Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 clarification request

2021-03-17 Thread Ben Smyth
On Tue, 16 Mar 2021, 20:03 Jeremy Harris, wrote: > On 16/03/2021 07:53, Ben Smyth wrote: > > Further, is it reasonable for the above first end to > >> expect the above second end to continue processing and > >> sending data that would have been sent in the absence of > >> such a first Close Alert

Re: [TLS] ECH/ESNI - is accept confirmation calculation brittle in the face of errors?

2021-03-17 Thread David Benjamin
Oh, that is a good observation. If the client has the same ServerHello-sensitive preferences (version, key share, supported groups, cipher suites, PSKs) between inner and outer ClientHello, it doesn't need to reprocess. But if it has different preferences, it needs to resolve this circular depende

Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 clarification request

2021-03-17 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
On Wed, Mar 17, 2021 at 08:15:53AM +0100, Ben Smyth wrote: > > Do I understand that right? And if so, what is the point of the > > language in the RFC that appears to permit a half-close? > > Specifications don't define systems, they guide design. The specification > does not "requir[e] an end t

Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 clarification request

2021-03-17 Thread Jeremy Harris
On 17/03/2021 07:15, Ben Smyth wrote: Perhaps one scenario where that behaviour is useful: An endpoint is about to be comprimised and raises an alert to avoid secrets being leaked. I'd have tout that a section 6.2 Error Alert would be more appropriate in such a situation, than the (implicitly n

Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 clarification request

2021-03-17 Thread Ben Smyth
On Wed, 17 Mar 2021, 15:31 Jeremy Harris, wrote: > On 17/03/2021 07:15, Ben Smyth wrote: > > Perhaps one scenario where that > > behaviour is useful: An endpoint is about to be comprimised and raises an > > alert to avoid secrets being leaked. > > I'd have tout that a section 6.2 Error Alert woul

Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 clarification request

2021-03-17 Thread Jeremy Harris
On 17/03/2021 14:45, Ben Smyth wrote: Do you at least agree that Google is in violation of the 6.1 wording requiring that it sends a Close Alert before sending a TCP FIN? Which aspect of Section 6.1 do you think Google doesn't comply with? "Each party MUST send a "close_notify" alert before

[TLS] Hopefully-final draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https-04 and nearing WGLC

2021-03-17 Thread Erik Nygren
We've closed out most of the open issues on draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https and it will be going to WGLC shortly. Current version at: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https-04.txt Hopefully we're done, but you can open issues against: https://github.com/MikeBishop/dns