On Wednesday, 8 May 2019 02:31:57 CEST Martin Rex wrote:
> Hubert Kario wrote:
> >> Thanks to Peter Gutmann for the summary:
> >> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/g0MDCdZcHsvZefv4V8fssXMeEHs
> >>
> >> which you may have missed.
> >
> > yes, Joux paper also shows that attacking MD5||
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.
Title : TLS 1.3 Extension for Certificate-based
Authentication with an External Pre-Shared Key
Author : Ru
I received some editorial suggestions by private email during WG Last Call.
This update implements those suggestions.
Here is the URL for the diff:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-00&url2=draft-ietf-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-01&difftype=--hwdiff
Hi all,
Following the recent thread on TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 deprecation, we
came up with a proposal to deprecate md5 and sha1 for digital
signatures in the TLS 1.2 spec.
Please find the draft at this url:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lvelvindron-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-03
We look forward to y
Hubert Kario wrote:
>On Wednesday, 8 May 2019 02:31:57 CEST Martin Rex wrote:
>> Hubert Kario wrote:
Thanks to Peter Gutmann for the summary:
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/g0MDCdZcHsvZefv4V8fssXMeEHs
which you may have missed.
>>>
>>> yes, Joux paper also sho
It might pay to spend more time on explaining what you are trying to do.
The goal appears to be to remove a dependency on signature schemes that include
these weaker hash functions. But the introduction just says that the functions
are bad.
You should be very clear about what effect this has o
Martin Rex writes:
>What *WOULD* provide *HUGE* benefit, would be to remove the dangerous
>"protocol version downgrade dance" from careless applications, that is the
>actual problem known as POODLE, because this subverts the cryptographic
>procection of the TLS handshake protocol.
Is there anyth
