On Tuesday, 21 March 2023 17:06:54 CET, David Benjamin wrote:
On Tue, Mar 21, 2023 at 8:01 AM Hubert Kario wrote:
On Monday, 20 March 2023 19:54:24 CET, David Benjamin wrote:
I don't think flattening is the right way to look at it. See my
other reply for a discussion about flattening, and how
>
> Unpopular pages are much more likely to deploy a solution that doesn't
> require
> a parallel CA infrastructure and a cryptographer on staff.
>
CAs, TLS libraries, certbot, and browsers would need to make changes, but I
think we can deploy this without webservers or relying parties having to
m
On Wed, Mar 22, 2023 at 01:54:22PM +0100, Bas Westerbaan wrote:
> >
> > Unpopular pages are much more likely to deploy a solution that
> > doesn't require a parallel CA infrastructure and a cryptographer
> > on staff.
I don't think the server-side deployment difficulties with this have
anything to
Hi Uri,
I'm afraid that like you I am not going to Yokohama, as I am attending RWC
and HACS in Tokyo that week instead. While the AuthKEM draft has been
sitting idle, I have been very busy, pretty much writing the book on it —
my PhD thesis. I am sitting on a large pile of tables and benchmark res
On Fri, Mar 10, 2023 at 05:09:10PM -0500, David Benjamin wrote:
>
> I've just uploaded a draft, below, describing several ideas we've
> been mulling over regarding certificates in TLS. This is a draft-00
> with a lot of moving parts, so think of it as the first pass at
> some of ideas that we think
Hi Hubert,
I totally agree on your points about time-to-first-byte vs time-to-last-byte.
We (some of my previous work too) have been focusing on time-to-first byte
which makes some of these handshakes look bad for the tails of the 80-95th
percentiles. But in reality, the time-to-last-byte or
