[TLS]Re: TLS trust expressions and certificate_authorities

2024-06-11 Thread Ilari Liusvaara
On Tue, Jun 11, 2024 at 02:36:50AM +0100, Stephen Farrell wrote: > > Hiya, > > On 11/06/2024 02:24, Devon O'Brien wrote: > > > > I realize there has been extensive discussion about trust expressions > > Just checking - does your mail amount to "we heard your well-intentioned > but misplaced opp

[TLS]Re: TLS trust expressions and certificate_authorities

2024-06-11 Thread Dennis Jackson
Hi Devon, I'm a bit disappointed in how you've characterized the earlier discussion, but I appreciate the attempt to move the conversation on to new technical ground. I previously started a thread on the problems with the proposed uses of Trust Expressions for PQC-transition [1] in a similar

[TLS]Re: Transitioning to PQC Certificates & Trust Expressions

2024-06-11 Thread Dennis Jackson
Hi Watson, Ilari, Watson wrote: Wait, I don't think the example's quite right (or maybe I'm just confused). How can two intermediates sign the "same" leaf? Or is the idea that we have L1' and L1 X509 Certificates with the same public key presented in the chain but signed by different intermedia

[TLS]Re: TLS trust expressions and certificate_authorities

2024-06-11 Thread David Benjamin
Hi Stephen, We added some text to the most recent draft that addresses some of the PKI dynamics that seem to underly the discussion. https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url1=draft-davidben-tls-trust-expr-02&url2=draft-davidben-tls-trust-expr-03&difftype=--html We've also been gradually updating

[TLS]Re: Curve-popularity data?

2024-06-11 Thread D. J. Bernstein
> > There will be an annoyingly large number of options on the PQ side---for > > example, for different security levels and for patent avoidance---and > > I'd expect a tricky discussion of which options to recommend for TLS. > I'm not sure I buy this premise. Currently there seems to be an > overwh

[TLS]Re: TLS trust expressions and certificate_authorities

2024-06-11 Thread Nick Harper
On Tue, Jun 11, 2024 at 3:25 AM Dennis Jackson wrote: > I think the above captures the main thrust of your argument in this > thread, but it seems like quite a flawed analysis. If T.E. does not offer > any new capabilities over certificate_authorities, then there is no point > in standardizing it