[TLS] Opt-in schema for client identification

2022-09-16 Thread Dmitry Belyavsky
Dear colleagues, I'd like to suggest an opt-in cookie-style schema allowing the server to identify the client in case when a client performs several unsuccessful connection attempts. Modern real-life applications (e.g. browsers) may perform several handshakes in a row until the connection to the

Re: [TLS] RFC 5746 applicable for session resumption?

2022-09-16 Thread Fries, Steffen
Hi Viktor, Thank you for the info. Regarding the information in the ticket, I was looking at the recommended ticket structure in RFC 5077 section 4 (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5077#section-4). There is the encrypted_state mentioned, which contains the encrypted information stated

[TLS] OCSP and browsers

2022-09-16 Thread Salz, Rich
I think this is of general interest, so I’m posting here rather than poking friends I know. Browsers are phasing out doing OCSP queries themselves. The common justification, which makes sense to me, is that there are privacy concerns about leaking where a user is surfing. My question is, what

Re: [TLS] [EXTERNAL] Opt-in schema for client identification

2022-09-16 Thread Andrei Popov
* Server can distinguish the client and alter some parameters in response to make the new connection successful. A TLS server would typically choose either server-preferred parameters (cipher suite, EC curve, etc.) among those advertised by the client, or honor the client’s preferences. Can

Re: [TLS] [EXTERNAL] Opt-in schema for client identification

2022-09-16 Thread David Benjamin
I too am not seeing the use case here. Could you elaborate? Since browsers were mentioned as an example, when Chrome makes several connections in a row (e.g. to measure impacts of a removal more accurately), we generally do *not* expect the server to change its selection algorithm across the two c

Re: [TLS] [EXTERNAL] Opt-in schema for client identification

2022-09-16 Thread David Benjamin
Depending on what the server does, there may also be downgrade implications, if the server uses some unauthenticated prior state to influence parameter selection. On Fri, Sep 16, 2022 at 11:53 AM David Benjamin wrote: > I too am not seeing the use case here. Could you elaborate? > > Since browse

Re: [TLS] [EXTERNAL] Opt-in schema for client identification

2022-09-16 Thread Dmitry Belyavsky
>From the top of my head I can imagine 2 sort of real-life scenarios: - processing of invalid session ID, if it is repeated in the 2nd attempt, can be omitted using a smaller cache on the server side - a server having more than one valid certificate for the domain name, can switch between them in

Re: [TLS] [EXTERNAL] Opt-in schema for client identification

2022-09-16 Thread Andrei Popov
* - processing of invalid session ID, if it is repeated in the 2nd attempt, can be omitted using a smaller cache on the server side Invalid session ID should not lead to handshake failure; it results in a full handshake and an updated session ID/ticket. * - a server having more than one

Re: [TLS] [EXTERNAL] Opt-in schema for client identification

2022-09-16 Thread Dmitry Belyavsky
On Fri, 16 Sep 2022, 21:35 Andrei Popov, wrote: > >- - processing of invalid session ID, if it is repeated in the 2nd >attempt, can be omitted using a smaller cache on the server side > > Invalid session ID should not lead to handshake failure; it results in a > full handshake and an upda