On Thursday, 15 March 2018 22:51:49 CET Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 12:25:38PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > On Wednesday, 14 March 2018 21:13:29 CET Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > > On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 12:46:25PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > > > On Wednesday, 14 March 2018 03
Reviewer: Stefan Santesson
Review result: Ready
The document handles IANA registration of identifiers.
Aspects and properties identified by these identifiers are relevant for
security, but for the most part that is outside the scope of this document that
deals only with registration.
The provided
On 3/15/2018 5:51 PM, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 12:25:38PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote:
> ...
>> we do not have a reliable mechanism of differentiating between external and
>> resumption PSKs while parsing Client Hello
> Well, a valid external PSK (identity) the server will o
During Adam Roach’s AD review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13, he noted something about
the HashAlgorithm and that made me go look at what was said in
draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates. Turns out that 4492bis assigned some
values draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates was marking as reserved. I have
Hi all,
We have recently submitted an updated version of the draft based on
comments at IETF100.
Also, a proof-of-concept implementation for DTLS 1.2 in
Californium/Scandium is available at [1].
Best,
/Marco
[1] https://bitbucket.org/sicssec/dos_dtls
Forwarded Message
Subjec
What is reasonable behaviour for a client to do with any tickets it has
previously received following a key update or a post-handshake
authentication? Should those old tickets be now considered out-of-date
and not used?
Matt
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On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 4:19 PM, Matt Caswell wrote:
> What is reasonable behaviour for a client to do with any tickets it has
> previously received following a key update or a post-handshake
> authentication? Should those old tickets be now considered out-of-date
> and not used?
>
There is no g
On Friday, 16 March 2018 17:19:49 CET Matt Caswell wrote:
> What is reasonable behaviour for a client to do with any tickets it has
> previously received following a key update or a post-handshake
> authentication? Should those old tickets be now considered out-of-date
> and not used?
as far as I
That's only because there is some chance that the ticket binds in more
contextual information. In practice, this might also happen as a
result of application-layer changes. At the TLS layer, it's hard to
know exactly why the new ticket was issued. If it was just adding
another ticket to the pile
On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 09:11:32AM -0400, Christian Huitema wrote:
>
>
> On 3/15/2018 5:51 PM, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 12:25:38PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote:
> > ...
> >> we do not have a reliable mechanism of differentiating between external
> >> and
> >> resumption PS
On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 02:01:48PM +, Sean Turner wrote:
> During Adam Roach’s AD review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13, he noted something
> about the HashAlgorithm and that made me go look at what was said in
> draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates. Turns out that 4492bis assigned some
> values d
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