Re: [tor-relays] Dear OBFS4 bridge operators, please enable timing and packet-size obfuscations to help clients facing timing analysis attacks.

2024-09-23 Thread pasture_clubbed242--- via tor-relays
Out of curiosity, can any other options be passed with ServerTransportOptions besides iat-mode? I could only find this article saying there is a 'cert=' option, which initially appear useful for Tor. https://hamy.io/post/000d/how-to-hide-obfuscate-any-traffic-using-obfs4/ Thank you On Monday,

Re: [tor-relays] Dear OBFS4 bridge operators, please enable timing and packet-size obfuscations to help clients facing timing analysis attacks.

2024-09-23 Thread Fran via tor-relays
Philipp Winter regarding iat mode: >The feature introduces a substantial performance penalty for a dubious >and poorly understood privacy gain. If I were to write an algorithm to >detect obfs4, I wouldn't bother dealing with its flow properties; there >are easier ways to identify the protocol.

[tor-relays] Looking for a ipv4 block and strategy

2024-09-23 Thread Osservatorio Nessuno via tor-relays
Hi everyone, our organization is working to add more physical nodes, in our little Italy headquarter[1]. We have reached an agreement with one of the available fiber reseller there, where we will pay for L2 transport to a datacenter, where we will buy our uplink separately and announce and rou

[tor-relays] Dear OBFS4 bridge operators, please enable timing and packet-size obfuscations to help clients facing timing analysis attacks.

2024-09-23 Thread George Hartley via tor-relays
Hello Tor community, this e-mail applies to you if you are running an obfs4 (now known under the name lyrebird) bridge or want to do so in the future. Some recent posts on this list has shown that traffic timing analysis can be used to locate a users or onion services guard nodes or bridges. Th