Re: [TLS] [EXTERNAL] Re: Servers sending CA names

2023-04-18 Thread Richard Barnes
On Mon, Apr 17, 2023 at 11:41 AM Robert Relyea wrote: > I know of no public CA which issues SSL client auth certs (or what it > would mean for a server to trust a public client auth cert). > Let's Encrypt issues roughly 3 million publicly trusted certificates per day that contain the client auth

Re: [TLS] [EXTERNAL] Re: Servers sending CA names

2023-04-18 Thread Peter Gutmann
Richard Barnes writes: >Let's Encrypt issues roughly 3 million publicly trusted certificates per day >that contain the client authentication EKU But they just set that by default for every cert they issue so it's pretty much meaningless. There are public CAs that set keyAgreement for RSA certs,

Re: [TLS] [EXTERNAL] Re: Servers sending CA names

2023-04-18 Thread Soni L.
So like a "client" cert is just a way to say "yes I'm really example.org" yeah? That seems particularly useful for federated networks (XMPP, etc). Why not call these server-to-server certs? On 4/18/23 20:45, Peter Gutmann wrote: Richard Barnes writes: >Let's Encrypt issues roughly 3 millio

Re: [TLS] [EXTERNAL] Re: Servers sending CA names

2023-04-18 Thread Rushil Mehra
Not necessarily. One could use client certificates to ensure that only authorized clients (e.g. a laptop with the client certificate in its key store) can access some resource. On Tue, Apr 18, 2023 at 5:07 PM Soni L. wrote: > So like a "client" cert is just a way to say "yes I'm really > example

Re: [TLS] [EXTERNAL] Re: Servers sending CA names

2023-04-18 Thread kha.thach
Yes, and organization IT can even mark the private key associated with the client cert not exportable from that laptop. I do have customers requiring client cert as one factor of authentication. Thanks, Kha Thach From: TLS On Behalf Of Rushil Mehra Sent: Wednesday, April 19, 2023 8:05 A

Re: [TLS] [EXTERNAL] Re: Servers sending CA names

2023-04-18 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
On Tue, Apr 18, 2023 at 09:06:40PM -0300, Soni L. wrote: > That seems particularly useful for federated networks (XMPP, etc). Why > not call these server-to-server certs? That's basically it. At least in OpenSSL, when a EKU extension is present in the client certificate, it must allow client a