On Sat, 14 Dec 2024 at 12:00, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
>
> On Fri, Dec 13, 2024 at 08:24:24PM -0800, Joseph Salowey wrote:
>
> > You continue to violate list policy with unprofessional commentary on other
> > participants' motivations and repeatedly raising points that are out of
> > scope. Please
Pull requests
-
* tlswg/sslkeylogfile (+0/-2/đź’¬1)
1 pull requests received 1 new comments:
- #17 ECH extensions added to the main SSLKEYLOGFILE spec (1 by yaroslavros)
https://github.com/tlswg/sslkeylogfile/pull/17
2 pull requests merged:
- ECH extensions added to the mai
D. J. Bernstein wrote:
> More recently, NSA's Dickie George is on video claiming that NSA generated
> the Dual EC points randomly and that Dual EC is secure.
Do you have a link to the video? Such a comment is surprising as it is a very
bad PR strategy. “No comment” is a far better strategy.
T
I would also be against a temporarily ban at this point, but hopefully the
warning will help reduce unprofessional commentary and personal attacks in the
future. Commentaries on other participants' motivations should not be forbidden
in general, and I don't think they are according to any IETF p
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-tls-rfc9147bis-00.txt is now available. It is a work
item of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) WG of the IETF.
Title: The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3
Authors: Eric Rescorla
Hannes Tschofenig
Nagendra Modad
D. J. Bernstein wrote:
> More recently, NSA's Dickie George is on video claiming that NSA generated
> the Dual EC points randomly and that Dual EC is secure.
Do you have a link to the video? Such a comment is surprising as it is a very
bad PR strategy. “No comment” is a far better strategy. The
Hiya,
On 15/12/2024 00:07, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL wrote:
Those who agree with BSI – let them use Hybrid KEM, as they have their reasons.
Those who agree with NSA – let them use pure ML-KEM, as they have their reasons
FWIW, my opinion is that the IETF and the TLS WG ought (try) develo
. . . however forceful, or insistent on being heard, Dan may be at times,
history has
shown that he is often enough ultimately proved right, years or decades
later.
An arguable point.
However "inconvenient", IMHO his voice should not be suppressed.
Of course.
However, there must be a limit
Stephen, I don’t think attempting to develop consensus in this case would be
either useful or productive.
It is obvious that pure PQ KEMs are the future, when CRQC becomes “more” real.
Some respected cryptographers are convinced that it is the optimal solution for
now as well.
Some other resp
