I support this draft. RFCs do not always equal the real world, but less
secure versions of TLS should be deprecated with the strongest possible
terms.
On Mon, Nov 9, 2020 at 2:27 PM The IESG wrote:
>
> The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG (tls)
> to
> consider the
, Jan 7, 2021 at 4:39 PM Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 04, 2021 at 03:40:34PM -0800, Martin Duke via Datatracker
> wrote:
> > Martin Duke has entered the following ballot position for
> > draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-06: Discuss
> >
> > When responding
Jan 7, 2021 at 4:39 PM Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Jan 04, 2021 at 03:40:34PM -0800, Martin Duke via Datatracker
>> wrote:
>> > Martin Duke has entered the following ballot position for
>> > draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-06: Discuss
>> >
>&g
lswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer/pull/41
On Tue, Jan 19, 2021 at 10:40 AM Martin Duke
wrote:
> Ekr,
>
> I appreciate that this is hard to represent in 8446 notation. Would it be
> possible to add some text in 4.1 that says "Due to the maximum size of the
> PSK extens
On Tue, Feb 23, 2021, at 4:32 PM, Martin Duke wrote:
> > After further consideration, the problem at hand is best resolved by
> > 8446, which has a generalized problem with subfield lengths that don't
> > add up to the field length. I will remove the DISCUSS
> >
> &
ithin limits, introducing a latency regression into DTLS 1.3 would be
perverse.
DTLS is a very important protocol and it is worth the time to get these
things right.
Thanks,
Martin Duke
Transport AD
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Thank you Eric (and Mark).
To reiterate, I believe introducing latency regressions with respect to
DTLS 1.2 would be bad for the internet. So what's new in the area under
discussion is (a) lowering the timeout from 1s to 100ms, and (b) the
introduction of ACKs.
I would characterize ekr's reply a
annes.tschofe...@arm.com> wrote:
> Hi Martin,
>
> the main issue Ekr is bringing up is that the DTLS handshake happens
> infrequently and it is small in size.
> The use of DTLS for protecting application traffic is not impacted by this
> timeout.
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
&g
an on-path attacker. An on-path attacker
> (such as a router) can already today perform a denial of service attack on
> DTLS secured communication by dropping all packets.
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Martin Duke via Datatracker
> Sent: Tuesday,
Hello TLS,
I just published an individual draft in QUIC that tries to take the ECHO
mechanism and use it to protect the entire Initial packet exchange in QUIC,
instead of just selected fields in the client hello. It is reliant on QUIC
version negotiation to recover from config mismatches:
https:/
Hello TLS,
I just started a thread on how ALPN will interact with new versions of QUIC:
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/quic/VuAWMvB8XFjpfK7kg6QaHn4KHqA/
This discussion could have a large impact on the evolution of the IANA ALPN
registry, which this WG created. Please participate in the di
This is a reminder that we are holding a side meeting on openSSL and QUIC
shortly after the third session today:
https://trac.ietf.org/trac/ietf/meeting/wiki/112sidemeetings#point3
Please come if you are concerned about the impact on existing QUIC
implementations or rollout of other (D)TLS functi
Sounds good to me, thanks!
On Fri, May 27, 2022 at 9:22 AM Sean Turner wrote:
>
>
> > On May 23, 2022, at 12:33, Martin Duke via Datatracker
> wrote:
> >
> > Martin Duke has entered the following ballot position for
> > draft-ietf-tls-subcerts-14: No Objectio
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