Re: [TLS] [T2TRG] ITDA - IoT Device Authentication

2019-02-18 Thread Eliot Lear
Just to add- this is what the plethora of BRSKI drafts are attempting to address in 6tisch, ANIMA, and EMU. If there is to be a new mechanism, I encourage that it be listed on the GitHub page at https://github.com/iot-onboarding/catalog . Both the RE

Re: [TLS] [T2TRG] ITDA - IoT Device Authentication

2019-02-18 Thread Sankalp Bagaria
Hi, Thank you for your insight. It will help me give direction to my work. I need to do my homework better. Will look from public/private pair angle instead of challenge/response. Looking forward to similar guidance in future also, Thanks and Regards, Sankalp Bagaria. On Mon 18 Feb, 2019, 10:44

Re: [TLS] [T2TRG] ITDA - IoT Device Authentication

2019-02-18 Thread Sankalp Bagaria
Hi, My apologies if I appeared a little aggressive in pursuing my incorrect idea. I have to learn a lot. Looking forward to your guidance in future also, Thanks and Regards, Sankalp Bagaria. On Mon 18 Feb, 2019, 1:51 PM Eliot Lear, wrote: > Just to add- this is what the plethora of BRSKI draft

Re: [TLS] ITDA - IoT Device Authentication

2019-02-18 Thread Salz, Rich
* Replay attack is avoided by using a challenge/ response pair only once. 2^32 combinations possible for 32 byte challenge. How is that enforced? * Server is authenticated by its certificate. An attacker will not be able to do so. Did I miss where you explained this? _