More biased nonce attacks for ECDSA
But in my mind the worst threat is Kleptogram for ECDSA (malicious random
number generator, such as Dual EC DBRG ?)
biased nonce attack for ECDSA
=
] J. Breitner and N. Heninger, "Biased nonce sense: Lattice attacks against
weak ECDSA si
Hey Ilari,
thank’s for replying. I did verify the transcript as well. Everything seems to
be correct. I bet if it wasn't the 1-RTT and 0-RTT(no-early-data) would fail
too. Something weird is going on only in 0-RTT(early-data) case.
Can you maybe point me to an URL with the correct TLS1.3 implem
Hi,
while reading RFC 5746 on TLS renegotiation indication extension I came across
the text in sections 3.4 and 3.6 that the client and server behavior
(verification of client_verify_data and server_verify_data) applies to full
handshakes as well as resumed handshakes. I was somehow mislead by
