Re: [tor-relays] Key files encryption methods.

There may be no better than pure ram, so this ticket may be of interest: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9478 ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

Re: [tor-relays] Key files encryption methods.

I have something to add to this. I'm a new relay operator, but not new to server hosting in general. People should be aware that some providers of vservers run their internal operations by using a large-capacity storage box for the disk storage, and separate hardware hosts which run the cpu/

Re: [tor-relays] [tor-talk] obfsproxy failure: obfs3

I'm still having trouble connecting to my obfsproxy bridge; Any pointers would be appreciated. External scanning indicates that the correct ports are open except for port 443 but it's definitely open on the firewall. lee@li388-156:~$ nmap -p 22,443,9001,40872,52176 173.255.119.202 Starting Nmap 5

Re: [tor-relays] Config Tor Exit Node

On Wed, 21 Aug 2013 18:04:53 +, var wrote: ... > The exit node is directly plugged in to the gateway. Its an DIR-655 > which just have to run our internet > traffic + the tor exit node. Does the exit node get a public IP address there? ... > Problem is that wh

[tor-relays] Config Tor Exit Node

Hi guys, we moved from a Win to Linux with our tor exit node. The win was running fine no problems since we are running the the exit node on a Debian wheezy we got in trouble. The exit node is installed and configured with the how to on the official Tor website. The exit node is directly plu

Re: [tor-relays] Experience with obfuscated bridge on Raspberry Pi Raspian

On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 1:58 AM, z0rc wrote: > On 20/08/13 12:01, Kostas Jakeliunas wrote: > > Do you remember where you did hear this? Was it in writing, are you by > chance maybe able to link to it? It would be interesting to know more. > > > Hi, > > It was actually on this list a few weeks ag

Re: [tor-relays] Key files encryption methods.

On 21.08.2013 11:56, Tony Xue wrote: > Is that those key files are only loaded when the Tor start and reload? > So could it be possible to decrypt the file before the start-up and > encrypt them again after the Tor start-up process is complete? The files are required only on startup of the relay,

Re: [tor-relays] Upgrading an obfsbridge to the latest alpha on git master, on raspberry pi

On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 10:35 AM, Peter Palfrader wrote: > Maybe you should build .deb package from these sources? > https://www.torproject.org/docs/debian#source Ah! debuild && dpkg -i. Yes, that's the cleaner way to do it for sure, thanks. There's no reason why this shouldn't work with the la

[tor-relays] Key files encryption methods.

Hi, As shown on the Tor website, the most important file of Tor is the key files. So is there any efficient way to encrypt those files in order to prevent anyone else, i.e. Hosting provider, getting and reading them? Is that those key files are only loaded when the Tor start and reload? So could

Re: [tor-relays] obfsbridge operators: git master enables client statistics!

Hi! George Kadianakis: > tl;dr, you might want to upgrade your tor to the latest git master. Please note that, thanks to weasel's work, we have Debian packages built every night from tor master branch. To use them, put the following in your sources.list: deb http://deb.torproject.org/ tor-n

Re: [tor-relays] Upgrading an obfsbridge to the latest alpha on git master, on raspberry pi

On Tue, 20 Aug 2013, Kostas Jakeliunas wrote: > Presumably everyone for whom this might be relevant already knows these > things much better than myself, but since they might be applicable to > all/some Debian users (raspberrypi + raspbian/debian users for sure), i'm > outlining a couple of snags