Re: [TLS] 3GPP forbids support of MD5, SHA-1, non-AEAD, and non-PFS in TLS

One comment.  Perhaps some caution might be advised in light of the antitrust court order in /Trueposition v. Ericsson/. Ref. Order in Case No. 2:11-cv-4574, (U.S. E.D. Pa, 14 Jul 2014). --amr On 2020-03-06 7:02 PM, John Mattsson wrote: Hi, I am happy to report that 3GPP just took the decisi

Re: [TLS] 3GPP forbids support of MD5, SHA-1, non-AEAD, and non-PFS in TLS

One comment.  Perhaps some caution might be advised in light of the antitrust court order in /Trueposition v. Ericsson/. Ref. Order in Case No. 2:11-cv-4574, (U.S. E.D. Pa, 14 Jul 2014). --amr On 2020-03-06 7:02 PM, John Mattsson wrote: Hi, I am happy to report that 3GPP just took the decisi

[TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-35.txt

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF. Title : The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3 Authors : Eric Rescorla

[TLS] draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-35

Hi folks, I have just submitted -35. This makes the following notable changes: - Fix contradictory text around the legacy cookie field by requiring it to be empty. - Note that you can't ACK records unless you are processing the contents (as noted by Hanno). It also fixes a few editorial problem

[TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh-01.txt

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF. Title : Semi-Static Diffie-Hellman Key Establishment for TLS 1.3 Authors : Eric Rescorla

Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh-01.txt

Among editorial changes, this update removes key schedule injection. The resulting design still requires formal analysis, though we don’t expect much more to change at this point. Please have a look and provide feedback. Thanks! Chris (no hat) On 7 Mar 2020, at 15:45, internet-dra...@ietf.org

Re: [TLS] 3GPP forbids support of MD5, SHA-1, non-AEAD, and non-PFS in TLS

In article you write: >-=-=-=-=-=- > >One comment.  Perhaps some caution might be advised in light of the >antitrust court order in /Trueposition v. Ericsson/. Ref. Order in Case >No. 2:11-cv-4574, (U.S. E.D. Pa, 14 Jul 2014). That's a single page dismissing 3GPP from the case. Really? https:

[TLS] Weekly github digest (TLS Working Group Drafts)

Issues -- * tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni (+0/-1/💬3) 3 issues received 3 new comments: - #183 Clarification on repeated extensions in ESNIRecord and ESNIKeys (1 by chris-wood) https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/183 - #145 Adopt HPKE (1 by chris-wood) https://github.c