On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 07:25:38PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> >> As it is, there are a number of servers which desperately require
> >> the presence of TLS extension SNI, or will fail TLS handshakes either
> >> by choking and dropping connections (Microsoft IIS 8.5+) or by
> >> v
>Nope, I've raised this *EVERY* time on the list when the dead horse was
newly beaten.
And you were in the minority, the WG consensus has clearly been to work on
this, despite your objections.
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This is yet another reminder to submit agenda topics for IETF 103.
spt
> On Oct 10, 2018, at 18:09, Sean Turner wrote:
>
> This is a reminder to submit agenda topics for IETF 103. We currently have
> two slots scheduled [0] so if you are requesting time please have a look at
> the agenda and
On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 02:48:47PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 7:40 AM Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
>
> > On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 06:18:27AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > > I'm responding to Ben here, because I think it's worth adding some
> > clarity.
> > > However, I want t
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.
Title : Exported Authenticators in TLS
Author : Nick Sullivan
Filename: draft-ietf-tls-expo
I've posted draft 08 of Exported Authenticators. It contains a few minor
changes:
- an updated reference to RFC 8443
- an updated IANA considerations section
- a text change to require CRCs to be unique within a connection (requested
at IETF 102 by Jonathan Hoyland)
- minor text fixes
At this poin
Thanks Nick. We'’ll have a quick look and assuming (as I am) that everything
looks good we’ll get the WGLC started. If anything comes up we can address it
at one of our sessions in Bangkok.
spt
> On Oct 18, 2018, at 17:55, Nick Sullivan
> wrote:
>
> I've posted draft 08 of Exported Authenti
The following errata report has been submitted for RFC5246,
"The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2".
--
You may review the report below and at:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5535
--
Type: Technical
Rep
An artifact of the times more than an error methinks? The document
does also say: "Currently, DSA [DSS] may only be used with SHA-1." in
the context of talking about use of different hash algorithms for DSA.
Good thing that we obsoleted that RFC and removed DSA, now we don't
have to worry about i
