Correct! Bridges weren't involved in the last attack thats why bridges will
never be involved in a future attack in a highly dynamic environment.
You cant make this shit up.
>
> AFAIK, bridges weren't involved in the last attack. But, maybe others
> folks here could have different evidences an
hi
just setup a tor bridge. how can I validate it is up and running ?
logs look fine:
> [notice] You can check the status of your bridge relay at
> https://bridges.torproject.org/status?id=
> [notice] Unable to find IPv4 address for ORPort . You might want to
> specify IPv6Only to it or set an
Hey,
Am 11.12.2021 13:51, schrieb Jens Kubieziel:
attacks. One possibility is, in my opinion, rejecting connection over
ports 389 and 636. What do you think? Should we as exit node operators
block connections over those LDAP ports for some amount of time?
don't think this is going to help.
Th
Regarding MyFamily, there's a new MyFamily proposal that will include
bridges, please check this thread and spec:
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/torspec/-/blob/main/proposals/321-happy-families.md
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2021-November/019954.html
the related is
Hi,
On Thu, Dec 09, 2021 at 09:08:05PM +0100, abuse department wrote:
> So we want bridges without contact info and from unknown persons / state
> agencies?
>
> I am sure there is nothing with this excellent plan that could possible go
> wrong.
>
AFAIK, bridges weren't involved in the last att
Sorry for this post but it pisses me off so much.
We now have terms and conditions how well known Tor relay operators are allowed
to donate their own money in form of IPs, BW and CPU cycles without getting
anything back?
>
> If censorship in Russia scale to a country-wide Tor block, then you
I can legit spin up 128 bridges. Let me know.
John
On Dec 10, 2021, at 15:55, gus wrote:
Hi John,
Let's do this:
If censorship in Russia scale to a country-wide Tor block, then you
can spin as many bridges as you can. What do you think?
Thank you!,
Gus
On Tue, Dec 07, 2021 at 08:40:24PM +
Hiho,
we got a notice that currently several exploit attempts for the log4j
flaw going through Tor exit nodes und using LDAP. See
https://www.greynoise.io/viz/query/?gnql=tags%3A%22Apache%20Log4j%20RCE%20Attempt%22
The sender asked to do something against the currently running attacks.
One pos
