Dear TLS list,
FYI, ICYMI,
Berndt et al. describe a subverted implementation attack against TLS
https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1452
I just noticed this report today and don't remember seeing it mentioned on the
TLS list already. It seems to be worth at least considering.
A summary and brief disc
I don't think that this is a particularly important result. The formalism is
perhaps valuable, but the intuition is not novel: if you control an endpoint
and it can send messages, those messages can contain information. There are
far too many places in almost any protocol where information can
On 8/26/21 at 6:01 PM, m...@lowentropy.net (Martin Thomson) wrote:
That Signal was hard is interesting, but I don't think that the
authors were sufficiently creative. They say "these
low-bandwidth attacks cannot be used to leak the short-term,
ephemeral keys", but I don't think that is true a
