On Thu, Jul 26, 2018 at 10:58:05AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> Here’s a specific construction, but we’re flexible about the details:
>
>struct {
>opaque base_identity<1...2^16-1>;
>HashAlgorithm hash;
>} imported_psk_identity;
>
>UPSKx = HKDF-Extract(0, UPSK) // UP
On Thu, 2018-07-26 at 10:58 -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> Ben,
>
> Thanks for focusing on this issue.
>
> Chris and I have been discussing an alternative design which we think
> is more consistent with the existing structure, which we call PSK
> Importers. As with your design, we have an input u
On Thu, 2018-07-26 at 15:05 -0700, Christopher Wood wrote:
> The sense of the TLS@IETF102 room was that the WG should adopt
> draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk as a WG item. This email
> is to confirm this sense on list. If you would like for this draft to
> become a WG document and you
On Mon, 2018-04-23 at 15:30 -0400, Russ Housley wrote:
> >
> > In the presentation the main driver for it seems to be quantum
> > computer
> > resistance as temporary measure. If that's the main argument I
> > don't
> > think it is really significant. PSK can hardly be used with PKI,
> > and as
>
On Fri, Jul 27, 2018 at 12:18 AM, Ilari Liusvaara
wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 26, 2018 at 10:58:05AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>
> > Here’s a specific construction, but we’re flexible about the details:
> >
> >struct {
> >opaque base_identity<1...2^16-1>;
> >HashAlgorithm hash;
> >
On Fri, Jul 27, 2018 at 05:00:52AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 27, 2018 at 12:18 AM, Ilari Liusvaara
> wrote:
>
> > On Thu, Jul 26, 2018 at 10:58:05AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> >
> > > Here’s a specific construction, but we’re flexible about the details:
> > >
> > >struct {
> As with Universal PSKs (UPSKs), each input key is a triplet of
> (BaseIdentity, BaseKey, KDF), where a BaseIdentity is a PSK identity
> as used today. To use a UPSK, an implementation takes the set of KDF
> hashes it knows about H_i and derives a set of PSKs
To be clear, you’re suggesting that
On Fri, Jul 27, 2018 at 6:43 AM, Karthikeyan Bhargavan <
karthik.bharga...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> As with Universal PSKs (UPSKs), each input key is a triplet of
> (BaseIdentity, BaseKey, KDF), where a BaseIdentity is a PSK identity
> as used today. To use a UPSK, an implementation takes the set of
A couple of comments on draft-ietf-tls-tls13-vectors-06:
Ordering of messages:
* Whenever the steps '{server} derive secret "tls13 c hs traffic":' and
'{server} derive secret "tls13 s hs traffic":' appear, this is corresponding
to the steps in the second phase of the key schedule (section
> On Jul 27, 2018, at 5:23 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote:
>
> On Mon, 2018-04-23 at 15:30 -0400, Russ Housley wrote:
>>>
>>> In the presentation the main driver for it seems to be quantum
>>> computer
>>> resistance as temporary measure. If that's the main argument I
>>> don't
>>> think i
Dear TLS WG members.
I am doing my final copy-edits for the TLS 1.3 RFC and I noted one
technical point and two points I would like to edit for clarity but I
wanted more eyes on.
1. https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28#section-4.1.2
If the client is attempting a PSK key
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