@Mirimir
>> This is not Blockchain where hundreds of thousands of greedy selfish
>> genes are working together for non-collusion. A practically zero-
>> effort collusion of already fully cooperating FIVE EYE agencies (US,
>> UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) is needed to sprinkle several tens
On 01/01/2017 11:28 PM, Rana wrote:
> @Mirimir, @Andreas
>>> This assumes that there is only one entity wanting to do that.
>>> When there are multiple the game isn't that easy.
>
>> Yes, that is a great Tor feature! Dueling adversaries strengthen
>> Tor against each other.
>
> That's wishful
@Sebastian
>> On 02 Jan 2017, at 07:28, Rana wrote:
>> I think I already covered the "if it exists" part. Sticking to the original
>> (old) design doc of Tor is not a practically useful strategy. I believe that
>> Tor has MOSTLY such strong adversaries, the others do not matter much. You
>> do
> On 02 Jan 2017, at 07:28, Rana wrote:
> I think I already covered the "if it exists" part. Sticking to the original
> (old) design doc of Tor is not a practically useful strategy. I believe that
> Tor has MOSTLY such strong adversaries, the others do not matter much. You do
> not really use
@Andreas
>It will not go quite unnoticed when the set of major relays changes
>substantially over a few months.
Tor exists for what, 10 years? 30 new rogue relays per month (monthly quantity
designed to be proportional to the recent months growth statistic) would go
totally unnoticed and would
> @Aeris
>
> I do not see how Sybil attacks relate to my question. The adversary will
> simply set up new nodes, without messing with attacking identities of
> existing ones.
Sybil attack is not attacking identity, but just running bunch of relays.
> As to the rest of it, let us calculate. Assum
On 01/01/2017 03:42 PM, Andreas Krey wrote:
> On Sun, 01 Jan 2017 23:54:03 +, Rana wrote:
> ...
>> I do not see how Sybil attacks relate to my question. The adversary will
>> simply set up new nodes, without messing with attacking identities of
>> existing ones.
>
> It will not go quite unno
On Sun, 01 Jan 2017 23:54:03 +, Rana wrote:
...
> I do not see how Sybil attacks relate to my question. The adversary will
> simply set up new nodes, without messing with attacking identities of
> existing ones.
It will not go quite unnoticed when the set of major relays changes
substantiall
On 01/01/2017 04:54 PM, Rana wrote:
> The adversary will simply set up new nodes
Which can be called a Sybil attack.
> That’s $1million a year to control most of the Tor nodes., You call this
> "costly"? This amount is a joke, a trifle, petty cash for any US or Russian
> government agency. F
@Aeris
I do not see how Sybil attacks relate to my question. The adversary will simply
set up new nodes, without messing with attacking identities of existing ones.
As to the rest of it, let us calculate. Assuming that the adversary wants to
control 4000 nodes for 3 years, the 70d startup perio
> Whats the trust mechanism (if any) to ensure that the majority of guards
> are not hijacked by adversaries?
See https://blog.torproject.org/blog/lifecycle-of-a-new-relay
* You need to wait around 70d to be a fully ready guard relay consuming all
the possible bandwidth.
* Any sybil attack will
Sorry for the naïve question, but we have a total of about 7000 relays, many
of them residential and thus practically unused or very lightly used. So the
actual number of relays that carry most of the traffic is rather small, and
many of them are middle relays, leaving an even smaller number of gua
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