Hey Ilari,
I think you are still misunderstanding the scheme. To clarify:
On 01/03/2024 18:01, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:
The unrecognized identifier issue is a bit more subtle.
Suppose that a client:
- Has only partial list of certificates (enough to cover the built-in
trust store).
- Allows a
Hi Panos,
On 02/03/2024 04:09, Kampanakis, Panos wrote:
Hi Dennis,
I created a git issue
https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-cert-abridge/issues/23 but I
am pasting it here for the sake of the discussion:
What does the client do if the server only does Pass 1 and compresses
/ omits th
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-tls-esni-18.txt is now available. It is a work item
of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) WG of the IETF.
Title: TLS Encrypted Client Hello
Authors: Eric Rescorla
Kazuho Oku
Nick Sullivan
Christopher A. Wood
Name:draft-ie
Thanks for your thoughtful reply.
Inline:
On Sat, Mar 2, 2024 at 9:21 PM David Benjamin wrote:
> Hi Orie,
>
> Thanks for the note! I'm not very familiar with the SCITT work, so I can't
> speak to it directly. But perhaps I can try to describe what we're trying
> to achieve for TLS, and that mig
Hi Dennis,
> I can see two different ways to handle it. Either as you suggest, we have it
> be a runtime decision and we just prefix the compressed form with a byte to
> indicate whether pass 2 has been used. Alternatively, we can define two
> codepoints, (pass 1 + pass 2, pass 1).
> I'd like t
