Re: [tor-relays] Responding to Tor censorship in Russia

2021-12-10 Thread gus
Hi John, Let's do this: If censorship in Russia scale to a country-wide Tor block, then you can spin as many bridges as you can. What do you think? Thank you!, Gus On Tue, Dec 07, 2021 at 08:40:24PM +, John Ricketts wrote: > gus, > > Since all of my exit nodes are within the same /16 - wou

Re: [tor-relays] Rejected-fingerprints-found-in-attacks wiki page

2021-12-10 Thread Georg Koppen
nusenu: Georg Koppen: suggestion for an improvement to this process so it will become more accurate/complete (example: May 2021 is incomplete) Could you elaborate on why you think May 2021 is incomplete and how to fix that? I believe DAs rejected >1000 relays, but instead of listing their f

Re: [tor-relays] Rejected-fingerprints-found-in-attacks wiki page

2021-12-10 Thread nusenu
Georg Koppen: suggestion for an improvement to this process so it will become more accurate/complete (example: May 2021 is incomplete) Could you elaborate on why you think May 2021 is incomplete and how to fix that? I believe DAs rejected >1000 relays, but instead of listing their fingerprint

Re: [tor-relays] Rejected-fingerprints-found-in-attacks wiki page

2021-12-10 Thread Georg Koppen
nusenu: Georg Koppen: Here we go. I added the list of fingerprints for April 2021. I plan to keep adding fingerprints monthly on the same wiki page[3], as we find them in attacks. Georg [3] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/wikis/Rejected-fingerprints-found-in-attacks

[tor-relays] Rejected-fingerprints-found-in-attacks wiki page

2021-12-10 Thread nusenu
Georg Koppen: Here we go. I added the list of fingerprints for April 2021. I plan to keep adding fingerprints monthly on the same wiki page[3], as we find them in attacks. Georg [3] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/wikis/Rejected-fingerprints-found-in-attacks suggest