> On 28 Aug 2018, at 13:13, Nathaniel Suchy wrote:
>
> This thread continues the broader discussion of Tor Circuit path selection
> discussed at
> https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2018-August/015994.html
> regarding possible correlation attacks by an autonomous system.
>
> C
This thread continues the broader discussion of Tor Circuit path selection
discussed at
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2018-August/015994.html
regarding
possible correlation attacks by an autonomous system.
*Current measures include:*
* Preventing two relays from the same /16 in
Hi again,,
> A valid point, thanks for linking the paper. I have the utmost belief
your intentions are good, but the concentration of exits under a
non-advertised central control warrants conversation, at least.
I discussing the best way to handle this is important. However I think it's
unfair to
One might worry more what Mega and Gigacorps are doing,
secret partner friendly endeavours with Govts against you,
than what some tiny ISP or whoever is doing with a few boxes.
And was posted here many times about creating additional trust
models and layers for relays, audits metrics and choices f
Hi,
A healthy, robust, and growing tor network needs a lot of different
ways to run tor relays. Focusing on one or two models creates single
points of failure.
So we encourage individual volunteers, organisations, donations, paid
services, and researchers: as long as they operate ethically and
pr
> On 28 Aug 2018, at 10:47, Nathaniel Suchy wrote:
>
> Tor will already avoid making circuits where two IP Addresses in the same /24
> are involved.
If you grow beyond a /24, it's worth knowing that Tor's current path
selection avoids the same /16 for IPv4, and will soon avoid the same
/32 for
Tor will already avoid making circuits where two IP Addresses in the
same /24 are involved. The research in this paper
(https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/DBLP:conf/ccs/EdmanS09.pdf) is
becoming more relevent and is worth discussing as more ISPs come out
with the goal of hosting lots and l
Jordan,
Tor will already avoid making circuits where two IP Addresses in the same
/24 are involved. The research in this paper (
https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/DBLP:conf/ccs/EdmanS09.pdf) is
becoming more relevent and is worth discussing as more ISPs come out with
the goal of hosting lots
No, because Digital Ocean doesn't market itself as a relay hoster-- the
percentage of relay-hosting clients wouldn't even near 0.1%.
What difference does that make?
You quoted it, you can read it again if you'd like.
There is little administrative overhead for Conrad to distribute a
MyFamil
On 08/27/2018 05:17 PM, Jordan wrote:
>> That is an interesting question. Conrad's hosting operation is an
>> extreme case, certainly. But consider two independently operated VPS
>> relays in the same Digital Ocean data center, with arbitrarily similar
>> IP addresses. And consider that both are vu
That is an interesting question. Conrad's hosting operation is an
extreme case, certainly. But consider two independently operated VPS
relays in the same Digital Ocean data center, with arbitrarily similar
IP addresses. And consider that both are vulnerable to compromise by
Digital Ocean staff. Sh
On 08/27/2018 04:42 PM, Jordan wrote:
> I'd be much more supportive of the typical "donate x to have a relay
> hosted for you" [1][2] rather than "host a relay with us" without
> maintaining them under the same family.
That is an interesting question. Conrad's hosting operation is an
extreme case,
I'd be much more supportive of the typical "donate x to have a relay
hosted for you" [1][2] rather than "host a relay with us" without
maintaining them under the same family.
If relays are running on his machines and he has access to relay keys,
the person who installs Tor via pkg and starts i
Damn, none of this belongs on a public list.
And for what it's worth, Ralph Seichter comes off worse than Conrad
Rockenhaus does.
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On 27.08.2018 23:00, Conrad Rockenhaus wrote:
> You had a custom Gentoo Image, just for you, deployed, which you were
> quite happy with, and now you have the audacity to slander Nathaniel’s
> and I’s work?
Oh my, slander. Let's see:
Slander: noun [ C or U ] UK /ˈslɑːn.dər/ US /ˈslæn.dɚ/ a f
The trial period was for 30 days for one server. You were able to try out three
servers at the same time. WHMCS calculated your trial period at 10 days and
scheduled your instances for deletion.
You didn’t even give me half of a day before you started acting paranoid that
your instances were de
On Mon, 27 Aug 2018 20:25:00 +
nusenu wrote:
> I assume you also run into the annoyance that this relay (or AS / country)
> is breaking TLS for certain destination (like some torproject.org domains).
Honestly, there need to be BadExit countries. That relay seems to be in
Turkey, I suppose wh
Nathaniel Suchy:
> Can the operator of the relay 185.125.33.114 please reach out to me? There
> is not any contact information available on Tor Metrics for the relay.
I assume you also run into the annoyance that this relay (or AS / country)
is breaking TLS for certain destination (like some tor
Can the operator of the relay 185.125.33.114 please reach out to me? There
is not any contact information available on Tor Metrics for the relay.
Cordially,
Nathaniel Suchy
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Hi Ralph,
Writing to you off-list. I'm sorry to hear you had a bad experience with
GreyPony IT Services.
Cordially,
Nathaniel
On Mon, Aug 27, 2018 at 1:59 PM Ralph Seichter
wrote:
> On 27.08.18 19:11, zimmer linux wrote:
>
> > Well done to Conrad - I say. The more, the merrier.
>
> I disagree.
On 27.08.18 19:11, zimmer linux wrote:
> Well done to Conrad - I say. The more, the merrier.
I disagree. My personal experience with the trial, or more specifically
with Conrad's behaviour, made it clear to me that he is not the kind of
person I want to have a business relationship with. The hone
Hi,
Just to let you know that following on with the one month trial with tor
exit relays that Conrad kindly offered, at least four of his exit relays
are now in the top 10 listing for Canada, out of 68 Canadian exit relays.
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/country:ca%20flag:exit
Wel
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