Re: [tor-relays] Recommended reject lines for relays affected by Heartbleed

intended for Tor clients? It's mainly intended for consumption by the directory authorities. You could transform into ExcludeNodes rules for clients if you want, I suppose. -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint (ECC): BDF5 F867 8A52 4E4A BECF DE79 A4FF BC34 F01D D536 PGP fingerprint (RSA): 3611

Re: [tor-relays] Recommended reject lines for relays affected by Heartbleed

r.it > [4] tor running on 5.9.165.90:443 A router at that IP with identity 9AB511B6894566C1CF56043CE60077D213CF1A1A tested positive for Heartbleed several times, most recently at 2014-04-17 10:19:18, before testing negative at 2014-04-17 18:51:46 (all times UTC). If you rotate the key you should b

Re: [tor-relays] Recommended reject lines for relays affected by Heartbleed

On Wed, Apr 16, 2014 at 06:24:40PM -0700, Andrea Shepard wrote: > A list of 1777 proposed reject lines of fingerprints which have > ever turned up as potentially exposed by Heartbleed in my scans > is available at the URL below. This was generated with the following > query: > >

[tor-relays] Recommended reject lines for relays affected by Heartbleed

keys properly. There are a bit over 900 vulnerable relays in the latest consensus. http://charon.persephoneslair.org/~andrea/private/hb-fingerprints-20140417002500.txt -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint (ECC): BDF5 F867 8A52 4E4A BECF DE79 A4FF BC34 F01D D536 PGP fingerprint (RSA): 3611 95A4

Re: [tor-relays] How effective is "NumCPUs"?

n I thought and I got distracted with other foreground-priority things at some point, IIRC. I should rebase it against current master and get back to it at some point. -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint (ECC): BDF5 F867 8A52 4E4A BECF DE79 A4FF BC34 F01D D536 PGP fingerprint (RSA): 3611 95A4 0740 E

Re: [tor-relays] new relays

On Sat, Aug 31, 2013 at 12:27:22AM -0400, grarpamp wrote: > On 8/30/13, Andrea Shepard wrote: > > On Tue, Aug 27, 2013 at 11:08:34AM -0500, Jon Gardner wrote: > >> Then why have exit policies? Exit nodes regularly block "unwelcome" > >> traffic > >&

Re: [tor-relays] new relays

ast some of the most egregious abuses of Tor--things like child > porn, or even porn in general, that either have nothing to do with Tor's > foundational mission, or (like child porn) are antithetical to it--the result > would be greater public support for the technology, and a

Re: [tor-relays] US Investigators seem to learn

lls that have to be padded, but I'd be surprised if that was that significant a difference. -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint: 3611 95A4 0740 ED1B 7EA5 DF7E 4191 13D9 D0CF BDA5 pgp09yLvzHsB7.pgp Description: PGP signature ___ tor-relays mailing

Re: [tor-relays] US Investigators seem to learn

ing; I'm pretty sure we do not use TLS compression. Nick M., that's true, yeah? On the other hand, it could also be unbalanced because of: * Using that Tor process as a client * Running a hidden service on that Tor process * Running a directory mirror -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint: