine thinking more about
it if there is interest from the community.
Thanks,
Georg
--
Danny
--
Yours sincerely, Xiaoqi Chen
On Sat, Oct 21, 2023 at 3:55 PM Georg Koppen wrote:
Hello everyone!
As indicated in our bug tracker a while ago[1]
aft[3]).
"""
```
Filename: 100-contactinfo-mandatory-email-address.md
Title: Restricting ContactInfo to Mandatory Email Address
Author: Georg Koppen
Created: 2023-10-21
Status: Open
```
## Overview
This document proposes to change the ContactInfo field from a free text
field to one that is on
Hello everyone!
As you might have noticed, Tor Browser 13 got released last week[1]
which ships for the first time a Tor 0.4.8.x version (0.4.8.7) to our
stable Tor Browser users. One of the main features in the 0.4.8.x series
is Conflux, which allows traffic-splitting to improve Tor performan
Hi!
telekobold:
Hi together,
I have an issue regarding the "first seen" flag at
metrics.torproject.org: It is definitely wrong for my two bridges - both
dates are much too close in the past.
For one of the bridges, it seems to correspond to the last signing key
renewal, for the other bridg
Hi!
You might recall that Tor has been restricting the possible amount of
Tor relays per IP address to 2, mainly for Sybil prevention reasons.[1]
We bumped that limit to 4 earlier this year[2] to make better use of
available resources and considered back then bumping that limit further
to 8 r
Hello!
I got recently pinged by a large exit operator asking whether we had a
website with nice graphs and statistics relevant to relay operators on
our project infrastructure (showing e.g. the largest exit operators
etc.), but that's currently not the case and we should fix that. There
are s
Georg Koppen:
Hello!
In case it affects you as you are still running your relay or bridge on
Tor 0.4.5.x: the 0.4.5 series is going EOL on *2023-02-15* (roughly in 3
weeks from now).
That's currently still 760 relays, which means roughly 7% of the
advertised bandwidth of the ne
gus:
On Mon, Mar 06, 2023 at 07:49:47PM +0100, nusenu wrote:
gus:
On Fri, Mar 03, 2023 at 11:26:07PM +0100, nusenu wrote:
I've got some practical experience with how things are (not) handled
by the Tor Project in this space which discourages involvement.
The past has also shown that proposals
toroperl...@jrobin.ephemeron.org:
On Sun, 2 Apr 2023, nusenu wrote:
I would actually like to hear the torproject's "self-assessment" on this
before I send my opinion on it.
I agree: it would be nice to hear about the current (informal) process,
flawed as it may be, and the Tor Project's self
nusenu:
I've got some practical experience with how things are (not)
handled by the Tor Project in this space which discourages
involvement.
That's unfortunate. What has been the problem with past
proposal-handling? And how should it have been done differently?
I would actually like to hear t
Georg Koppen:
Georg Koppen:
Hello everyone!
As indicated on the last relay operator meetup we were close to
re-launching the Tor Weather service. Now, after fixing a bunch of
last-minute issues and double-checking everything is working we can
finally announce that the newly designed Tor
Georg Koppen:
Hello everyone!
As indicated on the last relay operator meetup we were close to
re-launching the Tor Weather service. Now, after fixing a bunch of
last-minute issues and double-checking everything is working we can
finally announce that the newly designed Tor Weather service is
Hello everyone!
As indicated on the last relay operator meetup we were close to
re-launching the Tor Weather service. Now, after fixing a bunch of
last-minute issues and double-checking everything is working we can
finally announce that the newly designed Tor Weather service is ready
for publ
Keifer Bly:
Hi,
So I am still working on the issues for my relays, but am wondering, is it
possible to sign up for email notifications when a relay goes offline?
If you can wait another week until we have officially launched our new
Tor Weather service then we could offer that one. If you can
nusenu:
I've got some practical experience with how things are (not) handled
by the Tor Project in this space which discourages involvement.
That's unfortunate. What has been the problem with past
proposal-handling? And how should it have been done differently?
The past has also shown that
li...@for-privacy.net:
This is _not_ my relay:
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/D5A3882CBDBE4CAD2F9DDA2AB80FE761BEDC3F11
https://nusenu.github.io/OrNetStats/w/relay/D5A3882CBDBE4CAD2F9DDA2AB80FE761BEDC3F11.html
Thanks for the report, marked for rejection. Once a majority of
dire
nusenu:
Hi,
the tor 0.4.5.x end of live versions are still on the recommended
versions list:
https://consensus-health.torproject.org/#recommendedversions
consensus client-versions 0.4.5.6, 0.4.5.7, 0.4.5.8, 0.4.5.9,
0.4.5.10, 0.4.5.11, 0.4.5.12, 0.4.5.14, 0.4.5.15, 0.4.5.16, 0.4.7.7,
0.
ot as aggressively as we could).
Georg
This feature could be used more often to avoid those frustrating delays for a
growing number of participants.
C:
Am 14. Februar 2023 09:57:38 MEZ schrieb Georg Koppen :
nusenu:
Hi,
can we try to disable moderation on this list again and see how it goes?
nusenu:
Hi,
can we try to disable moderation on this list again and see how it goes?
If it gets out of hand you can always move back to a moderated mode or a
mode where
the first email of a sender is moderated.
I've no strong opinion but looking over my moderator experience spanning
the pa
Hello everyone!
You might recall that Tor is restricting the possible amount of Tor
relays per IP address to 2, mainly for Sybil prevention reasons.[1]
Given that Tor on the relay side at least is not multithreaded yet (and
will likely not be for the near and medium future) that's wasting a lo
t way at least the Debian relays would get a
proper update I assume.
--- Original Message ---
Georg Koppen g...@torproject.org schrieb am Montag, 23. Januar 2023 um 16:59:
Hello!
In case it affects you as you are still running your relay or bridge on
Tor 0.4.5.x: the 0.4.5 series i
Hello!
In case it affects you as you are still running your relay or bridge on
Tor 0.4.5.x: the 0.4.5 series is going EOL on *2023-02-15* (roughly in 3
weeks from now).
That's currently still 760 relays, which means roughly 7% of the
advertised bandwidth of the network (and 387 bridges, whic
Neel Chauhan:
On 2022-12-25 00:27, Frank Steinborn via tor-relays wrote:
Hi friends,
I made some smaller tweaks over the last few hours which should
especially help relays on nearly OOM or thrashing situations (making
use of Zswap + MGLRU if available).
The rules themselves are just the sam
Hello everyone!
It's been a while since we last provided some update on this mailing
list about our ongoing work fighting several DoS attacks.
We can use the attached graph about detected overload over the last
couple of months to show what is going on and what we do/plan to do
about it.
T
Hello relay operators!
If you are running OpenSSL 3 please be aware that you might need to
upgrade it to 3.0.7 as fast as possible on next Tuesday (Nov 1). In an
announcement[1] it got said 3.0.7 fixes a CRITICAL security issue.
Operators running on the 1.1 series are fine as far as we know s
Georg Koppen:
Hello!
To repeat what recently[1] got brought up: it's time to get relays
upgraded in case they are running the EOL 0.4.6.x Tor series. We'll
start reaching out to operators with valid contact information this week
and plan to reject relays which are still on 0.4.6.x
Me via tor-relays:
Good day,
Not sure if this would be the proper avenue to pursue this. I operate a couple
of middle relays from my home server. All seemed well until this morning. Three
days ago one was promoted to guard status while the other lags behind. This
morning I check the Tor metric
Hello!
To repeat what recently[1] got brought up: it's time to get relays
upgraded in case they are running the EOL 0.4.6.x Tor series. We'll
start reaching out to operators with valid contact information this week
and plan to reject relays which are still on 0.4.6.x in about 5 weeks
from now
Eddie:
I have 1 relay (40D13096BBD11AF198CE61DEE4EAECCE5472F2E7) that according
to the metrics is always bouncing between online and offline, sometimes
multiple times per day. The logs show it running the whole time and
when the metrics also show it running, the uptime continues to increase
c
given that we have a good workaround and
a lot of affected users are happy with it.
Patches (still) welcome! :)
Georg
[1] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/40347
Georg Koppen:
Right. One thing we recommended when talking to relay operators during
earlier EOL upgrade periods
Eldalië via tor-relays:
Hello there.
I have been running my (non-exit) relay without issues for some
months. Recently I noticed that my ISP started to reset my IP a few
hours after the node gets the Guard flag, thus making it lose such a
flag (as well as Stable and HSDir). I am not sure if the Gu
ilf:
What's the recommended way to run 0.4.7 on armhf?
The package repository [deb.torproject.org] does not offer 32-bit ARM
architecture (armhf) images (yet).
https://support.torproject.org/apt/tor-deb-repo/
Debian has 0.4.7 in bullseye-backports.
But Raspbian doesn't have bullseye-backpor
Logforme:
On 2022-07-06 21:19, Roger Dingledine wrote:
But it was replaced with a new overload (boo), from way too many Tor
clients running at a few cloud providers. The main result for relay
operators is greatly increased file descriptor use, with a few IP
addresses or /24's generating the majo
Christian Pietsch:
Dear all,
ExoneraTor is/was useful for showing law enforcement authorities that
a given IP address acted as a Tor exit relay at a given day.
Unfortunately, ExoneraTor seems to be offline.
This page does not work at all, returning an HTTP 503 error
immediately: https://exoner
Martin:
Hi all!
After updatering to the latest version, my relay consensus went down to 20
and was marked unmeasured. However it still serves a couple of thousand
connections (capped at 10 MB/s) and all flags are still there, but when I
try to use it to build a circuit manually it won't let me..
a tor op via tor-relays:
Hi
I wrote about incorrect date stamps for relays/bridges on atlas/metrics site in
December 2021.
This has reappeared since some time (dont know for how long).
First seen fullt incorrect by years and all times unlogic, first seen later
than last restarted etc.
Is th
li...@for-privacy.net:
On Wednesday, May 4, 2022 11:31:05 PM CEST Mike Perry wrote:
Tor 0.4.7.7-stable contains a very important performance improvement,
called Congestion Control.
You can read more about this improvement here:
https://blog.torproject.org/congestion-contrl-047/
The TL;DR is th
onion...@riseup.net:
Hello, we tried a solution proposed by ad...@for-privacy.net (deleting
/var/lib/tor folder) but now we get another error:
│ 19:41:54 [WARN] http status 400 ("Suspicious relay address range --
if you think this is a mistake please set a valid email address in
ContactInfo a
onion...@riseup.net:
I found in syslog file:
http status 400 ("Fingerprint and/or ed25519 identity is marked rejected
-- if you think this is a mistake please set a valid email address in
ContactInfo and send an email to bad-rel...@lists.torproject.org
mentioning your fingerprint(s)?") response f
Stefan Leibfarth:
Hello everyone,
On March 28, 2022 8:57:51 PM GMT+02:00, gus wrote:
The next Tor Relay Operator meetup will happen this Saturday, April 2 @
1900 UTC / 1500 EDT / 2100 CET.
Friendly reminder, today is the day. :-)
Right and it is 2100 CE*S*T
See you there,
Georg
OpenPGP_
Spydar007 via tor-relays:
Hello,
I notice (almost) all bridges are showing their distributor mechanism as None
on Tor Metrics.[1]
There are also hardly any in the latest pool assignments file from CollecTor.[2]
Curious as to why? Is this a change that needs fixing on a bridge operators
end,
Georg Koppen:
Hello!
It's time again to get relays upgraded running an EOL Tor series
(0.3.5.x). We'll start reaching out to operators with valid contact
information this week and plan to start reject relays which are still on
0.3.5.x about 4 weeks from now on at the begin of Marc
George:
On 3/5/22 13:40, flux via tor-relays wrote:
Hi,
will there be a recording? Unfortunately I won't be able to attend.
Unfortunately not flux.
We will catch you next time.
Pad notes will be posted after the meeting.
Here they come.
On March 5, a group of 40-50 operators joined the T
Hello!
As you might know we are doing regular (at the moment weekly) scans of
exit nodes to find and help with misconfigurations or errors that have
potentially serious effects for Tor network usability and performance.
The results we got so far after over a year of scanning are roughly
singl
Solar Array (~12 Hour Charge)
+ 2 x Charmast 26800mAh Power Banks
= iPhone XS Max 512GB (~2 Weeks Charged)
On Friday, March 4, 2022, 12:22:06 AM MST, Georg Koppen
wrote:
Gary C. New via tor-relays:
Georg,
Yes! That is precisely it!
Please know that the change appears to be work
Eldalië via tor-relays:
Hello there.
I see on every exit node I check on the metrics page, a massive bump
in bandwidth used without a change in exit probability.
I just checked the metrics page for the relay I operate
(791E637A38C715336290E8AC0EB6C99BD02A5F0E) and I noticed a bump similar
to
ursday, March 3, 2022, 1:28:12 PM MST, Georg Koppen
wrote:
Gary C. New via tor-relays:
David,
Has Tor Metrics implemented your RFC related to Written Bytes per Second and
Read Bytes per Second on Onionoo?
That's probably
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/metrics/onionoo/
Gary C. New via tor-relays:
David,
Has Tor Metrics implemented your RFC related to Written Bytes per Second and
Read Bytes per Second on Onionoo?
That's probably
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/metrics/onionoo/-/issues/40022
, no?
Georg
As of the 27th of February, I've no
awffelwaffels via tor-relays:
I see on every exit node I check on the metrics page, a massive bump in
bandwidth used without a change in exit probability. Is this perhaps an
attacker squeezing the bandwidth of the network so people are more likely to
use their malicious nodes?
You could mail
nusenu:
Hi,
I'm currently working on a TorWeather replacement (mainly using a
byproduct of another project)
that should be helpful for relay operators to get notifications about
their relay downtimes
and other issues.
I believe such a service will contribute to a more healthy tor network
and
Hello!
It's time again to get relays upgraded running an EOL Tor series
(0.3.5.x). We'll start reaching out to operators with valid contact
information this week and plan to start reject relays which are still on
0.3.5.x about 4 weeks from now on at the begin of March. You can follow
along th
Martin Gebhardt (Die LINKE.):
Hi,
in the past I had already written with someone about it. At that time
the entries were not up to date. There was a Gitlab issue about this,
but I can't find it now.
Anyway, the data is not up to date again.
Example: https://apps.db.ripe.net/db-web-ui/query?
Georg Koppen:
> Georg Koppen:
>> Hello!
>>
>> nusenu:
>>> in chronological order:
>>>
>>> --
>>>
>>> title: Towards a more Trustworthy Tor Network
>>>
>&g
Georg Koppen:
Hello!
nusenu:
in chronological order:
--
title: Towards a more Trustworthy Tor Network
when: 2021-12-28, 17:00 CET
where: https://streaming.media.ccc.de/rc3/csh
primary target audience:
- Tor user
- Tor relay operators
Hello!
nusenu:
in chronological order:
--
title: Towards a more Trustworthy Tor Network
when: 2021-12-28, 17:00 CET
where: https://streaming.media.ccc.de/rc3/csh
primary target audience:
- Tor user
- Tor relay operators
- onion service oper
ronqtorrel...@risley.net:
Hi!
I couldn't make the meeting (I retire at the end of January, and should at long
last have time to devote to things Tor). Thanks for posting the notes.
It prompted me to review the draft "expectations for relay operators" document. It looks
very good, though I do
nusenu:
To stop confusing operators it would make sense to remove the
"This relay is overloaded since"
banner from Relay Search for all tor versions prior to
0.4.6.9 and 0.4.7.3-alpha, no?
Well, not all potential overload is DNS related overload. There are a
bunch of different criteria for
2021 at 8:16 AM Georg Koppen wrote:
Qimam Fellowship:
Hello, the Torproject. We launched relays and bridges 3 days ago, today
we
received a few emails from nore...@torweather.org saying that our relays
are down. Your metrics website says our relays are offline, but in fact
our
VPS are onli
nusenu:
I was wondering whether this was the first actual
case where someone exploited vulnerabilities
at a wordpress website to place the CIISS v2 proof file
on someone else's webserver. To investigate that suspicion I reached
out to the Qimam organization (not using the gmail address) the same
Qimam Fellowship:
Hello, the Torproject. We launched relays and bridges 3 days ago, today we
received a few emails from nore...@torweather.org saying that our relays
are down. Your metrics website says our relays are offline, but in fact our
VPS are online and tor daemon is running. The status of
nusenu:
Georg Koppen:
suggestion for an improvement to this process so it will become
more accurate/complete (example: May 2021 is incomplete)
Could you elaborate on why you think May 2021 is incomplete and how
to fix that?
I believe DAs rejected >1000 relays, but instead of listing th
nusenu:
Georg Koppen:
Here we go. I added the list of fingerprints for April 2021. I plan to
keep adding fingerprints monthly on the same wiki page[3], as we find
them in attacks.
Georg
[3]
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/wikis/Rejected-fingerprints-found-in-attacks
th your question, but I hope
the above helps a bit at least.
Georg
[1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2021-May/019647.html
[2] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2021-May/019644.html
On 1. Dec 2021, at 14:32, Georg Koppen wrote:
We have not finished our analysis f
Georg Koppen:
Hello!
Relays running unsupported Tor versions is a problem we have never
really dealt with in a systematic way in the way. Some of you might
recall that we (with the help of volunteers) tried back in 2019/2020 to
get operators, running an unsupported Tor version, to upgrade[1
Georg Koppen:
Hello everyone!
Some of you might have noticed that there is a visible drop of relays on
our consensus-health website.[1] The reason for that is that we kicked
roughly 600 non-exit relays out of the network yesterday. In fact, only
a small fraction of them had the guard flag
Eddie:
On 10/14/2021 2:44 AM, Bleedangel Tor Admin wrote:
You are running 0.4.5.8, maybe updating to a newer version of tor will
help?
Sent from ProtonMail for iOS
On Thu, Oct 14, 2021 at 03:02, Georg Koppen <mailto:g...@torproject.org>> wrote:
Eddie:
> Looking at tor metric
nusenu:
BadExit: Rerouting exit relays detected (1)
The following exit relays are routing their traffic back into the tor
network:
nickname: EXNODE35037
First seen: 2021-11-22 15:00:00
Consensus weight: 1
AS: ITL LLC
OR IP address: 195.123.220.84
Exit addresses: 185.220.101.138 195.123.220.84
Imre Jonk:
On Tue, Nov 09, 2021 at 06:25:31AM -0500, John Csuti via tor-relays wrote:
Hello all,
I would have to agree on this it appears that the DNS failure timeout is
too low. I have more then enough bandwidth to host tor exit nodes, and
my own unbound full recursive relay and yet i still ge
bobby stickel:
I get that too I've noticed that Tor makes a lot of quest to non-existent
domains. I run a pihole DNS without the ad blocking. I think this is a bug. They
should at least give us the ability to control the warning level
It seems only one of your exit relays is affected by a gener
bobby stickel:
Okay thanks for the response. I see that I have the not recommended flag. I try
to update my node but it says that it's up to date I don't understand what else
I can do
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/50C590A57693085D9601371666B389152B011FF5
Ubuntu ships an outdat
Tor Relays:
Georg Koppen :
Hello everyone!
Some of you might have noticed that there is a visible drop of relays on
our consensus-health website.[1] The reason for that is that we kicked
roughly 600 non-exit relays out of the network yesterday. In fact, only
a small fraction of them had the
Georg Koppen:
Jonas via tor-relays:
Where is this criteria documented?
I am not sure what criteria you mean but we have our bad-relay
criteria[1] documented at our wiki and keep fingerprints we reject due
to attacks we noticed there as well[2].
It seems the tor project, or its designated
nal Message --
On Wed, November 10, 2021 at 8:59 AM, Georg Koppen wrote:
Hello everyone!
Some of you might have noticed that there is a visible drop of relays on
our consensus-health website.[1] The reason for that is that we kicked
roughly 600 non-exit relays out of the network yesterd
nusenu:
Anders Trier Olesen:
The Tor relay guide should recommend running your recursive resolver
(unbound) on a different IP than your exit:
https://community.torproject.org/relay/setup/exit/
yes, that is a good idea, here is a PR for it:
https://github.com/torproject/community/pull/169/fi
Hello everyone!
Some of you might have noticed that there is a visible drop of relays on
our consensus-health website.[1] The reason for that is that we kicked
roughly 600 non-exit relays out of the network yesterday. In fact, only
a small fraction of them had the guard flag, so the vast major
nusenu:
I think I have some general questions to begin with:
1) What part should the proposal you brought up play in the overall goal
of limiting impact of malicious relays? You write
"""
Therefore we propose to publish relay operator trust information to
limit the fraction and impact of malici
potlatch via tor-relays:
> Should torrc for bridges list MyFamily? I run several of both.
This feature is not supported. You even get a warning when doing that:
if (options->MyFamily_lines && options->BridgeRelay) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Listing a family for a bridge relay is not "
mpan:
>>> Relays running unsupported Tor versions is a problem we have never
>>> really dealt with in a systematic way in the way. Some of you might
>>> recall that we (with the help of volunteers) tried back in 2019/2020 to
>>> get operators, running an unsupported Tor version, to upgrade[1] but
>
Georg Koppen:
> Hello!
>
> Relays running unsupported Tor versions is a problem we have never
> really dealt with in a systematic way in the way. Some of you might
> recall that we (with the help of volunteers) tried back in 2019/2020 to
> get operators, running an unsupport
Hello!
Some of you might already have seen that we have a shiny new forum
now.[1] And, of course, there is a part of it dedicated to providing
support for relay operators as well.[2] Check it out and feel free to
contribute!
Thanks,
Georg
[1] https://forum.torproject.net/
[2] https://forum.torpr
David Goulet:
> On 17 Oct (13:54:22), Arlen Yaroslav via tor-relays wrote:
>> Hi,
>
> Hi Arlen!
>
>>
>> I've done some further analysis on this. The reason my relay is being marked
>> as overloaded is because of DNS timeout errors. I had to dive into the
>> source code to figure this out.
>>
>> I
Eddie:
> On 10/13/2021 11:29 PM, Eddie wrote:
>> I currently run 3 relays, across different servers and today I noticed
>> that one has now lost it's Guard and HS Dir flags. What's surprising
>> is that this particular relay has the highest Bandwidth and Consensus
>> Weight of all 3 and has not be
Arlen Yaroslav via tor-relays:
>> The problem is that it’s *not* currently overloaded, there’s nothing to see.
>> Maybe you can check your syslogs for anything out of the ordinary
>> system-wide?
>
> I've checked dmesg. Nothing that stands out as being problematic. Even if
> there was something
Arlen Yaroslav via tor-relays:
>> Did you use a lot of ram or cpu power recently? I got flagged as overloaded
>> when I was compiling something and used a lot of cpu.
>
> Nothing out of the ordinary. The server is a virtual machine which is
> dedicated to running a Tor relay. I don't use it for
Eddie:
> Looking at tor metrics, one of my bridges is showing as off-line:
> B080140DC1BAB5B86D1CE5A4CA2EF64F20282440
>
> However, the log isn't showing any issues:
>
> Oct 14 00:00:28.000 [notice] Tor 0.4.5.8 opening new log file.
> Oct 14 00:00:28.000 [notice] Configured hibernation. This inte
nusenu:
>> Thanks! You don't have an email-friendly version of that proposal by
>> chance, which one could reply to inline?
>
> there is just the .md file.
>
> You can also comment inline on the md file on gitlab.
>
> Due to David's comment on tor-dev there is a merge request on gitlab:
> https
Bleedangel Tor Admin:
> Can you link to where I can edit the torproject.org documentation? I cannot
> find
> this feature.
This is nowadays tracked in our Gitlab instance.[1] Thus, you could fork
the respective project and make a merge request. We'd be happy to review
it and improve our document
Arlen Yaroslav via tor-relays:
> Hi to all relay operators!
>
> I run two Tor relays:
>
> 77D08850C1EE8587451F838D3F49874F75B0B1AC
> 09A70E396DE93F54D4541BBB0EC8E2B23761F34F
>
> They both have DirPorts configured on port 80. I can connect to this port on
> both hosts externally. However, Relay
Hello!
Relays running unsupported Tor versions is a problem we have never
really dealt with in a systematic way in the way. Some of you might
recall that we (with the help of volunteers) tried back in 2019/2020 to
get operators, running an unsupported Tor version, to upgrade[1] but
then we dropped
nusenu:
> Hi,
>
> I wrote down a spec for a simple web of trust
> for relay operator IDs:
>
> https://gitlab.torproject.org/nusenu/torspec/-/blob/simple-wot-for-relay-operator-ids/proposals/ideas/xxx-simple-relay-operator-wot.md#a-simple-web-of-trust-for-tor-relay-operator-ids
Thanks! You don't
Gary C. New via tor-relays:
>
> David Goulet:
>
>
>
>
> Will you confirm whether the Advertised Bandwidth metric is also client
> initiated (I'm assuming to the Directory Authority)?
>
>
>
>
> I have a 250Mb pipe and have seen a maximum Advertised Bandwidth rate of
> 4MB/s with my Tor re
David Goulet:
[snip]
> There are two other overload lines that tor relay report:
> "overload-ratelimits" and "overload-fd-exhausted" but they are not used yet
> for the overload status on Metrics. But you can find them in your relay
> descriptor[0] if you are curious.
Small correction here: thos
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